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ABSTRACT 
 
The Institutional Consequences of Congressional Polarization. (December 2009) 
Nathan Arthur Ilderton, B.A., Clemson University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Jon Bond 
 
   Polarization, defined as the ideological distance between the Democrat and 
Republican parties in Congress, has increased dramatically in Congress since the 1970s.  
Research on polarization in the U.S. Congress primarily focuses on the sources of this 
increase.  Relatively little work has been done on the consequences of polarization for 
Congress’ relationship with the president and the passage of legislation.  This 
dissertation corrects this omission by examining the influence of polarization on several 
key aspects of the legislative process.  It examines the impact of polarization on the 
interaction between Congress and the president, including the president’s strategy in 
supporting or opposing legislation and the success the president has on bills when he 
takes a position.  It also examines the effect polarization has on the overall passage of 
legislation.   An empirical examination was undertaken using significant bills in 
Congress over a sixty year time period (1947-2006). 
The results indicate that the effects of polarization on the legislative process are 
contingent upon the presence of divided government, defined as times when the 
president and a majority of members of Congress are from different parties, and the 
chamber of Congress under examination.  As polarization increases, the president is 
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more likely to support legislation and be successful when his party controls Congress, 
but he opposes more legislation and is less successful as polarization increases under 
divided government.  Legislative gridlock, the inability of Congress to pass important or 
innovative legislation, tends to decrease in both the House and Senate as polarization 
increases under unified government.  However, as polarization increases under divided 
government the overall passage of bills into law decreases.   
The dissertation also offers an improved method for modeling the impact of 
divided government on gridlock.  Prior studies model divided government without 
regard for whether the president takes a position on a given bill.  This study shows that 
when the president takes a position on a bill under divided government the probability it 
passes decreases, but the probability of passage increases when the president does not 
take a position.  This finding implies that previous research may underestimate the true 
effects of divided government on gridlock.   
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: ANALYZING POLARIZATION IN CONGRESS 
 
 Political science has long been critical of the functioning of political parties in 
the American system of government.  Nearly half a century ago the American Political 
Science Association issued a report that called on parties to accentuate their differences 
and to offer distinct choices for the electorate (APSA 1950).  Today, the polarized 
parties are blamed for the gridlock in Washington that prevents the passage of innovative 
and important legislation (Binder 2003), leading political scientists to the opposite 
extreme, pining for the times when bipartisanship reigned supreme in Washington and 
problems like social inequality could be addressed (Rosenthal 2004).  Political 
practitioners outside of academia issue position papers against partisanship and lament 
its affects on governance (Hamilton 2008). 
 The electoral sources of partisan polarization have been scrutinized to the point 
that such studies make for a “cottage industry both among political scientists and 
pundits,” according to McCarty (2007, 223).  The consequences of polarization, 
especially for the elected branches of government, are less well understood.  There is a 
great deal of anecdotal evidence: speeches seem nastier, legislation takes longer to pass 
or does not pass at all, etc.  Though such observations are sufficient evidence for 
polemics and position papers, they do not and cannot satisfy the social scientist. 
 This study will examine the effects of party polarization with an emphasis on its 
effects on the functioning of Congress.  It tests if and how the recent resurgence in
______________  
This dissertation follows the style of American Political Science Review. 
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polarization has changed the way Congress passes legislation and how it works with the 
president.  The first order of business is to discuss the existing research on congressional 
polarization and outline the puzzle it has left.   
Party Polarization Literature 
 Since the 1970s, political scientists have observed an increase in the partisanship 
of and hostility between the major political parties in Congress.  The trend has been 
measured in multiple ways, including documenting the disappearance of moderates 
(Fleisher and Bond 2004), measuring the distance between party medians using a roll 
call vote measures such as Poole and Rosenthal’s (1997) NOMINATE scores, or a 
combination of the two (Binder 2003).  The latter two measures are illustrated in Figures 
1-1 and 1-2.  The Poole and Rosenthal measure is simply the distance between the 
median member of the Democrat and Republican caucuses in the House and the Senate.  
Binder’s measure combines the measure of ideological distance and a count of the 
number of moderates within a chamber.  These were averaged together to create a 
Congressional index of moderation or the opposite of polarization.  Regardless of 
methodology, the increase in partisanship is evident. 
 This trend led congressional scholars to research and model the sources of 
polarization.  This research has found two interrelated sources of congressional 
polarization.  Most scholars agree that the ultimate cause of congressional polarization is 
electoral, that changes in the electorate filtered into Congress.  The electoral changes 
eventually caused changes in the institution of Congress, which act as a secondary 
source of polarization, reinforcing the partisanship derived from the electorate.  The two 
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categories of polarization models often overlap, but individual works tend to emphasize 
one source over the other.  
  
Figure 1.1 
NOMINATE Measure of Polarization 
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
80 85 90 95 100 105 110
Congress
House Senate
 
Source: Poole and Rosenthal (1997) 
 
 
Models focusing on changes in the electorate either emphasize a particular trend 
(usually the realignment of the South) or divisions over certain issues.  The southern 
realignment hypothesis emphasizes the replacement of conservative Democrats, in the 
South with Republicans (Rohde 1991, Taylor 1996, Fleisher and Bond 2004) and new 
found success by liberal Democrats in the North (Brewer, Mariani, and Stonecash 2002).  
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As conservative Republicans in the South replaced conservative Democrats the caucuses 
of both parties became more ideologically homogenous.  As the caucuses became more 
homogenous, they became more different from one another creating a larger ideological 
distance between the two. 
 
Figure 1.2 
Binder’s Measure of Moderation 
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Source: Binder (2003) 
 
 
Several studies concluded that certain issues divided the electorate in recent 
decades and led to polarization in Congress.  Some scholars posit cleavages created by 
issues such as macroeconomic issues (Coleman 1997), income inequality and 
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immigration (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006), and race (Carmines and Stimson 
1989) are the source of the increase in polarization.  As the public became divided on 
these issues, the parties began to take opposite sides, leading to sharper ideological 
divisions.  Stonecash, Brewer, and Mariani (2003) track ideological change across issues 
and regions, creating a comprehensive view of polarization in the electorate that is not 
restricted to explaining change in one issue area or in one region (i.e. the South). 
 A second proposed source of polarization is institutional change in Congress 
itself.  This literature is closely tied to models of changes in the electorate and 
emphasizes that polarization in the electorate leads to polarization in Congress, which in 
turn allows members of Congress to make institutional changes that reinforces the 
existing polarization.  Rohde (1991), for example, finds that the increased homogeneity 
of the Democratic caucus resulting from the southern realignment enabled Democrats to 
launch institutional reforms in the 1970s that allowed for more partisan outcomes, 
particularly in the House.  Power was removed from senior and conservative committee 
chairs and given to party leaders and subcommittee chairs, which allowed for the 
passage of legislation that reflected the views of the caucus as a whole.  Cox and 
McCubbins (1993, 2005) find that as the parties become more ideologically 
homogenous, the leaders of the majority party are better able to control the agenda and 
reduce the chances of getting rolled on the floor on issues important to party members.  
These institutional advantages are enhanced as the majority party becomes more unified, 
which occurs during partisan eras. 
 6 
 Polarization resulting from both electoral and institutional sources has allowed a 
greater leeway to party leaders, particularly in the House to assert control over the 
legislative agenda (Rohde 1991, Aldrich 1995).  Party leaders have incentives to protect 
their members from casting politically difficult roll call votes.  Specifically, they seek to 
maintain their majority status and to do this they cannot put their fellow partisans in 
jeopardy (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005).  Majority party leaders, therefore, free their 
members to vote against the party on passage votes if necessary, but expect party loyalty 
to hold on procedural votes, which allow party leaders to control the agenda and debate.  
Indeed, Congress, particularly the House, is more polarized on procedural votes than on 
substantive roll calls (Theriault 2008).  
 Though much has been written about the causes of polarization, with few 
exceptions little has been said about the consequences of polarization.  Clearly, the 
consequences of polarization need more attention.  Though there has been some 
attention to the consequences of polarization, the quantity of this research pales in 
comparison to the amount of attention given to the causes of polarization.  Most of the 
work on the consequences of polarization has been in the context of the literature on 
policy gridlock, but polarization has received less attention as an explanation for 
gridlock than factors such as party control and divided government.   
 For example, Binder (2003) used the inverse of polarization, moderation, as an 
explanatory variable and found that polarization contributes to legislative gridlock.  
Rosenthal (2004) asserts that polarization exacerbates economic inequality because the 
gridlock that results from polarization defeats policies intended to address inequality.  
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McCarty (2007) casts the net a little wider and finds that polarization in conjunction with 
divided government and institutional obstacles that require supermajorities to overcome 
reduces the chances of significant legislation being passed.  The general conclusion from 
these three studies is that polarization enhances legislative gridlock. 
 However, these general conclusions ignore the potential subtleties to the process 
by which one would expect polarization to create gridlock.  Sinclair (2008) points out 
that given the known effects of the rules of the House and Senate, it can be anticipated 
that polarization’s effect on gridlock would vary across these chambers.  The House, as 
understood by the conditional party government and cartel theories (Rohde 1991, 
Aldrich 1995, Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005) should be less likely to gridlock as party 
cohesion and differences between the parties increase, i.e. an increase in legislative 
productivity should be observed in the House as polarization increases.  On the other 
hand, in the Senate, where individual members have more influence over the legislative 
process, polarization should lead to an increase in gridlock as the members of the 
minority party have more incentive to try to stop legislation sponsored by the majority. 
 The gridlock literature does not account for chamber differences in any rigorous 
way.  Most of the gridlock studies are aggregate studies that look at the rate at which 
Congress passed legislation on important issues, exemplified by Mayhew’s (1991) study 
on the effects of divided government on the passage of significant legislation.  A few 
account for the effects of policy and ideological differences between the chambers 
(Binder 1999, 2003, Jones 2001), but no study was found that breaks down the 
legislative process and examines bill passage in the House and Senate separately.  
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 Aside from its lack of attention to polarization and House and Senate differences, 
the gridlock literature appears to underestimate the importance of the president when 
modeling the effects of divided government.  By placing a variable for divided 
government in their models, researchers studying gridlock implicitly bring the president 
into the model.  It is reasonable to expect that divided government will have the greatest 
impact on bills the president supports (Congress under divided government will be more 
likely to oppose them) and on bills he opposes (the president will veto any such bills 
under divided government).  Aggregate studies of gridlock, particularly those that focus 
on divided government, generally fail to take this into account.  Binder (2003) models 
the effect of issues being mentioned by the president in the State of the Union Address 
on gridlock, but did not explicitly model presidential position taking.  Edwards, Barrett, 
and Peake (1997) model the effects of divided government on presidential position 
taking and presidential success, but did not look at how presidential position taking 
affected overall policy gridlock.   
 In sum, the literature as it currently stands contains two deficiencies.  First, the 
congressional literature as a whole and the gridlock literature specifically have yet to 
account for the consequences of party polarization.  A great deal of research has been 
conducted on the sources of polarization and on the consequences of divided 
government, but relatively little attention as been paid to the consequences of 
polarization.  Second, models of the effects of divided government do not adequately 
account for the role of the president, leaving such models underspecified.  The purpose 
 9 
of this dissertation is to correct these deficiencies and produce a better model of the 
passage of legislation.  The next section outlines the plan for how this will be done.   
Plan of the Dissertation 
 This dissertation will argue that aggregate models that fail to account for 
differences in the lawmaking process between the House and Senate, have divided 
government as the primary explanatory variable, and do not account for the position the 
president takes on legislation provide an incomplete picture of lawmaking and gridlock 
in the United States Congress.  This argument will be made in several stages.   
 Chapter II will begin this process by providing an in depth review of the gridlock 
literature and the small literature that discusses the consequences of polarization.  I will 
then discuss a theory that more fully accounts for the all of the subtleties that surround 
legislative gridlock and the effects divided government and polarization have on it.  The 
essential premise is that divided government and polarization interact, that the effects of 
polarization are in part determined by the presence or absence of divided government 
and that the impact of divided government is determined by the level of polarization.  
The chapter will conclude with a discussion of a dataset constructed to test the theory. 
 The assertion that models in the gridlock literature are underspecified by leaving 
out the position of the president is the main focus of the middle portion of the 
dissertation.  Studies of presidential influence, especially Edwards, Barrett, and Peake 
(1997), show that the president’s position taking and success in Congress is often 
contingent on the presence and absence of divided government.  If the theory that the 
effects of polarization and divided government are interactive is correct, then 
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polarization will have an influence on position taking and success as well.  These issues 
must be sorted out before presidential positioning can be added to the gridlock model.  
Chapter III will examine the effects of polarization and divided government on 
presidential position taking.  Chapter IV will look at the success the president has in 
getting Congress to support his position.  This chapter examines presidential success in 
Congress as a whole and in the House and Senate. 
 Chapter V will present the improved models of bill passage in Congress.  These 
models account for the impact of polarization, differences between the House and 
Senate, and the position of the president.  These models will show that the effects of 
polarization and divided government are interactive and vary according to the chamber 
being analyzed and the position of the President. 
 The final chapter of the dissertation concludes by summarizing the key findings 
and placing them in context with the rest of the literature.  It will also discuss avenues 
for future research.  The dissertation will conclude with some speculation on the long 
term consequences should the current upward trend of polarization continue indefinitely.       
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CHAPTER II 
A THEORY OF POLARIZATION AND CONGRESSIONAL GRIDLOCK 
 To address the flaws and oversights of the gridlock literature, a theory must be 
specified.  Such a theory must account not just for the general effects of divided 
government and polarization on legislative productivity, but also for the fact that the 
effects of both are contingent on other factors.  The theory constructed in this chapter 
holds that divided government and polarization increase gridlock overall, but the effects 
they have on the process are interactive, meaning that the effects of polarization are 
contingent on the presence of divided government and that the effects of divided 
government depend on the level of polarization.  Also, these effects vary depending on 
the chamber and the president’s position on a given piece of legislation. 
 The discussion of this theory will proceed in three steps.  It will begin with a 
review of the congressional politics research on the effects of party on roll call voting, 
the gridlock literature that focuses on divided government, and the scant literature that 
deals with the consequences of polarization for legislative productivity.  This will be 
followed with a discussion of the theory that will guide the empirical work in the 
remainder of the dissertation.  The chapter will conclude with an overview of the 
research design used to test the theory. 
Party Voting, Divided Government, and Polarization    
 The gridlock literature as it currently stands is a product of three lines of 
research.  It began with empirical research oriented towards understanding the influence 
party has over the individual roll call vote, and the studies that made the connection 
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between large seat swings between the parties and the potential for policy change.  The 
gridlock literature then sought to understand why periods of large policy change were so 
rare.  Divided government was thought to be the cause, at least for gridlock after World 
War II.  Most recently, gridlock studies have begun to examine party polarization as 
another cause of policy gridlock.   
 Political scientists have examined the influence of party on legislative output in 
two areas: the influence that party has over individual legislators on roll call votes; and 
the role of the parties in macro level changes in public policy.  On the individual level, 
the question has centered around the extent to which party influences decision making 
on roll call votes.  At least one prominent line of study holds that parties have little or no 
influence over the decision making process of individual members of Congress.  
Mayhew (1974) in his seminal work asserts that “no theoretical treatment of the United 
States Congress that posits parties as analytic units will go very far” (27).  Rational 
choice theorists, most prominently Krehbiel (1993, 1998), model congressional decision 
making as a function of individual ideal points.  In such models party is assumed to have 
no independent influence over the individual member’s decision, and any pattern a 
member may have of voting with his or her party is a product of the member’s individual 
preferences. 
 When roll call votes have been scrutinized, however, party has been shown to 
have at least some influence over the decisions of individual members of Congress.  A 
number of roll call voting studies found that party is the best single predictor of vote, 
even during an era when intra-party regional differences were also an important 
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predictor of certain roll call votes (Clausen 1973, Kingdon 1977, Weisberg 1978).  As 
issues become more contentious, party becomes a better predictor of roll call votes. 
 Recent studies test the limits of party influence over roll call votes.  Most find at 
least some evidence of party influence on roll call votes.  Ansolabehere, Snyder, and 
Stewart (2001) compare roll call behavior to the preferences of House members revealed 
by surveys across three Congresses and find that both party and individual preferences 
influence roll call decisions.  However, party exerted an influence independent of 
preferences in 40 percent of the roll calls and generally occurred on procedural votes, 
close votes and on issues of importance to the parties.  Other studies, using longer 
periods of time, find that party has an influence over roll call voting over time (Hager 
and Talbert 2000; Cox and Poole 2002; Lawrence, Maltzman, and Smith 2006).     
 Like the individual roll call voting decision, policy change at the national level in 
American politics is often correlated with changes in party politics both in political 
institutions and in the electorate.  Brady (1978, 1988), for example, shows that major 
changes in public policy occur after realigning elections that change the partisan balance 
in the electorate and in policy making institutions.  Research also shows that the 
potential for changes in policy across Congresses over time is contingent not only on the 
raw number of seats won by the respective parties, but also on the cohesiveness of 
majorities (Hurley, Brady, and Cooper 1977, Hurley 1979).  Thus, conditions necessary 
for large scale changes in public policy are rare. 
 The literature on legislative gridlock began as an effort to understand why 
periods conducive to significant legislative change such as the New Deal or Great 
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Society are relatively rare.  A certain amount of gridlock is built into the constitutional 
system itself.  Some political scientists go so far as to claim that the Founders, in 
particular James Madison, “designed a system for deadlock and inaction” (Burns 1963, 
6).  In other words, the Founders intentionally created a system that would naturally 
gridlock.  However, the constitutional system is also a delicate balance between creating 
a working government and protecting the public from tyrannical majorities (Jones 1995).  
Even institutional features intended to divide power (e.g. bicameralism) were intended to 
slow down excesses rather than create general gridlock (Lee and Oppenheimer 1999, 27-
9).  Gridlock is no longer assumed to be “a desirable and untouchable gift of the 
Founding Fathers” (Binder 2003, 6). 
 When political scientists look beyond constitutional causes of gridlock the most 
frequently examined factor came to be divided government.  At least since Woodrow 
Wilson’s (1911) work in the early 20th century, the parties have been considered the 
most effective means of overcoming constitutional barriers such as the separation of 
powers in order to produce major change in public policy (Rossiter 1960, Truman 1971).  
Thus the regular occurrence of divided government after World War II was an alarming 
development (Sundquist 1988), at least for those who desired frequent innovations in 
public policy.  The need emerged for new theories of government policymaking when 
the separate institutions were controlled by different parties.     
 This research began in earnest with Mayhew’s (1991) study of the passage of 
important legislation in the post World War II era.  Though political scientists had 
examined the importance of divided government prior to Mayhew’s work (see for 
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example Key 1964, Ripley 1969), Mayhew’s finding that divided government had no 
effect on the passage of legislation triggered a flurry of research that reexamined 
Mayhew’s surprising finding.  This flurry became the gridlock literature as we know it 
today.   
 Most of the research subsequent to Mayhew finds that divided government has at 
least some impact on the passage of legislation, especially for significant or important 
enactments.  However, there is a great deal of variation across the various studies in the 
strength and nature of the findings.  The results appear to vary according to how various 
authors define significant legislation.  
For example, Kelly (1993) refines Mayhew’s list of significant enactments and 
finds that divided government significantly reduced the passage of such legislation.  
Mayhew (1991) formed his list of important legislation using two sweeps.  The first was 
a contemporary assessment of the importance of the legislation.  The second sweep 
utilized retrospective analysis of the impact of the legislation.  Mayhew analyzed 
legislation that appeared in one or both lists.  Kelly used only legislation that appeared in 
both lists.  Howell et al. (2000) examine all public laws for a forty year period, splitting 
them into four categories based on the significance of the law.  The results indicate that 
divided government reduces the amount of landmark enactments, increases the passage 
of trivial legislation, but has no effect on the rate of passage of legislation in the middle 
categories.  Edwards, Barrett, and Peake (1997) examine important legislation that failed 
and find that the odds of important legislation failing increases under divided 
government, but found that divided government does not affect the amount of important 
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legislation that passes.  There are several more approaches to determining a sample of 
important legislation (Thorson 1998; Binder 1999, 2003; Thorson and Nitzsche 2000), 
but all find at least some effect for divided government on the passage of legislation. 
 Close reflection on this research identifies an important weakness in the divided 
government literature regardless of the approach used to determine a sample of 
important legislation.  By definition divided government implies that partisan differences 
between the president and Congress are the source of gridlock.  Yet, few gridlock studies 
explicitly account for the president as fully as they should.  Edwards, Barrett, and Peake 
(1997) come the closest by examining the effects of divided government on the positions 
that the president takes on legislation and the impact of divided government on the 
whether or not the president wins on an issue.  Much of the remaining divided 
government literature fails to account for the president’s position on legislation.  Binder 
(2003) examines the impact of the priority the president puts on an issue in gridlock, but 
this does not account for the weakness.  There is little theoretical reason to believe that 
Congress and the president will conflict on issues on which the president has taken no 
position, yet all of the studies discussed (with the exception of Edwards, Barrett, and 
Peake) examine all important legislation regardless of presidential position.  This is a 
possible reason for the variation in the strength of the impact on divided government 
across the literature and needs to be addressed.     
 In spite of the weaknesses remaining in the divided government studies, the 
gridlock literature has recently moved towards explanations for the lack of legislative 
productivity in Congress that go beyond divided government.  Binder (1999) cites 
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bicameral differences between the House and the Senate, by which she means 
ideological differences between the chambers, as one of the causes of gridlock.  
Elsewhere, Binder (2003) suggests that partisan polarization and divided government 
work in concert to depress the legislative productivity of Congress.  Others have found 
that polarization is the primary cause of gridlock (Jones 2001, Rosenthal 2004).  Jones 
goes as far to suggest that divided government has no effect once polarization and seat 
division is taken into account.  McCarty (2007) finds that institutional features such as 
holds and filibusters in the Senate enable polarization to create gridlock. 
 Several studies like McCarty’s posit that characteristics unique to the Senate 
enable polarization to increase gridlock.  The logic of the theory is that as polarization 
increases, the minority party in the Senate will be more willing to use the filibuster to 
stop legislation sponsored by the majority.  This line of reasoning leads to two 
conclusions.  First, increased polarization will lead to an increase in gridlock unless the 
majority party attains enough seats to overcome filibusters via cloture (Jones 2001).  
Second, if gridlock is increasing in a polarized Congress, the most likely place where it 
occurs should be the Senate, the chamber whose rules allow for the party minority to 
block legislation (Sinclair 2008). 
 Furthermore, much of the gridlock literature ignores these subtleties in the 
process.  These studies make, either explicitly or implicitly, the seemingly reasonable 
assumptions that (1) any increase in gridlock in the Senate will appear as gridlock in 
Congress as a whole given that it takes only one veto point (in this case the Senate) to 
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kill legislation, and (2) for most if not all the era normally studied, the majority party in 
the Senate failed to attain a filibuster proof majority.1 
 The most common approach in the gridlock literature is to collect information on 
issues that needed to be addressed by Congress during a particular session or Congress 
and see whether or not Congress passed legislation to address the issue (Binder 1999, 
2003; Jones 2001).  Studies of legislative gridlock commonly assume that if Congress as 
a whole did not pass legislation on a topic it ended in gridlock.  Binder’s models in 
particular take an aggregate approach to modeling the legislative process, meaning they 
look at the effects of divided government and polarization on the amount of legislation 
that is passed in a given Congress. 
 Aggregate models of gridlock, however, miss two theoretically important 
characteristics of polarization.  First, the aggregate approach misses the differences in 
effects that polarization should have in the House and Senate.  Binder (1999, 2003) 
accounts for the ideological differences between the chambers in her aggregate model, 
but does not account for how different chamber rules might cause polarization to have 
different effects in the House and Senate.  Jones (2001) does a better job of accounting 
for differences by including measures of both House and Senate polarization in his 
models. Binder accounts for polarization by averaging the House and Senate scores of 
                                                 
1
 The gridlock literature reviewed here does not contain a study that traces gridlock prior to the 80th 
Congress (1947-49).  Prior to 1975, cloture required 67 votes to end a filibuster.  Democrats held this 
number of seats in the 88th (1963-65) and 89th (1965-67) Senates, well prior to the observed increase in 
polarization.  After 1975, when the cloture requirement was reduced to 60 votes, the Democrats held 
enough seats to invoke cloture in the 94th (1975-77) and 95th (1977-79) Senates, which would be on the 
leading edge of the upward trend in polarization (Davidson, Oleszek, and Lee 2008). 
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her measure of moderation  Nonetheless, both Binder and Jones still model an aggregate 
process.   
Sinclair (2008) suggests that the effects of polarization in the House and Senate 
are the opposite of one another.  In the House, polarization would be expected to 
increase the amount of legislation that passes, while polarization in Senate causes a 
decrease in the passage of legislation.  The divergent effects of polarization in House and 
Senate are the result of differences in rules that governing lawmaking in each chamber.  
These rules make lawmaking in the respective chambers two very different processes 
(Sinclair 2000).  This insight shows that the effects of polarization on legislative 
productivity in the House and Senate should be modeled separately. 
 Second, the aggregate models of gridlock miss the interactive effect between 
divided government and polarization.  Increased party unity is a characteristic of 
gridlock.  Increased party unity in the Senate is likely to produce more gridlock because 
the ability of party leaders to build coalitions large enough to overcome filibusters is 
attenuated (McCarty 2007; Sinclair 2008).  Divided government creates gridlock due to 
partisan differences between Congress and the president.  Thus, the interaction of 
polarization and divided government compounds the problem as the majority parties in 
both chambers will refuse to pass the president’s program and the minority party in the 
Senate will filibuster the majority party’s agenda.  Though Binder (2003) includes both a 
polarization and a divided government variable in her gridlock models, she does not 
account for the interactive affect between the two.  Indeed, no research could be found 
that directly addresses the interaction between divided government and polarization. 
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 Though the gridlock literature has taught us much about the legislative process, it 
contains several flaws.  The divided government literature sometimes looks for conflict 
between Congress and the president where none should exist.  The effects of polarization 
and the combined effects of polarization and divided government have not been fully 
explored.  The next section will specify a theory that will guide the empirical 
investigations in subsequent chapters that will fill these gaps.  
A Theory of the Effects of Polarization on the Legislative Process 
 To understand gridlock properly, models of the legislative process must be 
correctly specified.  As discussed above, the gridlock literature as it currently stands falls 
short on three counts.  Studies that examine divided government do not properly account 
for the role of the president even though the president is implicitly included in the 
standard gridlock model in the form of a dummy variable for divided government.  
Gridlock models that examine polarization fail to account for the different effects 
polarization has in the House and the Senate.  The gridlock literature also fails to 
account for the interactive effects of divided government and polarization.  This section 
will outline a theory that will guide the construction and testing of a series of models that 
account for both shortcomings. 
 As recounted above, with few exceptions the gridlock literature fails to account 
for the president’s role in divided government.  By including a variable for divided 
government, scholars are stating implicitly that party differences between the president 
and Congress causes legislation to fail at some point in the process.  However, in 
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modeling legislative change in the aggregate, most studies lump together legislation the 
president takes a position on and legislation on which he takes no position.   
 There is no theoretical reason to believe that divided government affects 
legislation on which the president takes no position.  The theory behind divided 
government is that party differences between Congress and the president lead to a 
reduction in the probability of significant legislation being enacted into law (Ripley 
1969; Coleman 1999; Howell et al. 2000), but there is no greater incentive for Congress 
or the president to stop legislation on which the president takes no position.  Congress 
gains nothing in a partisan battle with the president by stopping legislation when the 
president has no stake in its passage.  Likewise the president has no added incentive 
under divided government to veto legislation when he is neutral regarding the merits of 
its enactment.   
 In contrast, Edwards, Barrett, and Peake (1997) have shown that divided 
government affects the patterns by which the president takes positions on legislation and 
the overall passage of legislation.  There is reason to believe that divided government 
increases the failure of legislation—legislation the president supports will be blocked or 
killed by a hostile Congress, and legislation the president opposes is likely to fail 
because he can kill it with a veto if the threat of a veto does not deter a hostile Congress 
from passing it.  Any apparent effects that divided government may have on legislation 
with no presidential position may be due to the effects of party polarization, a factor for 
which Edwards, Barrett, and Peake fail to account. 
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 It is, therefore, necessary to model the passage of legislation on which the 
president takes no position, legislation he opposes, and legislation he supports as 
separate processes.  Divided government should have no impact on the probability that 
legislation on which the president does not take a position becomes public law.  Partisan 
differences between the branches should not impact the passage of legislation on which 
the president for all intent and purposes is neutral.  On the other hand, divided 
government should reduce the probability of passage for legislation that the president 
takes any position on.  Under divided government, Congress has increased incentives to 
kill legislation the president supports.  At the same time, the president has the option to 
veto any legislation that he opposes that the opposition Congress sends to his desk. 
 The gridlock literature as a whole and Sinclair (2006, 2008) imply that the effect 
of polarization will vary according to how and at what point in the legislative process 
legislative productivity is modeled.  The gridlock literature provides a solid foundation 
for examining legislative productivity in Congress as a whole.  Several gridlock studies 
investigate the passage of legislation through both chambers and to the desk of the 
president (Jones 2001; Binder 2003; Rosenthal 2004; and McCarty 2007).  All agree that 
polarization affects the overall productivity of Congress, at least on significant 
legislation, and that the affect is negative.   
 Yet a shortcoming of the gridlock literature is that it does not adequately account 
for the effects of institutional differences between the chambers.  Binder (1999, 2003) 
does posit that differences in the distribution of policy preferences between the chambers 
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contribute to gridlock.  However, Sinclair (2006, 2008) brings into sharper focus the way 
polarization interacts with the institutional structures that vary between the chambers. 
 The conditional party government and party cartel theories (see Rohde 1991; Cox 
and McCubbins 1993, 2005; and Aldrich and Rohde 2000) hold that in the House, 
leaders gain more leeway to exercise agenda control as the majority party caucus 
becomes more homogenous.  Under these circumstances, majority party leaders will be 
more effective in bringing to the floor legislation that a majority of their members favor.  
The minority party has little recourse to stop legislation in the face of a unified majority.  
Polarized parties are more unified than non polarized parties.  Therefore, polarization 
would not necessarily act as an agent for gridlock in the House.  
 Senate rules, in contrast, invest individual Senators with great power over 
legislation.  The non-majoritarian features that McCarty (2007) cites as allowing 
polarization to interfere in the passage of legislation are located in the Senate.  One 
Senator can place a hold on legislation, often to gain concessions on unrelated matters.  
The oft cited filibuster requires a coalition of only forty-one Senators (a threshold easily 
attained by most partisan minorities) to slow down and possibly stop legislation.  The 
more cohesive minority party under polarization will be more likely to defeat cloture 
votes, leading to increased gridlock.  In sum, the institutional features of the Senate 
require broad legislative coalitions for bill passage.  Polarization makes it less likely 
these coalitions will assemble.   
        The rule structures of the two chambers lead to the theory that gridlock caused 
by polarization will be located primarily in the Senate.  The overall lack of legislative 
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productivity observed by the gridlock literature is likely the result of gridlock in the 
Senate.  At the same time polarization will lead to increasingly cohesive majority parties 
in the House, which allows leaders of the majority party the leeway to use House rules to 
pass the party’s program. 
 The final consideration concerns the interactive effects of polarization and 
divided government.  Polarization and divided government are reinforcing mechanisms, 
so it is to be expected that that gridlock would be higher when both factors are present 
instead of just one.  Prior to the recent resurgence of polarization in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, the parties in Congress contained more moderate and cross-pressured 
members (Fleisher and Bond 2004).2  From the 1930s through the early 1970s, the 
parties were less ideologically cohesive and party voting was low compared to prior and 
subsequent periods (Brady, Cooper, and Hurley 1979; Collie and Brady 1985; Hager and 
Talbert 2000; Cox and Poole 2002; Roberts and Smith 2003).  Though divided 
government was an obstacle, bipartisan coalitions provided a means around it.  However, 
since the parties began becoming more ideologically homogenous and polarized, there is 
now a decreased potential for bipartisan coalitions to form.  This makes divided 
government a more difficult obstacle to overcome.   
 In the aggregate, high polarization under divided government will decrease the 
probability that legislation will become public law.  However, the interactive effects of 
divided government will also vary according to chamber and presidential position.  In 
the House, high polarization under divided government should lead to an increase in the 
                                                 
2
 Fleisher and Bond define cross-pressured members as members “who have policy preferences outside the 
ideological mainstream of their party” (430).  
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passage of legislation which the president opposes, as the majority party uses the 
chamber rules to pass its agenda.  The same circumstances will lead to a decrease in the 
passage of legislation supported by the president.  It is likely that the majority party 
would not even let such legislation reach the floor for a vote.  Since divided government 
should not matter on legislation on which the president takes no position, high 
polarization will increase the passage of this legislation regardless of the presence of 
divided government. 
 In contrast, the Senate under divided government in an atmosphere of high party 
polarization will yield a decrease in legislative output regardless of the president’s 
position.  The majority party will block legislation the president favors, and the minority 
party would be expected to filibuster any legislation the president opposes.  For bills on 
which the president has not taken a position, the parties will stop any legislation except a 
bill that attracts the support of at least 60 senators.  That level of support would be 
unusual for important legislation in a polarized environment.       
Methods and Data 
 With a theory that accounts for the key shortcomings of the gridlock literature, 
the next task is to select a research design to test the theory.  The final section of this 
chapter is devoted to a discussion of the methodological approach the next three chapters 
will take, the dataset constructed to test the theory, and measures of the key concepts 
used throughout the study. 
 The most important design decision for this study is the level of aggregation.  
Gridlock can be modeled in two ways and research in the gridlock literature utilizes both 
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methods.  On the one hand, gridlock can be thought of in terms of the overall 
productivity of a Congress or series of Congresses.  Studies with this view of gridlock 
examine the overall rate of passage or the number of “significant” laws passed in a given 
Congress (Mayhew 1991; Kelly 1993; Binder 1999, 2003; Coleman 1999; Howell et al. 
2000).  This type of research tends to utilize time series methodologies when estimating 
their models. 
  On the other hand, gridlock can also be examined in terms of the probability 
individual pieces of legislation will be passed.  In such studies the unit of analysis is 
individual bills rather than the productivity of a Congress.  Studies using this approach 
estimate models using a nonlinear probability model such as the logit or probit (Thorson 
1998; Jones 2001).   
 This study will use the latter method.  There are several reasons for this decision.  
On a practical level, aggregating data into a count or passage rate by Congress greatly 
reduces the number of observations in the model.  The number of observations is low 
enough to make it difficult to correct for estimation problems such as autocorrelation and 
non-stationary variables inherent to time series modeling.  But more importantly, from a 
theoretical perspective, it makes little sense to discuss concepts such as presidential 
positions on a bill, or the passage of bills in the House or Senate, in terms of aggregate 
percentages by Congress.  Every bill is different and proceeds through the legislative 
process differently.  Indeed, Sinclair (2000) shows that Congress increasingly uses 
innovative, procedures to get around procedural roadblocks in order to pass major 
legislation.  Any aggregation involves a loss of information. Because the theory of this 
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study calls for the examination of subtleties in the legislative process, the use of bills as a 
unit of analysis makes more theoretical sense.   
 Therefore, all the models presented in subsequent chapters use maximum 
likelihood techniques to estimate nonlinear probability models.  The model of 
presidential position taking in Chapter III has a dependent variable with three 
categories—president opposes, takes no position, or supports a bill—and uses a 
multinomial logit model.  All other models in the study have dichotomous dependent 
variables and use probit to estimate coefficients.  Using probit is essentially a random 
choice as there is virtually no difference in results between the logit and probit models 
(Long 1997).     
 After specifying the unit of analysis and the method for analyzing it, the next step 
is to collect the data.  Divided government and gridlock studies inevitably narrow the 
scope of the legislation they examine.  For example, Rosenthal (2004) tested his theory 
using bills pertaining to social policy.  The more common approach is to select 
legislation across issues with potential to significantly change public policy.  Mayhew 
(1991) constructed a dataset of significant enactments in a two stage process utilizing 
both contemporary and retrospective judgments of the enactments impact on public 
policy.  Edwards, Barrett, and Peake (1997) later added proposals that would have been 
significant, but failed to pass.  Binder (2003) used New York Times editorials to 
reconstruct significant legislative agendas throughout the period of her study.   
 A common theme when narrowing the universe of bills for a gridlock study is the 
notion that some legislation is more significant than others.  For Mayhew (1991), this 
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meant legislation that is “both innovative and consequential” (37) should be considered 
important.  Though methods for determining which pieces of legislation are innovative 
and consequential varies across the gridlock literature (see Coleman 1999 for a 
discussion of these variations), there is wide agreement that some standard of importance 
should be used to narrow the scope of legislation being studied in gridlock models (for 
an exception see Howell et al. 2000).   
 Though I agree that a study of legislative productivity should include innovative 
and consequential legislation, there is also a need to analyze the more ordinary politics 
within a given Congress.  The passage of legislation that is not necessarily important by 
Mayhew’s standard can still be affected by divided government and party polarization.  
Though I do not advocate examining all pieces of legislation, an effort should be made 
to extend the examination of gridlock to the level of more routine politics rather than just 
legislation that changes the course of public policy over the near and long term.       
 To that end, I constructed a dataset consisting of a sample of bills from the 80th 
through the 109th Congress (1947-2006).  I sought out proposals that had the attention of 
key political actors regardless of whether or not these proposals significantly changed 
the direction of public policy over the near or long term.  To construct a dataset that 
fulfilled this requirement, the Congressional Quarterly Almanac (Congressional 
Quarterly no date) was consulted.  The Congressional Quarterly Almanac is a 
publication that summarizes the activities of the Congress on a yearly basis.  For each 
year, Congressional Quarterly constructs several roll call vote studies.  These roll call 
studies include key votes, which the editors select as the most important roll calls of the 
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session.  The dataset for this study was constructed using the bills from the yearly key 
votes studies. 
 The bills chosen from the Congressional Quarterly Almanac were supplemented 
by Mayhew’s list of important enactments (1991 extended by Mayhew) and Edwards, 
Barrett, and Peake’s list of significant failed legislation (1997 extended by Edwards).  
Treaties and constitutional amendments were dropped because of the special legislative 
procedures associated with them. 
 Also dropped from the dataset are bills that commonly pass.  Because these bills 
pass almost all the time, leaving them in the dataset may skew the results of the analyses 
in subsequent chapters.  Two types of commonly passed bills were dropped.  First, 
budget bills, even though their content may be controversial, tend to pass more often 
than other bills (Schick 2007).  Budget bills include authorization bills, appropriations 
bills, budget resolutions, and reconciliations (Fisher 1979; Davidson, Oleszek, and Lee 
2008).  There were 230 budget bills dropped from the dataset, of those 195 passed (84.8 
percent).       
 The second type of bill dropped from the analysis is omnibus legislation.  
Omnibus bills address multiple policy areas at once and are often used to ease the 
passage of controversial measures by attaching them to non-controversial ones.  
Evidence from prior research indicates that omnibus bills almost always pass (Krutz 
2001).  Omnibus bills in the dataset were identified and removed based on a list 
compiled by Krutz (1999) that includes omnibus legislation through the 103rd Congress.  
I extended the list through the 109th Congress, but was unable to exactly duplicate 
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Krutz’s technique.  It is probable that several bills that should have been dropped were 
not.  One hundred and ninety one bills in the dataset come from Congresses subsequent 
to the 103rd Congress and many of the omnibus bills within this subset were identified.  
Any error resulting from this limitation is likely to be small and is unlikely to affect the 
analyses in subsequent chapters.  I identified 125 omnibus bills in the data set, of those 
95 passed (78.4 percent).3 
 At the end of the process the dataset consisted of 1154 bills from 30 Congresses 
or about 38 bills per Congress.  Of these bills 886 were also on the combined lists of 
Mayhew and Edwards, Barrett, and Peake.  Information on each bill was gleaned from 
the Congressional Quarterly Almanac (Congressional Quarterly, no date) and Adler and 
Wilkerson’s (no date) Congressional Bills Project.  A list of all the bills in the dataset 
can be found in Appendix A.   
 The nature of the data presents some potential methodological problems.  Using 
bills as the unit of analysis across multiple Congresses creates a pooled time series.  The 
pooled time series created here is atypical because the pool is unbalanced.  This means 
that the typical method for accounting for the estimation errors associated with a pooled 
time series can not be applied. 
 In a typical pooled time series analysis (also called a cross sectional time series 
analysis) the data consists of observations of the same units across multiple time periods 
(Stimson 1985).  For example, a typical study of this type could consist of comparing the 
unemployment rate of several European countries.  In this scenario the researcher would 
                                                 
3
 Fifty-one bills were classified as both omnibus and budget bills, meaning a total of 304 bills were 
dropped due to common passage. 
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have to account for correlation in the error terms for the same unit across time and 
correlations in the errors between units.  In my hypothetical study, the researcher would 
have to account for correlation between observations for Italy at time t and time t+1, and 
for correlation between observations for Italy and Austria at time t.  In a balanced pool, 
both types of correlation can be accounted for with techniques such as estimating panel 
corrected standard errors (Beck and Katz 1995).    
 The pool for this study is clearly different from the pooled time series that cause 
the problems described above.  The data is stacked with individual bills by Congress, but 
some Congresses have more bills than others.  The number of important bills observed in 
a given Congress range from 24 in the 83rd (1953-4) to 68 in the 94th (1975-6).  Further 
the bills are not repeated observations of the same unit.  Though there are some instances 
where a bill covering the same topic appears in multiple Congresses, it is difficult if not 
impossible to draw exact parallels between bills in different Congress in the same way 
one would draw parallels between repeated observations of unemployment in the same 
country.  The nature of the dataset gives little cause for concern about correlation 
between observations across Congresses. 
 The second problem, the correlation of residuals for observations in the same 
time period, is likely present in this dataset.  It is possible that certain circumstances 
within an individual Congress affect all the bills within that Congress, but not bills from 
other Congresses.  To account for the correlation of residuals for observations within 
each Congress, robust standard errors clustered by Congress are estimated and used for 
the testing of all hypotheses in this study.  Clustered standard errors transform the 
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variance-covariance matrix to account for relationships between errors within clusters, 
while maintaining independence between clusters (Huber 1967).  Clustering the standard 
errors by Congress accounts for any effects specific to individual Congresses not 
accounted for by the independent variables in the model.  This is the optimal solution 
given that the uneven nature of the pool precludes other solutions such as panel 
corrected standard errors. 
 There are three key independent variables that will be used in each of the 
subsequent chapters.  These are divided government, polarization and the interaction of 
the two.  Though there are several ways to measure each concept, every model in this 
study will use the measurement techniques described here.  
 Divided government has traditionally been measured as a dichotomous variable 
that takes the value of one when Congress and the presidency have been controlled by 
different parties.  In recent years a few studies have begun to measure divided 
government in a slightly different manner (Binder 1999, 2003).  Specifically, they will 
include a dummy variable for pure divided government when both chambers are 
controlled by the party opposed to the president, and a second dichotomous variable for 
quasi-divided government for Congresses when the president’s party controls one 
chamber.  For the purposes of this study, divided government is defined as any Congress 
in which the government is not unified, i.e. pure and quasi-divided government are 
treated the same.  In theory, it takes only one veto point to stop a piece of legislation.   
Therefore quasi-divided government should present a similar obstacle to the president’s 
program as pure divided government.    
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 There are several ways to measure polarization.  It has been measured by the 
disappearance of moderates and cross pressured members from Congress (Fleisher and 
Bond 2004), measuring the gap between the parties using an ideological scale 
(Stonecash, Brewer, and Mariani 2003) or some combination of the two (Binder 2003).  
Measuring polarization in terms of the departure of moderates and cross pressured 
members from Congress is clumsy when a scale is available that purports to measure the 
ideological distance between the parties.  Binder’s measure is unsatisfactory because it 
measures moderation.  Though this may be the inverse of polarization, for the purpose of 
this study, it was decided to use the most direct means available.  Therefore, polarization 
was measured using the second method.  Specifically, the polarization variable was 
constructed by calculating the difference between the Democrat and Republican Party 
medians in each chamber using DW NOMINATE scores originally constructed by Poole 
and Rosenthal (1997).  The measure for polarization across the entire Congress is the 
average polarization of the House and Senate.  All measures of polarization are centered 
on their mean. 
 This measure of polarization creates some problems for the research design.  The 
measure of polarization varies by Congress, while the unit of analysis is individual bills.  
This creates a situation where two variables with different levels of measurement are 
being compared.  This is not an ideal setup, but necessary for this study. 
 Polarization is an aggregate concept.  Polarization is determined by the ideology 
of the representatives and senators elected to a particular Congress.  This does not vary 
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from bill to bill within a given Congress.4  There is no compelling theoretical reason to 
measure polarization by bill.  Polarization is an aggregate concept and is most 
appropriately measured to indicate an aggregate condition of each Congress in the study.  
This is a case where theory trumps methodology.    
 The final key variable is a measure of the combined effects of polarization and 
divided government.  This was done by creating an interaction with the two variables 
discussed above.  Using a polarization term centered on its mean eases the interpretation 
of the interaction term and its constituent parts.  When the interaction term is in the 
model the polarization term is interpreted as the effects of polarization under unified 
government.  The divided government coefficient is interpreted as the effects of divided 
government when polarization is zero, in this case its mean.  The interaction term gives 
the effects of polarization under divided government. 
 The intent of this chapter was to outline the flaws of the gridlock literature, 
specify a theory that corrects them, and discuss the data and methods that will be used to 
test the theory.  With these tasks complete I am ready to move on to test empirically the 
theory outlined above.  I will begin with an examination of presidential position taking 
in a partisan environment. 
 
                                                 
4
 While the replacement of members of Congress due to death or resignations occurs during every 
Congress, these replacements do not greatly affect measures of polarization for a particular Congress. 
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CHAPTER III 
POLARIZATION AND PRESIDENTIAL POSITION TAKING 
 The first task in building a model that addresses the shortcomings of the gridlock 
literature as it pertains to both divided government and polarization is to correct certain 
theoretical and empirical flaws that remain in the modeling of divided government.  As 
stated in Chapter II, a flaw in previous attempts to model the impact of divided 
government is the lack of distinction between legislation on which the president takes a 
position and legislation on which he does not.  To correct this flaw, a fuller 
understanding of presidential position taking is needed. 
 The task of this chapter is to investigate how political circumstances affect the 
position the president takes on legislation.  Edwards, Barrett, and Peake’s (1997) 
research on presidential position taking and success accounts for divided government, 
but does not account for polarization.  Therefore, this chapter will also provide an 
account of the effects of party polarization on the strategy the president implements 
when he supports or opposes legislation. 
 The chapter will proceed in three stages.  First, it will briefly examine the 
literature on presidential success in Congress and the president’s attempts to influence 
the legislative process.  This is to provide the necessary context beyond the gridlock 
literature discussed in Chapter II.  It will then present two hypotheses derived from the 
theory presented in Chapter II and present empirical tests of those hypotheses.  Finally, 
the conclusion will place the results in the broader context of the congressional-
presidential literature and this study. 
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The Presidential-Congressional Relationship 
 Though presidential-congressional interaction is not the focus of this study as a 
whole, it is important given the shortcomings of the divided government literature’s 
theoretical treatment of the president.  Most of the important work on the presidential-
congressional relationship does not directly overlap with the gridlock literature discussed 
in Chapter II.  Therefore, it will be briefly reviewed here to provide the theoretical 
context for examining presidential position taking in this chapter and presidential 
success in Chapter IV.   
  The starting point for the presidential-congressional literature is Neustadt’s 
(1960) classic work on presidential power.  Neustadt asserts that the president’s power 
lies primarily in his ability to persuade others to do as he wishes.  As it relates to 
Congress, this power is enhanced when the president is able to bring increased public 
attention to an issue and when his prestige is enhanced by personal popularity. 
 Empirical tests of Neustadt’s assertions have yielded mixed results at best.  There 
are some studies that provide evidence that public approval of the president can prompt 
Congress to give the president what he wants (Ostrom and Simon 1985, Brace and 
Hinckley 1992, Edwards 1997).  Yet there have been numerous studies that find the 
effects of presidential approval on roll call voting to be marginal (Edwards 1989, Bond 
and Fleisher 1990, Mouw and MacKuen 1992, Collier and Sullivan 1995, Cohen et al. 
2000, Fleisher and Bond 2000, Bond, Fleisher, and Wood 2003) or their approval only 
effects certain issues such those on which the president’s position is popular (Canes-
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Wrone 2001).  Furthermore, evidence is lacking that the personal skills of presidents 
make them more or less successful legislatively (Fleisher, Bond, and Wood 2007). 
 The alternative is to assert that presidential success in Congress is attributable to 
the political circumstances in which the president finds himself.  The most important of 
these political circumstances is the size of the president’s party in Congress (Edwards 
1989, Bond and Fleisher 1990, Edwards, Barrett, and Peake 1997, Edwards and Barrett 
2000), and more broadly the distribution of ideological preferences across Congress and 
the parties (Bond and Fleisher 1990 and Binder 1999).   
 This Congress oriented approach to presidential success has found that political 
circumstances such as divided government have a substantial impact on the legislative 
process.  Though divided government has been found to have little impact on the 
president’s ability to get legislation on the agenda (Edwards and Barrett 2000), it tends 
to increase the amount of significant legislation that the president opposes (Edwards, 
Barrett and Peake 1997). 
 Additionally, the distribution of preferences across members of Congress affects 
the ability of presidents to exercise leadership and create coalitions to support their 
initiatives (Binder 1999).  Bond and Fleisher (1990) found that the distribution 
preferences of members within parties and between members in the ideological core of 
the parties and moderate or cross pressured members create difficulties for the president 
to build coalitions.  Though there is some evidence that the president can convert 
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members initially hostile to a piece of legislation to his cause (Sullivan 1988)5, the 
source of the ideological distribution of Congress are elections, outcomes which are 
beyond the president’s control.  Since considerations such as personal ideology, party 
cues, and constituency positions come before the consideration of the president’s 
position in the roll call vote calculus (Kingdon 1981), the personal ideology of members 
is difficult for the president to overcome. 
 Though the individual ideology of members of Congress has figured prominently 
in some studies of presidential success in Congress, examination of polarization as a 
factor in presidential success is relatively rare.  Bond, Fleisher and Wood (2003), in their 
examination of the effects of presidential approval, found that approval’s marginal effect 
on success is time varying and is dependent on the level of partisanship.  Jacobson 
(2003) found that as the Congress polarized presidents and the members of Congress of 
the opposite party have fewer electoral constituencies in common.  This leads to a 
greater incentive for opposition members of Congress to vote against presidential agenda 
items.   
 The presidential-congressional literature as it presently stands holds that political 
circumstances, in particular party control in Congress, have a greater impact on whether 
or not the president’s agenda passes Congress than the political skills of individual 
presidents.  Additionally, there is evidence that divided government influences the 
positions the president takes on legislation, at least in terms of the amount of important 
legislation that the president opposes (Edwards, Barrett, and Peake 1997).  However, 
                                                 
5
 It must be noted that Sullivan’s (1988) empirical evidence for his model is limited to the Johnson 
administration, a period of unified government and relatively low party polarization. 
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polarization remains unexamined as a potential influence on presidential position taking.  
Given the interaction between polarization and divided government anticipated in 
Chapter II, polarization should have some influence over presidential position taking.  
The next section briefly discusses a theory for the effects of divided government and 
polarization on presidential position taking and derives two hypotheses to test the theory.    
Presidential Position Taking in a Polarized Congress 
 There are two primary sources for developing a theory on the effects of 
polarization on presidential position taking.  The first is the literature that focuses on the 
role of polarization in gridlock.  The second is from certain parts of the existent 
presidential-congressional literature.  Both will be used to develop hypotheses about the 
effect polarization has on the presidential position taking. 
 Divided government is one of the more important factors considered in the 
existing presidential literature.  Edwards, Barrett and Peake (1997) find that under 
divided government the president is more likely to oppose legislation and legislation that 
the president opposes is more likely to fail.  On the other hand, they found that divided 
government had little impact on the amount of legislation the president supported, and 
legislation that the president did support under divided government passed at the same 
rate as under unified government.   
 However, Edwards, Barrett, and Peake fail to consider the role of polarization in 
presidential position taking.  In addition to representing the ideological distance between 
the parties, polarization is also associated with increase internal cohesion within the 
parties as moderates leave Congress or move closer to their party’s median (Fleisher and 
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Bond 2004).  This ideological solidification of the parties means that under divided 
government, the president faces a Congress controlled by the opposition that is more 
unified ideologically than when the parties were less polarized.  In the House, as the 
majority party becomes more unified, the party leadership will be more willing to 
exercise its agenda setting powers to the benefits of its members leading to an increase in 
legislation favorable to the majority party (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005).     
 This leads to the expectation that polarization will enhance some of the effects of 
divided government found by Edwards, Barrett, and Peake (1997).  Under divided 
government, a polarized Congress will produce more legislation that the president will 
dislike, leading to an increase in presidential opposition to legislation.  Under unified 
government, the party in opposition to the president has no real means of getting its 
proposals serious consideration regardless of the level of polarization.  This leads to the 
following hypothesis:
Presidential Opposition Hypothesis (H1): The greater the polarization in Congress under 
divided government the more likely the president is to oppose legislation in Congress.  
 
 However, there is little reason to expect this same mechanism to carry over into 
the president’s support for legislation.  The president always has a policy program he 
wishes to get through Congress.  Research has shown that the president is able to get 
legislation he favors on the agenda regardless of the presence of divided government 
(Edwards and Barrett 2000).  Edwards, Barrett, and Peake (1997) find no relationship 
between the amount of legislation that the president supports and divided government.  
From this the following hypothesis can be derived:
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Presidential Support Hypothesis (H2): Polarization will have no effect on the probability 
that the president supports a piece of legislation regardless of the presence of divided 
government. 
 
 These hypotheses are partially based on the findings of Edwards, Barrett, and 
Peake (1997), except that they account for polarization where Edwards, Barrett, and 
Peake fail to do so.  Including polarization allows for a more thorough and complete 
examination of presidential position taking.  The next section will discuss how this test 
will be conducted. 
Data and Variables 
 To test the hypotheses, I utilize the dataset discussed in Chapter II.  For this 
chapter the dependent variable was whether or not the president supported or opposed 
the bill.  To determine the position of the president on each of the bills in the dataset, the 
Congressional Quarterly Almanac was consulted.  The Almanac offers a comprehensive 
legislative history of each Congressional session and in stories involving specific pieces 
of legislation discusses the president’s position on a given bill.  Each bill was coded 
according to whether the president supported, opposed, or took no position on the 
particular piece of legislation.  
At times the coding solution was less than obvious, and there were cases where 
the president ended up signing a bill that he opposed.  The coding decision was 
ultimately made based on whether the president got his way on the substantive issue that 
was the main focus of the disagreement between Congress and the president.  This 
commonly occurred on bills that urgently needed to be passed, but carried politically 
contentious riders.  For example, President Nixon signed a debt limit bill that was coded 
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as a bill he opposed because it had a 20 percent increase in social security benefits 
attached to it (Congressional Quarterly 1972).  In 1987, President Reagan signed the 
Defense Department’s budget authorization even though the bill narrowed the 
interpretation of the ABM treaty to his disliking (Congressional Quarterly 1987).  Since 
the primary political issue was the interpretation of the ABM treaty, the bill was coded 
as the president opposing the legislation. 
      Of the 1154 bills in the original dataset, the president supported 621 and opposed 
282.  The president took no position on 251.6  The dependent variable is presidential 
position.  The variable is coded as 1 when the president supports a bill, -1 when he 
opposes a bill, and zero when he takes no position. 
The nature of the dependent variable allows for the estimation of a multinomial 
logit model.  The multinomial logit allows for the comparison of the effects of 
independent variables on one value of the dependent variable relative to another value of 
the dependent variable.  In other words, the model will create equations that allow for 
the comparison of each presidential position to the other.  In two of the equations, 
presidential support is the baseline for comparison with presidential opposition and no 
position.  The third equation has presidential opposition as the baseline category and 
compares it to no position.     
 The independent variables for polarization, divided government and the 
interaction of the two were described in Chapter II.  The first and third equations of the 
                                                 
6
 Sixty-two bills were dropped from the analysis because the House and Senate both defeated their own 
versions of a bill with the same policy focus.  When this occurred either the House or Senate bill was 
dropped at random.  They were dropped in this analysis so that the president would not be recorded as 
supporting or opposing the same bill twice.  
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multinomial logit test presidential opposition hypothesis.  In the first equation, divided 
government should be positive and statistically significant as I expect the president to 
oppose more legislation under divided government.  Polarization is not expected to exert 
an independent effect, but the interaction term of divided government and polarization 
should be positive and significant, again because I expect the president to oppose more 
legislation under divided government.  The key independent variables should be 
negative in the third equation as the president opposes more legislation than he takes no 
position on under divided government and as polarization increases.   
 In the second equation, if Edwards, Barrett, and Peake (1997) and the 
presidential support hypothesis are correct, none of the three key independent variables 
will be significant.  It is expected that divided government and polarization will not have 
any effect on the probability that the president supports a piece of legislation.  Therefore, 
we should not see the president decreasing the number of bills he supports relative to 
those on which he has no position. 
 Several control variables are included in the model to account for other possible 
explanations for the president supporting or opposing a piece of legislation.  Though the 
effect of public approval has been shown to be marginal at best (Bond and Fleisher 
1990, Edwards 1989), the notion that public approval enhances presidential prestige 
remains an important alternative hypothesis to political conditions in the presidential 
literature and must be accounted for.  Two measures of public approval are included.  
The first was the average monthly percentage of those who approved of the president’s 
job performance according to the Gallup Poll (Edwards with Gallup 1990, updates from 
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Gallup) based on the bill’s introduction date.  For each bill introduced prior to the 
twentieth of the month, the president’s average approval from the prior month was used. 
For bills introduced on or after the twentieth of the month, the current month’s average 
was used.7  The second measure was the change in presidential approval from the time 
the bill was introduced to the time it exited the congressional agenda (i.e. passed, failed, 
or the Congress ended).  High public approval theoretically emboldens the president to 
support more legislation in an effort to use his popularity to broaden his agenda. 
 Several control variables were included to account for the point in the president’s 
term that the bill was considered.  There is evidence that the president enjoys more 
success early in his tenure than later when he becomes a lame duck (Pfiffner 1988; 
Grossman, Kumar, and Rourke 1998; Barrett and Eshbaugh-Soha 2007).  To account for 
this, five dummy variables were included in the model.  These variables were coded one 
if the bill was introduced in the first year of the president’s first term, the first year of his 
second term, in a presidential election year, in a presidential year in which the incumbent 
president was running, and in a midterm election year.  These variables are intended to 
capture any effects that either the political calendar or electoral mandates may have on 
the president’s position taking. 
 The final control variable accounts for the ideological distance between the 
president and the sponsor of the bill.  The president can be expected to oppose 
legislation sponsored by members of Congress who are on the opposite end of the 
                                                 
7
 During the first month of a presidential term (i.e. the January following a presidential election year) the 
president’s average approval for the month of January was used for all bills introduced that month.  Early 
in the dataset, there were several months when the Gallup did not ask the approval question.  In these 
cases the nearest available monthly average was used.  For gaps longer than two months, the two closest 
months’ averages were averaged together. 
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ideological spectrum from him.  Conversely, the president is more likely to support 
legislation sponsored by members with whom he shares ideological similarities.  This 
variable accounts for this by measuring the absolute difference between the president 
and the sponsor of the bill.  This was done using DW NOMINATE scores which include 
scores for each of the presidents during the period under study (Poole and Rosenthal 
1997).  Summary statistics for all the variables are available in Appendix B.    
Results 
 Table 3.1 displays the coefficient estimates of the multinomial logit model of 
presidential position taking.  The results for individual bills partially confirm Edwards, 
Barrett and Peake’s (1997) aggregate analysis.  The president is more likely to oppose a 
bill during divided government than under unified government.  This can be seen in the 
coefficient estimates in equation 1.  Divided government is positive and statistically 
significant when presidential opposition is compared to presidential support.  This 
indicates that under divided government when polarization is at its mean the president 
has a higher probability of opposing a bill rather than supporting it. 
  There is also some evidence that polarization under divided government leads to 
an increase in the probability of the president opposing a piece of legislation.  The 
positive coefficient for the interaction term in equation 1 indicates that the president is 
more likely to oppose legislation rather than support it as polarization increases under 
divided government.  Similarly, the statistically significant and negative coefficient for 
the interaction term in the equation 3 means that the president is less likely to take no 
position relative to the likelihood he opposes a bill.  Taken together,  
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Table 3.1 
Multinomial Logit Model of  Presidential  Position Taking on Legislation 
 
Variables 
Equation 1 
Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
Equation 2 
Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
Equation 3 
Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
Polarization 
 
Divided Government 
 
Polarization* Divided 
Government 
-1.19** 
(.51) 
.87*** 
(.14) 
1.42* 
(.73) 
.74 
(.84) 
.54** 
(.21) 
-1.63 
(1.16) 
1.92** 
(.95) 
-.33 
(.23) 
-3.05* 
(1.81) 
 
Presidential Approval at 
Introduction 
 
Change in Presidential 
Approval  
 
1st Year of 1st Term 
 
1st Year of Second Term 
 
Presidential Election Year, 
President Running 
 
Presidential Election Year 
 
Midterm Election Year 
 
Ideological Distance 
 
Constant 
 
Baseline 
Equation 
-.001 
(.006) 
 
-.005 
(.008) 
 
-.86*** 
(.21) 
-.24 
(.18) 
-.39 
(.40) 
 
.13 
(..32) 
-.24 
(.21) 
1.72*** 
(.33) 
-2.14*** 
(.38) 
Support 
Opposed 
-.01 
(.01) 
 
-.006 
(.01) 
 
-.44* 
(.23) 
-.05 
(.25) 
-.27 
(.53) 
 
-.20 
(.38) 
-.12 
(.19) 
.21 
(.32) 
-.72 
(.48) 
Support 
No Position 
-.01 
(.01) 
 
-.001 
(.01) 
 
.42 
(.34) 
.19 
(.18) 
.12 
(.41) 
 
-.32 
(.24) 
.11 
(.30) 
-1.51*** 
(.32) 
1.41** 
(.51) 
Opposed 
No Position 
Prob < chi²= .0000*** 
Pseudo R² = .0745 
AIC= 1.92 
N=1085 
* significant at p < .10 ** significant at p < .05 *** significant at p < .001 
 
Note: Standard errors are clustered by Congress. 
Polarization is centered on its mean. 
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 these results mean that the president opposes more legislation under divided 
government as polarization increases.  This is critical evidence for the presidential 
opposition hypothesis.  On top of confirming the findings of Edwards, Barrett, and 
Peake (1997), I have found that polarization in concert with divided government 
influences position.      
 On the other hand, the model appears to contradict the presidential support 
hypothesis.  The hypothesis held that polarization will have no effect on the probability 
that the president supports a piece of legislation.  However, polarization is negative and 
significant in the equation 1.  This indicates that the probability that the president 
opposes a piece of legislation relative to his probability of supporting it decreases as 
polarization increases.  In other words the president is supporting more legislation as 
polarization increases under unified government.  This evidence clearly forces the 
rejection of the presidential support hypothesis.  Additionally, the president has a higher 
probability of taking no position on a piece of legislation than opposing as polarization 
increases.  This is indicated by the positive and significant coefficient in equation 3.  It 
appears that the president opposes less legislation overall when his party controls a 
polarized Congress.  
 The divided government coefficient estimates in equations 1 and 2 produce a 
result that contradicts the previous literature, particularly Edwards, Barrett, and Peake 
(1997).  In both equations, the divided government variable was statistically significant 
and positive, indicating that divided government leads to a decrease in the probability 
that the president will support a bill under divided government.  Equation 1 indicates that 
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divided government increases the probability that the president opposes a bill rather than 
supports a bill.  This means that the president is supporting less and opposing more 
legislation under divided government.   
 Equation 2 indicates that the president is taking no position more often relative to 
supporting legislation under divided government.  This likely indicates a strategic choice 
by the president.  He may decide to take no position on a bill he really supports under 
divided government in the hope that the opposition Congress will not kill it solely on the 
basis of his support.  There is some evidence in the literature that the president 
strategically takes no position on legislation, but this has only emerged on relatively 
minor bills during the Kennedy and Johnson era (Covington 1987).  This finding is 
evidence that this type of strategic behavior extends to significant legislation.   
Conclusion 
 This chapter provides several findings critical for our understanding of the effects 
of polarization and divided government on presidential position taking.  First, it shows 
that under certain circumstances polarization enhances the propensity of the president to 
take opposing positions under divided government.  When facing a hostile Congress the 
president does oppose more legislation.  A polarized divided Congress offers more 
legislation that the president dislikes and therefore forces him to oppose even more 
legislation at least relative to the number of bills on witch he takes no position. 
 Secondly, polarization plays a greater role in presidential position taking than I 
theorized.  The increased presidential opposition to legislation under divided government 
was anticipated.  The increase in presidential support for legislation under unified 
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government was not.  A polarized unified Congress provides the president with more 
legislation to support just as a polarized divided Congress provides more legislation for 
him to oppose.  The finding may indicate that polarized parties in Congress more 
enthusiastically press their own agendas and the president reacts to the legislation 
according to which party is in the majority.   
 Finally, this chapter finds that divided government decreases the probability that 
the president supports a given bill.  As stated above, this result stands in contrast to 
Edwards, Barrett, and Peake’s (1997) finding that divided government has no impact on 
the amount of legislation the president supports.  There are several possible reasons for 
this.  Edwards, Barrett, and Peake only included data through the 102nd Congress (1991-
92).  It is possible that including data from an era when a Democratic president faced a 
Republican Congress switched the finding.  Another possibility is that Edwards, Barrett, 
and Peake lost information when they aggregated their data to look at the total number of 
bills per Congress supported by the president rather than individual bills. 
 The most likely explanation is that Edwards, Barrett, and Peake reached this 
conclusion by comparing the average number of bills supported by administrations under 
unified and divided government, but never conducted a systematic statistical test.  They 
do note that the only time that president’s supported less legislation under divided 
government was late in their sample, but they dismiss this as “reflecting the limited 
legislative agendas of the second Reagan and Bush administrations” (558).  However, 
they seem reluctant to consider divided government as an explanation for these limited 
agendas.  In light of the shortcomings of Edwards, Barrett, and Peake, the finding that 
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divided government does impact the probability that the president supports a bill is not 
all that surprising. 
 In the context of this study, this chapter has provided an important base for the 
next two chapters.  Now that the effects of divided government and polarization on 
presidential position taking have been clarified, this study can move on to examining the 
impact of polarization on presidential success in Congress and the ultimately the impact 
of polarization on the passage of legislation.    
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CHAPTER IV 
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESS IN THE POLARIZED CONGRESS 
 Having established an understanding of how polarization and divided 
government affect presidential position taking, I now move on to examine presidential 
success.  Presidential success is defined in terms of whether or not the president gets 
what he wants from Congress.  In other words, this chapter will look at how polarization 
affects whether or not bills that the president supports pass, and bills he opposes fail. 
 It is here that I will begin to explore the differences between the House and the 
Senate.  While there is no theoretical reason to believe that the president treats House 
and Senate bills differently when he takes positions, theory gives ample reason to 
believe that the House and Senate treat legislation differently, particularly when 
Congress is polarized.  These differences begin to emerge upon examining presidential 
success.  The examination of these differences will begin with specifying hypotheses 
about presidential success in Congress in general and in the House and Senate 
specifically.   
A Theory of Presidential Success 
 There are two primary sources for creating a theory on the effects of polarization 
on the presidential success.  The first is the literature that focuses on the role of 
polarization in gridlock.  The second is from certain parts of the existent presidential-
congressional literature.  Both will be used to hypothesize about the effect polarization 
has on presidential success. 
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 As discussed in Chapter II, the literature that has dealt with the effects of 
polarization on the legislative process find that polarization leads to gridlock (Binder 
2003; McCarty 2007; and Rosenthal 2004).  Rosenthal examines one issue area (social 
welfare policy), while McCarty and Binder cast the net wider.  The general conclusion 
remains the same--polarization increases gridlock across the board.  Further, McCarty 
asserts that polarization works in concert with divided government and the 
supermajoritarian features of the Senate to produce gridlock.  There is good reason to 
expect that polarization will lead to gridlock on issues that the president supports.   
 The literature reviewed in Chapter III on the presidential-congressional 
relationship is the source of my theory of presidential success.  There is no need 
summarize this literature again here, other than to note the general finding that political 
conditions rather than the personal skills of the president determine presidential success 
in Congress.  The most important of these conditions are the size of the president’s party 
(Edwards 1989), the distribution of ideological preferences within the parties (Bond and 
Fleisher 1990), and divided government (Edwards, Barrett, and Peake 1997).  The 
president has little direct influence over the roll call votes of individual members 
(Edwards 1989; Kingdon 1981) and there is little systematic evidence that the personal 
skills of presidents affect legislative outcomes (Fleisher, Bond, and Wood 2007). 
 I will examine two aspects of presidential success: (1) the probability that the 
president wins when he takes a position regardless of what that position is, and (2) the 
probability that president is successful based on the position he takes.  Findings of the 
gridlock literature suggest that divided government should lead to fewer presidential 
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victories regardless of whether the president supports or opposes a bill and which 
chamber of Congress is being examined.  With the exception of Mayhew (1991), 
aggregate analyses of divided government find that divided government leads to a 
decrease in the passage of legislation overall (Howell et al. 2000; Kelly 1993; Thorson 
1998).  This effect should be higher for legislation on which the president takes a 
position, particularly legislation he supports.   
 Edwards, Barrett, and Peake (1997) find that divided government does not affect 
the failure of legislation that the president supports, i.e. the president losses on bills he 
supports at the same rate under unified and divided government.  However, the 
dependent variable in this study was the number of bills the administration supported 
that failed to pass.  This specification limited the sample size and thus did not account 
for other legislation that the president supported and passed.  This means that Edwards, 
Barrett, and Peake’s null result is based on the comparison of a count, but not the rate 
that the bills passed.  In other words, this result does not account for whether the number 
of bills the president supported changed under divided government and cannot tell us 
whether or not the president really won at the same rate under divided government as 
under unified government.  This conclusion needs to be reexamined.   
 When we look at the effects of divided government on presidential victories, we 
should expect a decrease in the overall number of victories when the opposition party 
controls Congress.  The president is likely to see fewer bills he supports pass under 
divided government.  The majority party in a hostile House can use the chamber rules to 
insure that the president’s agenda never reaches the floor.  In the Senate, the opposition 
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party can block passage of legislation the president supports with a filibuster, and if the 
opposition party has a majority, the majority leader has great discretion of the floor 
agenda. Therefore, presidential victories on legislation he supports should decrease 
under divided government. 
 On the other hand, divided government may not affect the probability that the 
president wins on legislation he opposes. The legislative process has multiple veto 
points, and failure to clear any one can kill legislation. As a result, the president is more 
likely to win when he opposes legislation. Under unified government, party leaders in 
the House can use the rules of the chamber to keep legislation that the president opposes 
from passing.  Under divided government, the president’s party can stop legislation in 
the Senate with the filibuster, and should a bill the president opposes get past a Senate 
filibuster the president can always veto it.  Therefore, in an aggregate model of 
presidential victories, the presence of divided government should make no difference in 
the probability that the president wins on legislation he opposes. 
 In summary, it can be anticipated that under divided government, presidential 
victories will decrease overall as a result of the president losing on bills he supports.  
However, there should be no effect for divided government on bills the president 
opposes.  This leads to the following hypothesis: 
Divided Government Hypothesis (H1a): Divided government decreases the probability 
of presidential victories overall. 
Divided Government Support Hypothesis (H1b): Divided government decreases the 
probability that the president will win on legislation he supports.   
Divided Government Opposition Hypothesis (H1c): Divided government makes no 
difference on legislation the president opposes. 
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 Polarization, on the other hand, has different effects depending upon the chamber 
being investigated.  In the House, the majority party can pass anything its members can 
agree upon (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005).  Polarization is characterized by 
increased cohesion within the parties.  This leads to an increase in the overall legislative 
productivity of the chamber (Sinclair 2008).   
 In terms of presidential success, under unified government the president can 
expect to see an increase in overall legislative victories and see more of the bills he 
supports pass as polarization increases.  The leaders of the president’s party in the House 
will use their procedural prerogatives to push through the president’s agenda and stop 
any bills he opposes.  However, under divided government, the president will see a 
decrease in success in the House as the opposition party uses the same legislative 
devices to stop legislation the president supports and pass legislation he opposes.  This 
leads to the following hypothesis: 
House Polarization, Unified Government Hypothesis (H2a):  In the House, the 
probability the president wins on individual bills he takes a position on increases as 
polarization increases under unified government.   
House Polarization Divided Government Hypothesis (H2b): The probability of success 
decreases as polarization increases under divided government. 
 
 In the Senate, the increased cohesiveness of the parties leads to a decrease in 
presidential support.  Parliamentary devices such as holds and filibusters empower 
individual members of the Senate.  In a polarized environment, members of the minority 
party have increased incentives to use these devices, leading to gridlock (McCarty 2007; 
Sinclair 2008).  Under divided government, a cohesive majority party will block 
presidential priorities.  Under unified government with polarized parties, the Senate 
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minority party will have an increased incentive to filibuster legislation the president 
supports.  This leads to the following hypothesis. 
Senate Polarization Hypothesis (H3): As polarization increases, the probability of 
presidential victories in the Senate will decrease. 
 
 Finally, an increase in polarization leads to a decrease in presidential victories in 
Congress as a whole.  It takes the veto of only one of three players--the House, the 
Senate, or the president--to stop a bill.  Because polarization is hypothesized to decrease 
the probability of presidential victories in the Senate, we should see a decrease in 
presidential victories in the aggregate.  Therefore, I posit the following. 
Congressional Polarization Hypothesis (H4): An increase in polarization will lead to a 
decrease in the probability of presidential victories in Congress.   
 
Designing the Models 
 Four models were estimated to test the above hypotheses.  Three of them 
examine the impact of divided government and polarization in the overall process, in the 
House, and in the Senate, respectively.  Because of the expectations of the divided 
government hypothesis, a model that takes into account presidential positions across the 
entire process was also estimated.   The dependent variables for the models are coded in 
three different ways.  For the Congress model and the presidential positions model, it is 
coded one if a bill that the president supported became law or a bill that the president 
opposed failed and zero otherwise.  Bills on which the president took no position are 
excluded.  The dependent variable for the House and Senate models of the president’s 
victories for all positions taken has the same coding scheme for bills considered by the 
House and the Senate, except bills need only pass or fail in the chamber instead of 
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becoming public law.  The sample of bills for each chamber included all bills that 
originated in the chamber and all bills from the other chamber that passed that chamber 
and were therefore considered by both chambers.  For example the House model 
includes all House bills and all Senate bills that passed the Senate.  For the models of 
total victories, there were 777 bills in the House model, 795 in the Senate, and 846 in the 
Congress model.   
 For the House, Senate and congressional models all the independent variables 
used in the models for this chapter were used in Chapter III.  The coefficient estimates 
for the divided government variable should be negative in all the models in this chapter.  
The polarization variables are anticipated to be positive in the House models and 
negative in the Senate and congressional models.  The polarization and divided 
government interaction term is expected to be negative in all the models it is in as well.  
The same control variables that were used in Chapter III were also used in this chapter.  
These include the president’s public approval at the introduction of the bill and the 
change in presidential approval from the time it was proposed until it left the agenda.  A 
measure of ideological distance between the president and the primary sponsor of the bill 
is also included.  Finally, several dummy variables denoting key points during the 
president’s term are also in the model.      
 For the model of presidential victories by positions taken, a series of interaction 
terms were included to estimate the effects of polarization and divided government on 
the probability of presidential success on bills the president supported.  Presidential 
support was selected because it is on such bills that polarization and divided government 
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are expected to make a difference.  These interaction terms included an interaction of 
polarization and presidential support, divided government and presidential support, and a 
three way interaction of presidential support, divided government, and polarization.   
 In addition to the probit estimates, Monte Carlo simulations of each model were 
run to estimate the probability of presidential victory in several scenarios.  These 
simulations were run using King, Tomz, and Wittenberg’s (2000) program “clarify.”  
“Clarify” estimates the set of coefficients for each model 1000 times and uses those 
estimates to estimate values of the dependent variable at substantively interesting levels 
of the independent variables.  Because the dependent variable in these models is 
dichotomous, “clarify” estimates the probability that the dependent value takes on the 
value of 1 under the specified circumstances.  For every set of simulations in this 
chapter, mean polarization is defined as zero and high polarization as .25.  This value is 
selected because it is near the maximum value that polarization takes in each model.  
Because it is dichotomous, divided government is defined as either zero or one 
depending on the scenario.  The values of the interaction terms are set according to the 
value of their constituent parts.  All continuous control variables are set to their mean 
and all dichotomous control variables are set to their modal category.  
Models of Congressional Presidential Success 
 The first set of models is intended to test the divided government hypotheses and 
congressional polarization hypotheses.  These models look at the probability of 
presidential victories throughout the process.  In other words, they examine the 
probability that bills the president supports become public law and bills the president 
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oppose fail to become public law. Table 4.1 displays the probit estimates and changes in 
predicted probability of presidential victories across the entire process.  The probit 
model performs well in terms of statistical significance, but the goodness of fit measures 
are small.  However, a 1.3 percent reduction in error indicates at least some added 
predictive power over a naïve model. 
 
 Table 4.1  
Congressional Model of Presidential Victories 
 Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Pr 
Change 
Polarization 0.35 0.46 0.001 
Divided Government -0.25 0.17 -0.09 
Polarization*Divided Government -0.47 0.80 0.01 
Presidential Approval at Introduction 0.01 0.01 0.04 
Change in Presidential Approval 0.01 0.01 0.05 
1st Year, 1st Term -0.19 0.13 -0.07 
1st Year 2nd Term 0.15 0.14 0.05 
Presidential Election Year -0.21** 0.10 -0.09 
President Running for Reelection -0.15 0.17 -0.04 
Midterm Election Year -0.07 0.18 -0.03 
Ideological Distance 0.87*** 0.22 0.26 
Constant -0.36 0.30  
 
Prob < chi²= .0000*** 
AIC= 1.28 
Correctly Classified= 65.1% 
Reduction in Error= 1.3% 
N=846 
P(y=1׀x)=.6445 
* significant at p < .10 ** significant at p < .05 *** significant at p < .001 
 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by Congress. 
Polarization is centered at its mean. 
Pr Change is the change in predicted probability of a presidential victory as continuous variables increase 
by one standard deviation and as dichotomous variables move from zero to one. 
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 The model appears to provide no support for either hypothesis.  The coefficient 
for divided government is statistically insignificant in the probit model even though 
substantively it has one of the larger impacts on the predicted probability of presidential 
success.  Only ideological distance has a greater substantive impact.  But with 
interaction terms, proper interpretation requires consideration of the joint significance of 
all the variables and interactions.  
 To that end, I ran 1000 Monte Carlo simulations of the model in Table 4.1 and 
used those simulations to estimate the probability of presidential success on a piece of 
legislation under certain scenarios.  These estimates are reported in Table 4.2.  These 
estimates show that at both mean and high polarization, the presence of divided 
government reduced the probability of presidential success.  At mean polarization, the 
probability of presidential decreases from 72 percent to 63 percent, a statistically 
significant decrease according to difference of means test 1.  When polarization is high, 
divided government reduces the probability of success from 75 percent to 62 percent, 
again a statistically significant decrease (difference of means test 2).  Though a 
difference of means test is a low hurdle, these changes are substantively large especially 
in comparison to the changes in probability for polarization.  While the president’s 
success rate does not drop below 50 percent, the decreases under divided government are 
large enough to not reject the overall divided government hypothesis (H1a)     
 Returning to Table 4.1, the coefficient estimates in the model do not support the 
congressional polarization hypothesis.  There is no evidence that polarization decreases 
the probability of presidential victories either under unified or divided government.  The 
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changes in predicted probability for both polarization and the interaction of polarization 
and divided government indicate that polarization under both unified and divided 
government has little substantive impact on the probability of presidential success. 
 The simulations in Table 4.2 support the findings in the probit model.  Though 
there are differences in the probability of presidential success between mean and high 
polarization, these differences are much smaller than the differences between unified and  
 
Table 4.2 
 Estimated Probabilities of Presidential Victory in Congress with Difference of Means 
Tests 
Scenario  
Mean Polarization, Unified Government 0.72 
Mean Polarization, Divided Government 0.63 
High Polarization, Unified Government 0.75 
High Polarization, Divided Government 0.62 
 
Difference of Means Tests   
1. Divided Government at Mean Polarization  
Ho: Mean (Divided Government) - Mean (Unified Government)= 0 
Difference= -.09 t= -65.6*  
   
2. Divided Government at High Polarization  
Ho: Mean (Divided Government) - Mean (Unified Government)= 0 
Difference= -.12 t= -48*  
   
3. Polarization Under Unified Government  
Ho: Mean (High Polarization) - Mean (Low Polarization)= 0 
Difference= .03 t= 17.5*  
   
4. Polarization Under Divided Government  
Ho: Mean (High Polarization) - Mean (Low Polarization)= 0 
Difference= -.01 t= -6.66*  
 
Notes: The mean probabilities of passage for each scenario are derived using 1000 simulations of the 
model in Table 4.1 using King, Tomz, and Wittenberg’s (2000) clarify, and setting variables to key values.   
Mean polarization is defined as polarization=0, high polarization is defined as polarization = .25.  
President’s position and divided government alternate between 0 and 1.  Continuous control variables are 
held at their mean, dichotomous control variables are held at their modal category. 
For all difference of means tests N=1000. 
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divided government.  As small as they are, they are still statistically significant 
according to difference of means tests 3 and 4.  Interestingly, the probabilities shift in 
opposite directions under unified and divided government.  Under unified government, 
the probability of presidential victory increases from 72 percent to 75 percent.  Under 
divided government, the probability of presidential success decreases from 63 percent to 
62 percent.  Thus, although the differences are statistically significant, the substantive 
impact of polarization is trivial.  Regardless of the position that the president takes on a 
bill, divided government has a larger impact on the probability of presidential success 
than polarization.   
 The finding that polarization has opposite effects under unified and divided 
government implies that there may be an interactive relationship between polarization 
and divided government.  In other words, polarization may have a different effect on the 
probability of presidential success under unified government than it does under divided 
government.  This possibility is examined in Figure 4.1.  Figure 4.1 displays the 95% 
confidence intervals around the estimates the probability of presidential success at 
different levels of polarization under unified and divided government.  If the there were 
an interactive relationship between unified and divided government there would be a 
space in between the confidence intervals of the two series.  The confidence intervals 
overlap across all the estimated values of polarization, leading to the conclusion of no 
significant interaction.    
 The divided government hypothesis predicts that there should be differences in 
the effects for divided government depending upon whether the president supports or 
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opposes a bill.  To test this aspect of the theory a second congressional probit model was 
specified. The estimates for this model are found in Table 4.3.  This model included 
interaction terms intended to tease out the differences between bills the president 
supported and those he opposed.  An interaction term that includes the presidential 
support variable would give the effects of the other portions of the interaction when the 
president supported legislation.  Terms that did not include the presidential support  
  
Figure 4.1 Estimates of the Effects of Polarization on the Probability of Presidential 
Victory in Congress for Unified and Divided Government  
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variable give the effects for when the president opposed legislation.  Overall, the model 
performs fairly well.  Like most models in this study the reduction in error is low (1.7 
percent), but the model still provides better leverage than a naïve prediction of the modal 
category.   
 The results in Table 4.3 provide no support for either portion of the divided 
government hypothesis.  None of the variables or interaction terms that included divided 
government were statistically significant.  If the divided government hypothesis 
pertaining to bills the president supports was correct (H1b) the coefficient for the 
interaction of divided government and presidential support would be negative and 
significant.  As it stands neither divided government nor polarization have an impact 
when the president supports a bill.   
 On the other hand, the coefficients that examine the effects of divided 
government and polarization when the president opposes legislation are also statistically 
insignificant.  This is the result anticipated by the hypothesis pertaining to the effects of 
divided government on legislation the president opposes (H1c).  However, the number of 
interaction terms in this model makes it difficult to clearly interpret the results based 
upon coefficients alone.  The large and negative decrease in the predicted change in 
probability for the divided government and presidential support interaction implies that 
the evidence against H1b in particular may not be as strong as it appears.   
 To account for this possibility, estimates of the probability of presidential success 
under different circumstances were estimated once again using 1000 simulations of the 
probit model in Table 4.3.  The results of these simulations are displayed in Table 4.4.   
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 The comparisons that stand out in Table 4.4 are the differences between unified 
and divided government when the presidents supports legislation.  At mean polarization, 
divided government reduces the probability of presidential success from 68 percent to 53 
percent.  At high polarization, the presence of divided government reduces the  
 
 Table 4.3 
Presidential Victories in Congress by Presidential Position 
 Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Pr 
Change 
Polarization  0.79 1.65 0.03 
Divided Government  -0.06 0.24 -0.02 
President Support  -0.33 0.22 -0.12 
Polarization * Divided Government  -0.23 1.91 -0.01 
Polarization * President Support  -0.40 1.77 -0.01 
Divided Government * President Support  -0.32 0.25 -0.12 
Polarization * Divided Government * President 
Support -0.61 2.10 -0.02 
Presidential Approval at Introduction 0.009* 0.005 0.04 
Change in Presidential Approval 0.012** 0.005 0.05 
1st Year, 1st Term -0.12 0.14 -0.04 
1st Year 2nd Term 0.16 0.14 0.06 
Presidential Election Year -0.21 0.23 -0.08 
President Running for Reelection -0.11 0.26 -0.04 
Midterm Election Year -0.04 0.14 -0.02 
Ideological Distance 0.69*** 0.18 0.09 
Constant -0.04 0.33  
 
Prob < chi²= .0000*** 
AIC= 1.26 
Correctly Classified= 65.5% 
Reduction in Error= 1.7% 
N=846 
P(y=1׀x)=.6517 
* significant at p < .10 ** significant at p < .05 *** significant at p < .001 
 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by Congress. 
Polarization is centered at its mean. 
Pr Change is the change in predicted probability of a presidential victory as continuous variables increase 
by one standard deviation and as dichotomous variables move from zero to one. 
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probability of presidential victory from 71 percent to 49 percent.  The president loses 
more than half of the time when he supports legislation under divided government when 
parties are highly polarized.   
 When the probability of presidential success on legislation the president opposes 
is examined, a much different story emerges.  First, note that the president is successful  
 
Table 4.4  
Estimated Probabilities of President Victory in Congress with Difference of Means Tests 
by Presidential Position 
 Support Oppose 
Scenario   
Mean Polarization, Unified Government 0.68 0.79 
Mean Polarization, Divided Government 0.53 0.77 
High Polarization, Unified Government 0.71 0.82 
High Polarization, Divided Government 0.49 0.80 
 
Difference of Means Tests   
Legislation the President Supports 
1. Divided Government at Mean Polarization  
Ho: Mean (Divided Government) - Mean (Unified Government)= 0 
Difference= -.14 t= -93.9*  
   
2. Divided Government at High Polarization   
Ho: Mean (Divided Government) - Mean (Unified Government)= 0 
Difference= -.23 t= -70.5*  
   
3. Polarization Under Unified Government   
Ho: Mean (High Polarization) - Mean (Low Polarization)= 0 
Difference= .03 t= 19.3*  
   
4. Polarization Under Divided Government   
Ho: Mean (High Polarization) - Mean (Low Polarization)= 0 
Difference= -.05 t= -22.9*  
   
Legislation the President Opposes 
5. Divided Government at Mean Polarization  
Ho: Mean (Divided Government) - Mean (Unified Government)= 0 
Difference= -02 t=-8.16*  
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Table 4.4 (continued) 
 
6. Divided Government at High Polarization  
Ho: Mean (Divided Government) - Mean (Unified Government)= 0 
Difference= -.02 t= -5.29*  
   
7. Polarization Under Unified Government  
Ho: Mean (High Polarization) - Mean (Low Polarization)= 0 
Difference= .04 t= 12.2*  
   
8. Polarization Under Divided Government  
Ho: Mean (High Polarization) - Mean (Low Polarization)= 0 
Difference= .03 t= 16.3*  
 
Notes: The mean probabilities of passage for each scenario are derived using 1000 simulations of the  
model in Table 4.2 using King, Tomz, and Wittenberg’s (2000) clarify, and setting variables to key values.   
Mean polarization is defined as polarization=0, high polarization is defined as polarization = .25.  
President’s position and divided government alternate between 0 and 1.  Continuous control variables are 
held at their mean, dichotomous control variables are held at their modal category. 
For all difference of means tests N=1000. 
 
 
more than three quarters of the time when he opposes legislation regardless of the 
political circumstances.  Under both mean and high polarization, divided government 
decreases the probability of presidential success, but the decrease is no where near as 
dramatic as the drop in presidential success under divided government when the 
president supports legislation.  The differences of means test that examine divided 
government when the president opposes a bill (5 and 6) show that the differences are 
statistically significant at the .05 level.  Again this is a fairly low hurdle and the 
differences are not nearly as dramatic as the differences when the president supports 
legislation.  The small differences in the simulation probabilities and the insignificant 
probit coefficients are enough to not reject the presidential opposition portion of the 
divided government hypothesis. 
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 No hypothesis posited a differences for the effects of polarization between 
legislation the president supports and legislation the president opposes.  Both the probit 
model and the simulations illustrate that there are differences in the way polarization 
affects legislation the president supports and legislation he opposes.  None of the 
coefficients for variables modeling polarization are statistically significant.  The 
differences in means in the simulation (difference of means tests 3, 4, 7 and 8), though 
statistically significant, are again much smaller than those for divided government.  The 
difference in direction between polarization under unified and divided government when 
the president takes a position hints polarization and divided government interact.  
However, there is no such evidence in Figure 4.2, which leads to the conclusion of no 
significant interaction.          
 In summary, the congressional models partly meet the expectations laid out by 
the hypotheses.  Divided government is the key determinant of overall presidential 
success and polarization plays a rather small role.  The position the president takes on a 
bill makes a large difference for presidential success under divided government. The 
president wins at a high rate when he opposes legislation regardless of the political 
circumstances.  He is much less successful pushing a positive agenda under divided 
government.  This section provides strong evidence for all three parts of the divided 
government hypothesis, but the congressional polarization hypothesis must be rejected.      
House Model of Presidential Success 
 The two part hypothesis on presidential victories in the House proposed an 
interactive effect for divided government and polarization.  Under unified government  
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Figure 4.2 Estimates of the Effects of Polarization on the Probability of Presidential 
Victory in Congress for Unified and Divided Government by Presidential Position 
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polarization should have a positive impact on the probability of presidential victory.  
When the government is divided, polarization should have a negative effect.  These 
expectations were only partially supported.  Polarization leads to an increase in the 
probability of presidential success in the House, regardless of the presence of divided 
government. Likewise divided government reduces the odds of presidential victory 
regardless of the level of polarization.  There is no significant interaction.  
 The results of the probit model can be seen in Table 4.5.  This model performs 
better than the other models in the chapter showing a reduction in error of 3.9 percent.  
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The other goodness of fit indicators are unimpressive, but still indicate that the model is 
a better predictor of legislative success than a model that simply holds that every 
observation of presidential success falls into the modal category.    
 
Table 4.5 
House Model of Presidential Success 
 Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Pr Change 
Polarization 1.36** 0.55 0.07 
Divided Government -0.31* 0.16 -0.12 
Polarization*Divided Government -0.99 0.85 -0.03 
Presidential Approval at Introduction 0.00 0.01 -0.01 
Change in Presidential Approval 0.00 0.01 0.02 
Majority Party 0.02 0.17 0.01 
1st Year, 1st Term 0.11 0.14 0.04 
1st Year 2nd Term 0.22 0.18 0.08 
Presidential Election Year -0.08 0.27 -0.03 
President Running for Reelection 0.02 0.35 0.01 
Midterm Election Year 0.04 0.20 0.01 
Ideological Distance -0.37 0.24 -0.05 
Constant 0.71* 0.39  
 
Prob < chi²= .0001*** 
AIC= 1.32 
Correctly Classified= 64.5% 
Reduction in Error= 3.9% 
N=777 
P(y=1׀x)=.6118 
* significant at p < .10 ** significant at p < .05 *** significant at p < .001 
 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by Congress. 
Polarization is centered at its mean. 
Pr Change is the change in predicted probability of a presidential victory as continuous variables increase 
by one standard deviation and as dichotomous variables move from zero to one. 
 
 
 The probit models of presidential victories in the House illustrate the findings.  
Divided government is negative and statistically significant as expected.   Polarization 
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also performs as expected.  It is positive and statistically significant.  However, the 
interaction term is statistically insignificant indicating that polarization does not have a 
statistically significant impact under divided government.  The changes in predicted 
probability for divided government and polarization are strong, but the predicted 
probability changes for the interaction term is small, a mere 3 percent. 
 Once again, the results of several simulations bring more clarity to the results 
than probit coefficients and changes in predicted probability can on their own.  The  
simulations for the House model are displayed in Table 4.6.  Divided government had 
the expected negative impact regardless of the levels of polarization.  At mean 
polarization, the presence of divided government leads to a drop in the estimated 
probability of presidential success from 66 percent to 54 percent.  At high polarization 
the drop is even steeper.  Divided government leads to a drop in the probability of 
presidential success from 77 percent to 57 percent.  Difference of means tests 1 and 2 
show that these changes are statistically significant. 
 Polarization behaves as expected only under unified government--as polarization 
moves from its mean to a high level, the probability of passage increases by 11 percent 
from 66 percent to 77 percent.  This is the only instance in any of the models where 
polarization produces a change in estimated probability nearly as large as a change 
created by divided government.  This provides support for the polarization and unified 
government portion of the hypothesis in the House.   
 In contrast, polarization has the opposite effect than was expected under divided 
government.  As polarization moves from its mean to a high level under divided 
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government, the probability of legislative success increases from 54 percent to 57 
percent.  A statistically significant difference according to difference of means test 4, but 
the size of the difference is once again modest.  The probability of presidential success 
also moves in the opposite of the hypothesized direction.  When combined with the 
findings of the probit model, these simulations lead to the unequivocal rejection of the 
portion of H2 that deals with polarization under divided government. 
   
Table 4.6  
Estimated Probabilities of President Victory in the House with Difference of Means 
Tests  
Scenario  
Mean Polarization, Unified Government 0.66 
Mean Polarization, Divided Government 0.54 
High Polarization, Unified Government 0.77 
High Polarization, Divided Government 0.57 
 
Difference of Means Tests   
1. Divided Government at Mean Polarization  
Ho: Mean (Divided Government) - Mean (Unified Government)= 0 
Difference= -.12 t= -73.8*  
   
2. Divided Government at High Polarization  
Ho: Mean (Divided Government) - Mean (Unified Government)= 0 
Difference= -.20 t= -73.1*  
   
3. Polarization Under Unified Government  
Ho: Mean (High Polarization) - Mean (Low Polarization)= 0 
Difference= .11 t= 81.2*  
   
4. Polarization Under Divided Government  
Ho: Mean (High Polarization) - Mean (Low Polarization)= 0 
Difference= .03 t= 16.6*  
 
Notes: The mean probabilities of passage for each scenario are derived using 1000 simulations of the 
model in Table 4.5 using King, Tomz, and Wittenberg’s (2000) clarify, and setting variables to key values.   
Mean polarization is defined as polarization=0, high polarization is defined as polarization = .25.  
President’s position and divided government alternate between 0 and 1.  Continuous control variables are 
held at their mean, dichotomous control variables are held at their modal category. 
For all difference of means tests N=1000. 
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 Based on the simulations derived from the results of the probit model, 
polarization has a positive effect on the probability of presidential success in the House 
and divided government has a negative impact on the probability of presidential success.  
There was no interactive effect for polarization and divided government as anticipated 
by H2.  Figure 4.3 provides a final check on the possibility of an interaction between 
polarization and divided government, but no such relationship is evident in the graph.   
 
Figure 4.3 Estimates of the Effects of Polarization on the Probability of Presidential 
Victory in the House for Unified and Divided Government 
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 The findings of the House model indicate that only part of the hypothesis 
regarding polarization can be accepted.  The evidence for the polarization and unified 
government hypothesis is clear.  Polarization increases the probability of presidential 
success under unified government.  On the other hand, polarization also increases the 
probability of presidential success under divided government.  This the opposite of what 
the divided government portion of the House polarization hypothesis anticipated.  This 
leads to the conclusion that in the House polarization does not impede the president, and 
can actually help him, but there is no help for the president’s position when he faces a 
House controlled by the opposition party.    
Senate Model of Presidential Success 
 The Senate model yields some unexpected results.  The Senate polarization 
hypothesis anticipated that polarization in the Senate would lead to a decrease in the 
probability of presidential success regardless of the presence of polarization.  Yet, the 
probit models and the simulations show the exact opposite effects.  This finding leads to 
the rejection of the Senate polarization hypothesis.  The model presented in this section 
also provides the first hint in this study that the Senate does not behave as theorized in a 
polarized environment.   
 Table 4.7 displays the probit estimates for presidential success in the Senate.  The 
model is weaker than the other models in the chapter.  Though the model is statistically 
significant, the reduction in error is a paltry 0.7 percent.  The results from the model and 
the simulations must be interpreted with a certain amount of caution.  However, it does 
provide enough evidence for the rejection of the Senate polarization hypothesis.   
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Table 4.7 
Senate Model of Presidential Victories  
 Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Pr Change 
Polarization 1.05* 0.53 0.05 
Divided Government -0.32** 0.13 -0.12 
Polarization*Divided Government -0.48 0.64 -0.02 
Presidential Approval at Introduction 0.004 0.004 0.02 
Change in Presidential Approval 0.01 0.01 0.03 
Majority Party 0.12 0.09 0.05 
1st Year, 1st Term 0.13 0.08 0.05 
1st Year 2nd Term 0.03 0.13 0.01 
Presidential Election Year -0.33*** 0.10 -0.13 
President Running for Reelection 0.37* 0.20 0.13 
Midterm Election Year -0.03 0.13 -0.01 
Ideological Distance 0.02 0.21 0.00 
Constant 0.10 0.29  
 
Prob < chi²= .0661* 
AIC= 1.36 
Correctly Classified= 59.8% 
Reduction in Error= 0.7% 
N=795 
P(y=1׀x)=.5933 
* significant at p < .10 ** significant at p < .05 *** significant at p < .001 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by Congress. 
Polarization is centered at its mean. 
Pr Change is the change in predicted probability of a presidential victory as continuous variables increase 
by one standard deviation and as dichotomous variables move from zero to one. 
 
 
 The probit estimates reveal remarkable similarities between the House and 
Senate.  Polarization is significant and positive with a change in predicted probability of 
5 percent.  This should be interpreted as polarization increasing the probability of 
presidential success in the Senate under unified government.  At the same time divided 
government is significant and negative.  These are the same results as those in the 
House.   
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  Table 4.8 displays the simulations based on the probit results from the Senate 
model.  As in the congressional and House models, divided government is large and 
negative force when it comes to presidential success.  At mean polarization, the 
probability of presidential victory falls from 67 percent under unified government to 54 
percent under divided government.  At high polarization, divided government reduces  
 
Table 4.8 
Estimated Probabilities of President Victory in the Senate with Difference of Means 
Tests 
Scenario  
Mean Polarization, Unified Government 0.67 
Mean Polarization, Divided Government 0.54 
High Polarization, Unified Government 0.75 
High Polarization, Divided Government 0.60 
 
Difference of Means Tests   
1. Divided Government at Mean Polarization  
Ho: Mean (Divided Government) - Mean (Unified Government)= 0 
Difference= -.12 t= -89.6*  
   
2. Divided Government at High Polarization  
Ho: Mean (Divided Government) - Mean (Unified Government)= 0 
Difference= -.16 t= -59*  
   
3. Polarization Under Unified Government  
Ho: Mean (High Polarization) - Mean (Low Polarization)= 0 
Difference= .08 t=56.9*  
   
4. Polarization Under Divided Government  
Ho: Mean (High Polarization) - Mean (Low Polarization)= 0 
Difference= .05 t= 30.2*  
 
Notes: The mean probabilities of passage for each scenario are derived using 1000 simulations of the 
model in Table 4.7 using King, Tomz, and Wittenberg’s (2000) clarify, and setting variables to key values.   
Mean polarization is defined as polarization=0, high polarization is defined as polarization = .25.  
President’s position and divided government alternate between 0 and 1.  Continuous control variables are 
held at their mean, dichotomous control variables are held at their modal category. 
For all difference of means tests N=1000. 
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the probability of presidential success from 75 percent to 60 percent.  Difference of 
means test 1 and 2 show that these drops are statistically significant.  Given the effects in 
the House and congressional models, these results were to be expected. 
 The unexpected result is that polarization increases the probability of presidential 
success in the Senate regardless of whether party control is unified or divided.  The 
positive effect appears to be stronger under unified than under divided government.  
During unified government, the probability of presidential success on a given piece of 
legislation increases from 67 percent to 75 percent as polarization increases from its 
mean to a high value.  Under divided government, the same change in polarization only 
yields an increase from 54 percent to 60 percent.  Both changes are statistically 
significant according to difference of means tests 3 and 4.   
 Figure 4.4 finishes the analysis by testing for an interactive relationship between 
polarization and divided government.  Such a relationship is not hypothesized, and 
neither the probit model nor the simulations provide any indication of one.  This final 
test is employed out of an abundance of caution.  However, the graph in Figure 4.4 
provides no surprises.  There is no significant difference between the estimated 
probability of presidential victory under unified and divided government at any plausible 
value of polarization.      
 Based on the evidence in the probit model and simulations, it appears that 
scholars have underestimated the ability of a cohesive majority party in the Senate to 
win legislative battles for a president of their own party.  Though majority party control 
is not as much of an advantage in the Senate as it is in the House, the majority party is  
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Figure 4.4 Estimates of the Effects of Polarization on the Probability of Presidential 
Victory in the Senate for Unified and Divided Government 
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not thwarted all the time.  A possible explanation for this unexpected result is that the 
filibuster is a tool that the minority party uses selectively.  It may be that the minority 
party picks its battles with the president rather than trying to stop every piece of 
legislation the president supports.  They are selective enough for the majority party to 
get what it wants most of the time, which means presidential victories increase in the 
Senate as polarization increases under unified government. 
 An explanation for why polarization leads to an increase in the probability of 
presidential success under divided government is more difficult to conjecture.  However, 
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it should be noted that once again the increase in the probability of presidential victory 
as polarization increases under divided government is small compared to the change 
under unified government.  It should also be noted that in the Senate, the differences in 
probability between divided and unified government are larger than the differences 
between mean and high polarization.  Party differences with the president rather than 
differences between the parties are the more important factor when it comes to 
determining presidential victories in the Senate.  
Conclusion 
 The key finding of the analysis in this chapter is the negative impact of divided 
government on presidential success.  Divided government consistently has a significant 
negative impact on the probability of presidential success.  This finding is consistent 
with what is known in the previous literature.  Works like Bond and Fleisher (1990) find 
that partisan make up of the chambers has the greatest impact on presidential success, 
rather than factors like the personal skill of individual presidents. 
 Although polarization has a minimal impact in the aggregate, it does have an 
effect in the individual chambers.  In the House, polarization leads to an increase in the 
probability that the president gets what he wants, especially under unified government.  
When the president’s party is in the majority, it is more willing to give the president 
what he wants as the parties become ideologically more distinct.  The House performs as 
expected under unified government. 
 The surprising finding in this chapter is that the Senate treats the president in 
much the same way as the House as polarization increases.  Though the differences in 
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probability are smaller than in the House, the Senate majority party also shows a greater 
tendency to support the president of there own party as polarization increases.  This is 
the first evidence this study finds that the Senate reacts to polarization in a similar 
manner as the House.  This is the first indication in this study that researchers who focus 
on the filibuster as the way of drawing distinctions between the House and the Senate 
may be overestimating its importance.  The following chapter will provide further 
evidence of this possible error.      
 Taken together, the findings of this chapter and Chapter III make it clear that to a 
certain extent party label trumps ideology.  Polarization does not enhance the effects of 
divided government on presidential position taking and presidential success.  The 
opposition party does not want to hand the president victories regardless of how 
ideologically close or distance the parties might be.  The president understands this and 
adjusts his position taking strategy under divided government.  The only exception to 
this is that under unified government, the president’s party in both chambers is more 
willing to use their power under the rules to help their president achieve his goals.  At 
the same time, polarization does not increase the hostility to the president’s position of 
the opposing party under divided government.  Party difference is reason enough to try 
to stop the president regardless of the ideological distance between the parties.    
 This chapter completes the task that began in Chapter III.  Given the theory that 
the impact of divided government on the law making process is contingent on whether or 
not the president takes a position on a bill and the impact of polarization is contingent on 
divided government, it is critical to establish an empirical foundation for how these 
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factors impacted presidential position taking and presidential success.  With these tasks 
complete, the effects of polarization and divided government on bill passage and 
gridlock can now be explored.   
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CHAPTER V 
PASSING LEGISLATION IN A POLARIZED CONGRESS 
 With a better understanding of the presidential-congressional relationship, I now 
turn to the main object of this study, the effects of polarization on the passage of 
legislation.  This chapter has two objectives.  The first objective is to gain an 
understanding of the effects of polarization on the legislative process.  This is the most 
important institutional feature this study examines, as making decisions on the passage 
of legislation is one of the primary purposes of Congress.  If it can be shown that 
polarization has changed the way that Congress passes legislation we will have evidence 
that the increase in polarization over the past several decades has altered the way 
Congress functions as an institution, and alters more than just the tone of debate on 
Capitol Hill. 
 The second objective is to contribute to the gridlock literature by properly 
modeling both polarization and divided government.  As discussed in Chapters I and II, 
studies of gridlock make two errors.  First, previous studies use aggregate the data and 
miss the different effects of polarization in the House and Senate.  Second, they 
improperly model divided government by not accounting for presidential position.  This 
chapter corrects these errors by breaking down the process by the House and Senate and 
by whether or not the president takes a position.  If this modeling strategy proves viable, 
then the traditional modeling strategy of the gridlock literature must be altered to 
account for these findings.  The investigation begins by outlining a few specific 
hypotheses that are tested in this chapter.  
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A Theory of Polarization and Legislative Productivity 
 The gridlock literature leaves us with general conclusions regarding the role of 
divided government and polarization in the legislative process.  Both conditions 
contribute to gridlock.  Yet, the gridlock literature does a poor job of explaining where in 
the legislative process divided government and polarization actually produce gridlock.  It 
is, therefore, necessary to specify a theory about how divided government will affect the 
passage of legislation in the House and Senate respectively, and how the presence of 
polarization under divided government would affect the productivity of each chamber. 
 A basic flaw in the study of divided government is the failure to properly account 
for the role of the president.  Studies that model the passage of legislation in the 
aggregate generally assume that party differences between the president and Congress 
uniformly cause gridlock across important legislation (see Howell et al. 2000; Kelly 
1993; among others).  Apparently, little thought has been given to whether divided 
government affects legislation when the president has no position.  There is no 
theoretical reason to assume that either Congress or the president is hostile to such 
legislation in general, nor should they be more hostile towards it under divided 
government. 
 Divided government should manifest its effects on legislation where the 
president takes a position, regardless of that position.  Under divided government, the 
majority party in the House is more likely to stop legislation the president supports and 
pass more legislation the president opposes.  Even if his fellow partisans in the Senate 
are able to stop some of the legislation the president opposes, they will be unable to put 
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forth an agenda the president supports.  This means that the president has to veto any of 
the legislation he opposes that gets past the filibuster in the Senate.  This leads to the 
following hypothesis: 
Divided Government Hypothesis (H1): Divided government causes a decrease in the 
probability that a bill passes, but only if the president takes a position on the bill. 
 
 Though divided government has independent effects on the probability that 
legislation passes, it also interacts with polarization.  The effects of polarization are 
theorized to be different in each chamber.  In the case of the House, if the conditional 
party government and cartel theories (Aldrich and Rohde 2000; Cox and McCubbins 
1993; 2005) hold, then it is likely that divided government will have no impact within 
the House itself.  Under unified government, the president’s party passes the president’s 
agenda.  Under divided government, the majority party will substitute its own program 
for the president’s.  Further, as polarization increases in the House, the better the 
condition of the conditional party government theory is satisfied, leading to an increase 
in the probability of important legislation passing.  Although legislation passing the 
House under these circumstances may have less chance of passing the more bipartisan 
Senate, or of ultimately being signed by the president, whatever the ultimate fate of the 
legislation the House passes, it is clearly not the chamber in which one would expect to 
find gridlock.  Therefore, I posit the following hypothesis about bill passage in the 
House: 
House Polarization Hypothesis (H2): Increased polarization will lead to an increase in 
the probability of passage of legislation in the House of Representatives regardless of the 
presence of divided government. 
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 As polarization increases in the Senate, however, members of the minority party 
are more likely to exercise their prerogatives under Senate rules to block majority party 
legislation.  The filibuster is a more effective roadblock when parties are polarized 
because the more cohesive minority party is better able to keep its members together on 
cloture votes.  McCarty (2007) and Sinclair (2008) anticipate this effect of polarization.  
The question is whether the minority party has additional incentives under divided 
government to filibuster.  Once again the premise of the gridlock literature is that 
partisan difference between Congress and the president prevents policy change under 
divided government.  But minority members of Congress can use Senate rules to block 
legislation under both unified and divided government.  Thus, while polarization in the 
Senate will lead to a decrease in the passage of legislation, divided government should 
have little if any effect on this relationship. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
Senate Polarization Hypothesis (H3): Increased party polarization leads to a decrease in 
the probability of passage of legislation in the Senate regardless of the presence of 
divided government. 
 
 With respect to the overall legislative process, most of the gridlock literature, 
especially that which concentrates on the effects of divided government, looks at the 
passage of legislation through the entire process--i.e., legislative success is defined as a 
bill that passes the House, Senate, and is signed by the president and becomes law.  With 
few exceptions (Jones 2001), previous studies do not disaggregate the process.  The 
models implicitly assume that divided government causes gridlock because the president 
and Congress disagree.  But disagreement between the president and Congress is not the 
only reason significant legislation fails. Bicameralism builds gridlock into the legislative 
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process.  For example, some gridlock occurs when both chambers pass a bill, but one 
rejects a conference report, or they fail to go to conference either for lack of time or 
because of policy disagreements.  Binder (2003) includes a variable to control for 
bicameral differences that may account for this source of gridlock.  The gridlock 
literature in the main finds that divided government causes an increase in gridlock.  
Although the strength of the effect varies according to how researchers define 
“significant legislation” (see Kelly 1993 and Howell et al. 2000), the definition of 
divided government is consistent—the presidency and one or both houses of Congress 
controlled by different parties.  This definition of divided government assumes that the 
observed effect is the result of policy disagreement between the president and Congress. 
 Even with the differences in strength across models, the finding is consistent 
enough to posit that divided government increases the overall occurrence of gridlock or 
reduces the number of bills that become law.  But if differences between the president 
and Congress are the source of gridlock, this effect should occur only on bills on which 
the president takes a position.  Furthermore, I provide a more complete explanation of 
why gridlock occurs.   
 Because the minority party in the Senate always has an incentive to slow down 
and if possible stop legislation and polarization should enhance their ability to do so, an 
increase in polarization should lead to a decrease in the passage of legislation under both 
unified and divided government.  Divided government creates a situation where the 
House is no longer passing legislation the president is willing to sign.  This means that 
whatever gets past the Senate filibuster is more likely to get vetoed by the president.  
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Thus the combination of divided government and polarization should create even more 
gridlock then either of the two factors could alone.   This can all be distilled into the 
following hypothesis: 
Polarization Interaction Hypothesis (H4): As party polarization increases, the probability 
of passage of legislation into law will decrease.  The probability of passage will decrease 
more as polarization increases under divided government. 
 
Setting up the Models 
 To test the hypotheses discussed above, three models were estimated.  These 
examined legislation in the House, Senate, and overall legislative process.  Each model 
includes a series of interaction terms whose coefficients measure the significance of the 
impacts of divided government and polarization when the president did or did not take a 
position.  Once again, the data used to test the hypotheses was the set of bills described 
in Chapter I and listed in Appendix A.  Bills were placed in the House, Senate and 
congressional models according to the methods discussed in Chapter IV.  After these 
adjustments, the House model contained 973 bills, the Senate models 1003, and the 
congressional models 1093.   
 The dependent variable for each model is whether or not a bill passed each body 
under investigation, coded one if it passed the chamber, zero otherwise.   For the 
congressional model, bills are coded one if they became public law, zero otherwise.  
These are bills that passed both chambers, were signed by the president or had the 
president’s veto over ridden.  The binary dependent variables necessitate the use of 
probit for all of the models estimated in this chapter. 
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 As in Chapters IIII and IV, all models include the polarization variable, divided 
government variable and the polarization and divided government interaction term.  
These variables are fully described in Chapter II.  Once again, polarization is centered on 
its mean. 
 The models in this chapter also include a series of interaction terms designed to 
estimate the effects of divided government and polarization when the president takes a 
position on a bill.  An interaction term between divided government and the presidential 
position variable is specifically designed to test the divided government hypothesis.  The 
interaction of polarization and presidential position is included to see if the effects of 
polarization change when the president takes a position on a bill.  To test the influence of 
polarization on the probability of a bill passing when that bill is considered under 
divided government and the president has taken a position on the bill requires a three-
way interaction between divided government, polarization, and presidential position. 
 The inclusion of multiple interaction terms and a three-way interaction term 
makes the direct interpretation of probit coefficients and the predicted changes in 
probability associated with them difficult.  To ease the interpretation of the results, I 
utilized the statistical software package “Clarify” (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000). 
Using Monte Carlo simulations of the model under analysis, “Clarify” calculates the 
mean expected value of a dependent variable under various conditions of interest.  The 
specific scenarios created for each model are discussed more in depth below. 
 All the models in this chapter had one control variable in common.  Time to 
Congress close captures the effects of the timing of the introduction of legislation.  A bill 
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introduced at the beginning of a Congress has a better chance of passing than one 
introduced at the end simply because of time considerations.  The variable is measured 
in days.  For the congressional models it is the number of days between the introduction 
date and the close of the Congress.  For the House and Senate models it is the number of 
days from when the chamber received it, either through the bill being introduced or the 
bill arriving from the other chamber, until the end of the Congress. 
 Three additional control variables are included in the House and Senate models 
to account for other party factors that may affect the passage of legislation.  A dummy 
variable for party is coded one for when the Democrats were the majority in the chamber 
and zero otherwise.  Majority party size is the percentage of seats held by the majority 
party in a given chamber.  Majority party cohesion is the measure used by Cooper and 
Young (1997, 2002) to measure the internal cohesion of congressional parties.  The 
measure is the difference in the average absolute percentage of members of the majority 
voting yes and average absolute percentage of majority party members voting no across 
all roll call votes in a given Congress.  These party measures are included because there 
is some evidence that changes in the majority party or an increase in the number of seats 
or cohesion of the majority party can at least create an opportunity for policy change 
(Hurley, Brady, and Cooper 1977, Brady 1978, Hurley 1979).  Descriptive statistics for 
all variables in the models in this chapter are available in Appendix B. 
Congressional Model 
 Because the congressional model is most comparable to the models from the 
previous gridlock literature, I will discuss it first.  The model of congressional bill 
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passage is displayed in Table 5.1. Though the model is statistically significant, the 
goodness of fit measures are not especially impressive.  However, the 2.1 percent 
reduction in error is about average for the models throughout this study and is the largest 
reduction in error in this chapter.  The model is increasing our ability to predict the 
passage of legislation compared to a naïve model that always predicts the modal 
category.  At the very least, the model provides us with an ability to predict the passage 
of legislation based on polarization and divided government. 
 
Table 5.1 
Probit Estimates and Probability Changes for the Congress Model 
 
     
Coefficient 
Standard 
Errors 
Pr 
Change 
Polarization  2.02** 0.94 .09 
Divided Government  0.43* 0.23 .16 
President Takes a Position  1.07*** 0.24 .35 
Polarization * Divided Government  -1.59 1.65 -.06 
Polarization * President Takes a Position -1.52* .92 -.06 
Divided Government * President Takes a 
Position -0.80** 0.26 -.30 
Polarization * Divided Government * President 
Takes a Position 0.71 1.44 .02 
Time to Congress Closes 0.00 0.00 .001 
Constant -0.98*** 0.25  
    
 
Prob < chi²= .0000*** 
AIC= 1.31 
Correctly Classified= 61.8% 
Reduction in Error= 2.1% 
N=1093 
P(y=1׀x)= .3975 
* significant at p <.10 ** significant at p < .05 *** significant at p < .001 
 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by Congress. 
Polarization is centered at its mean. 
Pr Change is the change in predicted probability of a bill becoming public law as continuous variables 
increase by one standard deviation and as dichotomous variables move from zero to one.  
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 This model provides the best test of the divided government hypothesis in this 
chapter.  The evidence indicates that, as expected, divided government has a negative 
and statistically significant impact, but only when the president takes a position on a bill.  
Substantively, legislation has a 30 percent less chance of becoming public law when the 
president takes a position on it under divided government.  In contrast, under divided 
government when the president takes no position on a bill, the probability of its passage 
actually increases by 16 percent.  This illuminates the finding from Chapter III.  Recall 
that the president has a greater chance of taking no position on bills under divided 
government relative to supporting bills.  These two findings illustrate that he has 
incentives to take no position on legislation under divided government.  Not only does 
the president avoid setting up an extra obstacle, taking no position actually gives his bills 
a boost.  He also has greater incentive to oppose legislation he dislikes as taking any 
position leads to an increased probability that the legislation fails.   
 The simulations in Table 5.2 further illustrate both points.  In the top part of the 
table are the mean estimates of eight simulations created using the congressional model 
in Table 5.1.  The values represent the mean probability that a bill passes under the 
defined circumstances.  For the dichotomous variables, divided government and  
presidential position, they were set at one according to whether the scenario included 
them or not.  For the mean polarization scenarios, polarization was set at zero, in high  
polarization scenarios it was set to .25.8  This value was chosen because the objective of 
this work is to understand the consequences of high polarization.  Therefore, a value was 
                                                 
8
 Polarizations maximum value in the congressional model was .30. 
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Table 5.2 
Estimated Mean Probability of a Bill Becoming Public Law and Difference of Means 
Tests 
Scenario 
President Takes 
Position 
President Takes No 
Position 
Mean Polarization, Unified Government 0.54 0.17 
Mean Polarization, Divided Government 0.39 0.29 
High Polarization, Unified Government 0.58 0.33 
High Polarization, Divided Government 0.35 0.33 
   
 
Difference of Means Tests   
1. Divided Government at Mean Polarization when the President Takes a Position 
Ho: Mean (Divided Government) - Mean (Unified Government)= 0 
Difference= -.15 t=-130.0*  
   
2. Divided Government at High Polarization when the President Takes a Position 
Ho: Mean (Divided Government) - Mean (Unified Government)= 0 
Difference= -.22 t=-90.8*  
   
3. Divided Government at Mean Polarization when the President Takes a No 
Position 
Ho: Mean (Divided Government) - Mean (Unified Government)= 0 
Difference= .13 t= 71.9*  
   
4. Divided Government at High Polarization when the President Takes a No Position 
Ho: Mean (Divided Government) - Mean (Unified Government)= 0 
Difference= .01 t=1.83  
   
5. Polarization Under Unified Government When President Takes a Position 
Ho: Mean (High Polarization) - Mean (Low Polarization)= 0 
Difference=.05 t=28.5*  
   
6. Polarization Under Divided Government When President Takes a Position 
Ho: Mean (High Polarization) - Mean (Low Polarization)= 0 
Difference= -.03 t= -23.8*  
 
Notes: The mean probabilities of passage for each scenario are derived using 1000 simulations of the 
model in Table 5.1 using King, Tomz, and Wittenberg’s (2000) clarify, and setting variables to key values.   
Mean polarization is defined as polarization=0, high polarization is defined as polarization = .25.  
President’s position and divided government alternate between 0 and 1.  Continuous control variables are 
held at their mean, dichotomous control variables are held at their modal category. 
For all difference of means tests N=1000.  * significant at p < .05 
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selected near the maximum value of polarization for all three models.  The interaction 
terms were set according to the values of their constituent parts.  Continuous control 
variables were set at their mean and dichotomous control variables to their modal 
category. 
  The simulations show that under divided government when the president takes a 
position, the probability of passage of significant legislation takes a noticeable drop 
regardless of the level of polarization.  The probability of passage decreases from 54 
percent under unified government to 39 percent under unified government when 
polarization is held at its mean.  The probability of passage shows a similar decline when 
polarization is high, moving from 58 percent to 35 percent.  Difference of means tests 1 
and 2 in the second portion of Table 5.2 confirm that these declines are statistically 
significant. 
 The same effects do not hold when the president takes no position on legislation.  
At mean polarization the probability of passage of legislation shows a counterintuitive 
increase from 17 percent to 29 percent when moving from unified to divided 
government, a statistically significant increase according to difference of means test 3.  
At a high level of polarization the difference is negligible as shown in difference of 
means test 4. 
  This is strong evidence for the divided government hypothesis.  Divided 
government behaves as expected.  The concept of divided party control, assumes that the 
president and Congress are likely to have opposite policy preferences, and these policy 
differences will lead to more gridlock.  If the president takes no position, there is no 
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basis to expect divided government to contribute to gridlock.  The simulations show that 
when the president is not explicitly accounted for in models of legislative gridlock, the 
effect of divided government is underestimated.  At mean levels of polarization, bills on 
which the president has no position are more likely to pass under divided government.  
By bills on which the president expressed no position, in their models of legislative 
gridlock, previous studies underestimate the true effects of divided government.       
 Moving to polarization, Tables 5.1 and 5.2 also provide the statistics necessary to 
test the polarization interaction hypothesis, which holds that the effects of divided 
government become increasingly negative as polarization rises.  For this hypothesis, the 
simulations in Table 5.2 prove to be indispensable.   Based purely on the coefficients in 
the probit model, the effects of polarization are less than impressive.  First, the 
coefficient for polarization is in the opposite direction than was anticipated by 
polarization interaction hypothesis, suggesting that the probability of passage increases 
as polarization increases on bills under unified government when the president took no 
position.  At the same time, the coefficient for the polarization and presidential position 
interaction term is negative and significant.  This seems to suggest that an increase in 
polarization decreases the probability of passage when the president takes a position 
under unified government.  There is no theoretical reason why this should occur. 
Furthermore, none of the interaction terms that account for both polarization and divided 
government are significant in this model.  Regardless of whether the president takes a 
position, polarization in combination with divided government does not create gridlock.  
The large number of interactions in the model, however, muddles the picture.  
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 The simulations in Table 5.2 provide a clearer picture of the effects polarization, 
particularly when it interacts with divided government.  In the interests of simplicity the 
discussion of the effects of polarization will only involve scenarios for bills on which the 
president took a position.  I do this primarily because the theory in this chapter does not 
posit significant differences for the effects of polarization based on presidential position.  
In effect, my discussion of polarization will treat presidential position as a control 
variable.  Under unified government, the probability that a bill passes increases from 54 
percent to 58 percent when polarization moves from its mean to a high value.  In 
contrast, under divided government, as polarization moves from its mean to .25, the 
probability of passage decreases from 39 percent to 35 percent.  Though these 
differences are modest, difference of means tests 5 and 6 show that both changes are 
statistically significant.   
 This provides partial evidence for the hypothesis that an increase in polarization 
should lead to a decrease in the probability of passage in general.  The simulations show 
evidence that polarization interacts with divided government, as illustrated by the 
differences in the direction of the t statistic in difference of means tests 5 and 6.   
 The difference in the effects of polarization under unified and divided 
government is illustrated graphically in Figure 5.1.  The lines in the graphs represent 95 
percent confidence intervals around the probability of passage at different levels of 
polarization.  When the lines do not overlap there is a statistically significant difference 
between the two series at the .05 level.  At low levels of polarization, the estimated 
probability of passage is not statistically different between unified and divided 
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government.  As polarization increases above its mean level (zero), a statistically 
significant difference emerges.  This may be why the coefficient for the polarization and 
divided government interaction is not significant in the probit model.  Only 489 bills in 
the dataset occur in Congresses with above average polarization. Because there are no 
differences in the estimated probability of passage when polarization is low, it unlikely 
that the probit model was able to discern the differences between unified and divided 
government when polarization was high.   
 
Figure 5.1 Effects of Polarization under Unified and Divided Government, Congress 
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 The evidence presented so far makes a strong case for both the divided 
government hypothesis and the polarization interaction hypothesis.  The effects of 
divided government are clearly contingent on whether or not the president takes a 
position on a piece of legislation.  Polarization has a significant affect on the probability 
a bill becomes law, but the effects are different under unified and divided government.  
Polarization increases the probability of passage under unified government and 
decreases it under divided government.  This is evidence not only of the importance of 
polarization, but of the interactive effects between polarization and divided government.  
However, it should be noted that difference of means tests are a low barrier, especially 
when comparing means for series with such a high number of observations.  Though the 
comparison of means were significant for both polarization and divided government, the 
much larger differences for the divided government tests indicate that divided 
government rather than polarization is the primary cause of gridlock at the overall 
Congressional level.  At the same time, the impact of polarization under divided 
government should not be ignored.  I now turn to the effects polarization has in the 
individual chambers. 
House Model 
 The House polarization hypothesis anticipates that polarization leads to an 
increase in the probability of bills passing the House regardless of the presence of 
divided government.  In other words, the influence of polarization under both unified 
and divided government should be positive and significant.  A combination of both the 
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coefficients in the probit model of bill passage and the House and simulations based on 
that model support this interpretation.   
 The results for the probit model of House passage of legislation are displayed in 
Table 5.3.  The model performs as well as the other models in this chapter and 
throughout the study.  Again, the actual reduction in error, 1.1 percent, is not impressive, 
but it does indicate that the model explains more about the passage of legislation in the 
House than the simple alternative. 
 This model indicates that when the president does not take a position under 
unified government, polarization is significant and positive.  Conversely, under divided 
government when the president does not take a position polarization is significant and 
negative, leading to the conclusion that polarization interacts with divided government in 
the House the same way it does in the general model.   
 However, as I argue above, when looking at polarization, it is useful to treat 
presidential position as a control variable at least when analyzing the simulations.  In the 
model itself, the interaction terms between polarization and presidential position are 
insignificant under both unified and divided government.  This indicates that 
polarization does not influence bills on which the president takes a position.  However, 
the scenarios in Table 5.4 indicate that when the president takes a position, an increase 
from mean to high polarization leads to an increase in the probability of significant 
legislation passing under both unified and divided government.   
 These changes in means are small.  Under unified government, an increase from 
mean to high polarization increases the probability of passage from 79 percent to 87  
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  Table 5.3 
Probit Estimates and Probability Changes for the House Model 
 Coefficient 
Standard 
Errors 
Pr 
Change 
Polarization  2.69** 1.10 0.11 
Divided Government  -0.10 0.20 -0.03 
President Takes a Position  0.59** 0.20 0.20 
Polarization * Divided Government  -3.49** 1.59 -0.10 
Polarization * President Takes a Position  -1.29 1.09 -0.05 
Divided Government * President Takes a Position  0.06 0.23 0.02 
Polarization * Divided Government * President 
Takes a Position 2.58 1.79 0.07 
Majority Party -0.11 0.17 -0.03 
Majority Party Size 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Majority Party Cohesion 0.002 0.01 0.01 
Time to Congress Closes 0.001** 0.0003 0.04 
Constant -0.49 0.86  
    
 
Prob < chi²= .0000*** 
AIC= 1.10 
Correctly Classified= 75.5% 
Reduction in Error= 1.1% 
N=973 
P(y=1׀x)= .7557 
* significant at p <.10 ** significant at p < .05 *** significant at p < .001 
 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by Congress. 
Polarization is centered at its mean. 
Pr Change is the change in predicted probability of a bill passing the House as continuous variables 
increase by one standard deviation and as dichotomous variables move from zero to one. 
 
 
percent.  Under divided government, the same increase in polarization leads to an 
increase in the probability of passage from 78 percent to 81 percent.  These changes are 
not as dramatic as the effects of divided government in the congressional model, but they 
are statistically significant (see difference of means tests 1 and 2 in Table 5.4).  There 
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are some more dramatic increases under unified government when the president takes no 
position.  
 This leads to the conclusion that an increase in polarization from its mean to near 
its high leads to an increase in the probability of passage.9  Note that the effects of 
polarization only occur when polarization is above its mean.  It is likely that a lack of  
 
Table 5.4 
Estimated Mean Probability of a Bill Passing the House and Difference of Means Tests 
 
President Takes 
Position 
President Takes No 
Position 
Mean Polarization, Unified Government 0.79 0.58 
Mean Polarization, Divided Government 0.78 0.54 
High Polarization, Unified Government 0.87 0.80 
High Polarization, Divided Government 0.81 0.46 
   
 
Difference of Means Tests   
1. Polarization Under Unified Government When President Takes a Position 
Ho: Mean (High Polarization) - Mean (Low Polarization)= 0 
Difference= .08 t= 64.9*  
   
2. Polarization Under Divided Government When President Takes a Position 
Ho: Mean (High Polarization) - Mean (Low Polarization)= 0 
Difference= .03 t= 18.4*  
   
3. Divided Government at Mean Polarization when the President Takes a Position 
Ho: Mean (Divided Government) - Mean (Unified Government)= 0 
Difference= -.01 t= -12.6*  
   
4. Divided Government at High Polarization when the President Takes a Position 
Ho: Mean (Divided Government) - Mean (Unified Government)= 0 
Difference= -.06 t= -34.6*  
 
Notes: The mean probabilities of passage for each scenario are derived using 1000 simulations of the 
model in Table 5.3 using King, Tomz, and Wittenberg’s (2000) clarify, and setting variables to key values.   
Mean polarization is defined as polarization=0, high polarization is defined as polarization = .25.  
President’s position and divided government alternate between 0 and 1.  Continuous control variables are 
held at their mean, dichotomous control variables are held at their modal category. 
For all difference of means tests N=1000.  * significant at p < .05 
  
                                                 
9
 The maximum value of polarization in the House was .30. 
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effects for polarization below its mean is the reason why the polarization and 
presidential position interactions are insignificant in the probit model. The fact that the 
coefficients in the probit model for polarization when the president does not take a 
position are statistically significant is also important.  These results lead to the 
conclusion that polarization leads to an increase in the probability of significant 
legislation passing the House regardless of whether the president takes a position and the 
presence of divided government.  This is compelling evidence for the House polarization 
hypothesis. 
 There are few more noteworthy features to the simulations for the House models.  
The difference of means tests for divided government when the president takes a 
position (tests 3 and 4 in Table 5.4) are statistically significant and negative.  This was 
unexpected.  House rules allow the majority party to push through its agenda regardless 
of the president.  One would not expect the House to show a decrease in the probability 
of passage due to divided government.   
 However, it should be noted that the actual movement due to divided 
government, a reduction from 79% to 78% at mean polarization and 87% to 81% at high 
polarization, are small compared to the decreases divided government caused in the 
congressional model.  According to the simulations, legislation has a very good chance 
of passing the House regardless of divided government.  In contrast, the congressional 
models show that legislation goes from about a 50-50 chance of becoming law under 
unified government to odds on failure under divided government.  This does not take 
away from the statistical significance of the differences between unified and divided 
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government in the House.  It should be pointed out that the effects of divided 
government are much more devastating to legislative productivity in the context of the 
general model. 
 Unlike the congressional model, there is no evidence of an interaction between 
polarization and divided government in the House.  Polarization does not enhance the 
negative effects of divided government in the House.  Evidence for this can be found in 
the positive results in difference of means test 2 in Table 5.4.  Figure 5.2 illustrates this 
graphically.  If there were an interactive effect, Figure 5.2 would show a gap between  
 
Figure 5.2 Effects of Polarization under Unified and Divided Government in the House 
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the confidence intervals of the divided and unified government series like in Figure 5.1.  
There is no evidence of such a gap in either graph in the figure. 
 The House model and simulations show the expected results.  Polarization leads 
to an increase in the probability of passage of significant legislation in the House.  These 
results lend credence to the conditional party government and cartel models of party rule 
in the House (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005; Aldrich and Rohde 2000).  Polarization 
helps to satisfy the condition of conditional party government which leads to an increase 
in the probability of passage in the House.  With the effects of polarization in the House 
now understood, I turn my attention to the Senate.  
Senate Model 
 The final model examines the impact of polarization and divided government in 
the Senate.  Unlike the House and congressional models, the Senate model and 
simulations provide no evidence for the stated hypothesis.  However, like the House 
model, polarization increases the probability that significant legislation passes the  
Senate.  I will speculate below on why this is so, but first I will take a closer look at the 
evidence.  
 The probit model for bill passage in the Senate, displayed in Table 5.5, performs 
about as well as the congressional and House models in terms of goodness of fit.  Again, 
the 1.6 percent reduction in error is far from overwhelming, but does indicate that the 
model has some explanatory value.  
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  The positive and significant results for the polarization variable indicates that 
polarization leads to an increase in the probability of the passage of significant 
legislation, but only under unified government and when the president does not take a  
 
Table 5.5 
Probit Estimates and Probability Changes for the Senate Model 
 Coefficient 
Standard 
Errors 
Pr 
Change 
Polarization  1.55* 0.83 0.06 
Divided Government  0.33 0.21 0.12 
President Takes a Position  0.69*** 0.18 0.26 
Polarization * Divided Government  -1.66 1.45 -0.05 
Polarization * President Takes a Position  0.06 0.79 0.002 
Divided Government * President Takes a 
Position -0.24 0.22 -0.09 
Polarization * Divided Government * President 
Takes a Position 0.31 1.40 0.01 
Majority Party 0.12 0.11 0.04 
Majority Party Size -0.01 0.01 -0.02 
Majority Party Cohesion -0.02* 0.01 -0.06 
Time to Congress Closes 0.001** 0.0002 0.05 
Constant 1.39 1.02  
 
Prob < chi²= .0000*** 
AIC= 1.24 
Correctly Classified= 64.8% 
Reduction in Error= 1.6% 
N=1003 
P(y=1׀x)= .6739 
* significant at p <.10 ** significant at p < .05 *** significant at p < .001 
 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by Congress. 
Polarization is centered at its mean. 
Pr Change is the change in predicted probability of a bill passing the Senate as continuous variables 
increase by one standard deviation and as dichotomous variables move from zero to one. 
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position.  All of the interaction terms that model the effects of polarization present null 
results.  Divided government also has no impact in the probit model.  The raw 
coefficients lead to the expectation that the only impact of polarization is found in the 
least controversial of circumstances. 
 However, like the House and congressional models, the interaction terms in the 
Senate model make it difficult to sort out the effects of polarization and divided 
government based on coefficients and predicted probabilities alone.  The simulations in 
Table 5.6 reveal effects for polarization that are strikingly similar to the House.  
 Under unified government, the increase in the probability of passage under high 
polarization compared to mean polarization is even higher than it is in the House.  When  
the president took a position, an increase in polarization increases the probability of 
passage from 71 percent to 82 percent.  Difference of means test 1 in Table 5.6 indicates 
that this increase is significant.  The increase in the mean probability of passage under 
divided government is much smaller, 74 percent to 76 percent, but is still statistically 
significant according to difference of means test 2.  There is a similar pattern of an 
increase in the probability of passage as polarization increases under unified government 
when the president takes no position.  These combined results force the rejection of 
Senate polarization hypothesis, polarization clearly does not lead to a decrease in the 
probability of passage of significant legislation in the Senate.   
 Why does the Senate model not only fail to yield the expect result, but also 
shows the opposite of the expected effect?  The institutional structure of the Senate may 
account for these findings.  A comparison to the House will be useful to illustrate this 
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point.  Both of the polarization hypotheses for the House and Senate were derived based 
on key institutional features unique to each chamber.  The House procedures that allow 
the majority party to control the floor and the agenda apply to every bill.  This means 
that the mechanism through which polarization affects legislative productivity is 
universal in the House. 
 
Table 5.6 
Estimated Mean Probability of a Bill Passing the Senate and Difference of Means Tests 
Scenario 
President Takes 
Position 
President Takes No 
Position 
Mean Polarization, Unified Government 0.71 0.45 
Mean Polarization, Divided Government 0.74 0.57 
High Polarization, Unified Government 0.82 0.60 
High Polarization, Divided Government 0.76 0.56 
   
 
Difference of Means Tests   
1. Polarization Under Unified Government When President Takes a Position 
Ho: Mean (High Polarization) - Mean (Low Polarization)= 0 
Difference= .12 t= 74.6*  
   
2. Polarization Under Divided Government When President Takes a Position 
Ho: Mean (High Polarization) - Mean (Low Polarization)= 0 
Difference= .02 t= 8.86*  
   
3. Divided Government at Mean Polarization when the President Takes a Position 
Ho: Mean (Divided Government) - Mean (Unified Government)= 0 
Difference= .03 t= 27.1*  
   
4. Divided Government at High Polarization when the President Takes a Position 
Ho: Mean (Divided Government) - Mean (Unified Government)= 0 
Difference= -.07 t= -34.2*  
 
Notes: The mean probabilities of passage for each scenario are derived using 1000 simulations of the 
model in Table 5.5 using King, Tomz, and Wittenberg’s (2000) clarify, and setting variables to key values.   
Mean polarization is defined as polarization=0, high polarization is defined as polarization = .25.  
President’s position and divided government alternate between 0 and 1.  Continuous control variables are 
held at their mean, dichotomous control variables are held at their modal category. 
For all difference of means tests N=1000.   * significant at p < .05 
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 On the other hand, the filibuster, the mechanism through which polarization was 
expected to cause gridlock in the Senate is only selectively applied.  The minority party 
uses the filibuster strategically, perhaps on issues key to their constituency.  This means  
that the filibuster is not an obstacle for every bill that passes though the Senate.  It also 
suggests that the increase in polarization does not affect every bill via the filibuster. 
 Further, the filibuster may not completely kill legislation.  In some cases, the 
threat of a filibuster can be used by the minority party to negotiate with the majority 
party for concessions on the substance of legislation.  Therefore it is likely that the true 
impact of polarization on legislation in the Senate is on the substance of legislation 
rather than on the passage of legislation.  If polarization is forcing the majority party to 
negotiate more with the minority, it could create more bipartisan legislation that in turn 
passes the Senate.  This is a possible explanation for why polarization actually increases 
the probability of important legislation passing the Senate. 
 Divided government also behaves in an unexpected manner in the Senate.  Like 
the House, divided government should not have an impact on the probability of passage 
in the Senate.  However, when polarization is at its mean divided government leads to a 
statistically significant increase in the passage of legislation (see difference of means test 
3), but at high polarization divided government leads to a decrease in the probability of 
passage (see difference of means test 4).  This suggests an interactive relationship 
between polarization and divided government, but the simulations in Figure 5.3 shows 
no significant difference between the unified and divided government series as was seen 
in Figure 5.1.  Like divided government in the House simulations, divided government 
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in the Senate simulations has a much smaller substantive impact than was found in the 
congressional simulation.  The evidence for an interactive effect between polarization 
and divided government in the Senate is mixed at best.   
 The important point from the Senate model is the lack of evidence that 
polarization increases gridlock through the filibuster.  Neither the probit coefficients nor 
the simulations derived from them provide any evidence that polarization decreases the 
probability that significant legislation passes the Senate.  This finding based on a more 
comprehensive sample of major bills calls into question the conclusions reached by the 
prior literature, especially those of McCarty (2007) and Sinclair (2008).   
 
Figure 5.3 Effects of Polarization under Unified and Divided Government in the Senate 
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 However, it is still possible that polarization in the Senate is having an impact on 
policy outputs.  The increase in polarization may allow the minority party to use a threat  
of a filibuster to force concessions in the content of legislation.  This effect does not 
show up in an analysis of the passage of legislation, but could still create a type of 
gridlock.  The central normative complaint about gridlock is that it inhibits policy 
innovation (Binder 2003 provides a good overview of such arguments).  McCarty, Poole, 
and Rosenthal (2006), for example, find that polarization prevents new solutions to 
income inequality.  It is possible that bills are still being passed, and at an even higher 
rate.  But if the most innovative features of the bills are being stripped out in the Senate, 
they might as well not pass at all.   
Conclusion 
  The results of this chapter provide evidence that both divided government and 
polarization impact the legislative process.  Divided government, as expected, decreases 
the probability that a bill becomes law and polarization increases this effect.  
Polarization also increases the probability that bills pass both the in House and in the 
Senate.  In the House this was expected, in the Senate it was not.     
 The contributions of this chapter are two-fold.  First, in terms of divided 
government, the findings of this chapter underscore the importance of explicitly 
accounting for the president’s position when examining the impact of divided 
government on the legislative process.  The conceptual definition of divided government 
suggests that party differences between the president and Congress is a cause of 
gridlock, yet the previous literature generally does not account for the position the 
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president takes on legislation.  The difference in the impact of divided government 
between when the president does or does not take a position shows that the literature is 
underestimating the effects of divided government.  The common methods of modeling 
divided government need to be reconsidered.   
 The second contribution pertains to both polarization and divided government.  
The influence of polarization and divided government were with a few exceptions 
remarkably similar in the House and the Senate.  The House and Senate both display a 
tendency to pass the bills that come before them.  When the president takes a position on 
a bill, the mean probabilities of passage of legislation in both chambers ranges between 
70 and 80 percent regardless of the status of divided government or polarization.   
 In contrast, the congressional model shows a large impact for divided 
government and that polarization enhances the effect of divided government.  Further, 
there is a much broader range of probabilities of passage in the congressional model.  
When the president takes a position, under unified government the probability of a bill 
becoming law ranges between 54 and 58 percent, but under divided government the 
probability range plunges to 39 to 35 percent.  The most important finding is that the 
probability of passage of legislation in the congressional model falls below 50%.  It 
indicates that the source of gridlock is located in the differences between the president 
and Congress rather than in bicameral differences. 
 This is important because of the tendency of some in the literature, particularly 
McCarty (2007) and Sinclair (2008) to locate the source of gridlock in differences 
between the House and Senate.  This emphasis appears to be ill founded.  The fact that 
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gridlock connected with polarization was only found in the congressional model 
indicates that the separation of powers rather than bicameralism is the primary source of 
gridlock.  This further underscores the importance of cooperation between the branches 
to advance policy change.  This is not to say that bicameralism should be dismissed as an 
obstacle to legislative productivity.  However, the institutional mechanism through 
which polarization and divided government create gridlock is clearly friction between 
the branches rather than bicameral differences.     
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
 This dissertation began with the challenge laid down by McCarty (2007), which 
was to push beyond examinations of the sources of party polarization and begin to build 
an understanding of the changes that the recent resurgence in polarization has brought to 
Congress as an institution.  As a first step, I chose to examine the impact of polarization 
on one of Congress’ most basic function, the passage of legislation.  Because of the 
interactive effects of divided government and polarization, errors in the way divided 
government was modeled in previous research had to be corrected.  This was done by 
examining the influence of divided government and polarization in the presidential-
congressional relationship and by accounting for the president’s position when modeling 
the passage of legislation.  This allowed for the specification of a more complete model 
of legislative gridlock.  This approach revealed a great deal about the workings of the 
polarized Congress. 
 Yet much work in this area remains.  The passage of legislation is only one of the 
basic tasks.  Congress is also a representative institution.    It is likely that polarization 
has affected the relationship between members of Congress and their constituents.  
Further, this dissertation does not map out the entire legislative process.  Committee 
activity, for example, is a key component of the legislative process.  The effects of 
polarization on committees need to be accounted for as well.  The findings of this study 
reveal the need for a broader research agenda that moves beyond policy gridlock into 
these areas of congressional politics. 
 113 
 As a first step in the process this chapter undertakes two tasks.  It summarizes the 
key findings of this study, tying together the seemingly disparate conclusions from the 
previous three chapters.  Second, it will suggest multiple directions that future research 
may take as the study of the consequences of polarization moves forward.  Particular 
attention will be paid to moving the study of the consequences of polarization beyond 
the confines of the gridlock literature. 
The Consequences of Polarization 
 The main objective of this dissertation is to increase the understanding of the 
effects of party polarization on Congress.  The findings of the previous three chapters on 
this point are best summarized in terms of context.  The effects of polarization on the 
functioning of Congress vary according to the object under study (i.e. presidential-
congressional relations, bill passage), the venue (House, Senate, aggregate process), and 
other institutional factors (divided government).   
 This summary in and of itself is unsatisfactory.  It is a complicated way of 
saying, “it depends.”  What it does make clear is that an aggregate analysis, heretofore 
the most common type in the gridlock literature, is incomplete.  It misses important 
variations in the effects of polarization that become evident once the process is broken 
down.  For example, one important finding of this study is that polarization increases the 
passage of legislation in the House and in the Senate under unified government.  This 
finding would be missed in an aggregate analysis.    
 From a theoretical perspective, the findings in the House on the effects of 
polarization support the cartel and conditional party government perspectives (Rohde 
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1991; Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005; Aldrich and Rohde 2000).  In contrast to 
parliamentary democracies, parties in the U.S. Congress lack the ability to discipline 
their members.  Because voters in states and districts control nominations, members of 
Congress will rebel against party leaders when they have electoral incentives to do so 
(Mayhew 1974).  Members of Congress must have incentives to support their party 
leaders.  When the electorate polarizes and elects members that are more extreme, 
polarization increases.  Under these circumstances, members have more incentives to 
support the party’s program.  In other words, polarization creates a de facto party 
discipline.  The parties become more discipline because the ideology of the electorate 
allows members to support their party’s program.  Polarization satisfies the conditions of 
conditional party government in the House.   
 Conditional party government and cartel theories, however, tend to concentrate 
on the House.  Institutional complications, such as the filibuster and other individual 
prerogatives available to the minority, suggested that party polarization might play out 
differently in the Senate.  This study initially made the Senate a key venue, theorizing 
that polarization would create gridlock because of institutional features like the filibuster 
that allow members of the minority party to obstruct legislation.  I found no evidence to 
support the expectation that polarization in the Senate leads to more gridlock. 
 Instead, the results from Chapters IV and V indicate that polarization affects the 
process in the Senate in a nearly identical way as in the House.  The simulations for the 
Senate model of presidential success show that as polarization increases in the Senate the 
probability of presidential success increases.  Increasing polarization also leads to a 
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substantial increase in the probability that the Senate passes significant legislation.  Both 
effects hold regardless of the presence of divided government, though they are stronger 
under unified government. 
  These results suggest that we need to rethink the theory.  The basis for the 
expectation that the Senate and the House will be different is the differences in rules of 
each chamber.  House rules give a great deal of power to the leaders of the majority 
party.  Legislation in the House must go through the Rules Committee controlled by the 
majority party to be considered on the floor.  Closed and restrictive special rules, which 
have come into greater use as polarization has increased (Sinclair 2000), allow the 
majority party to control the agenda and the terms of debate in the House.  The 
procedures that allow the majority party control of the floor are virtually absolute.  It is 
easy to develop theory about a process that leaves few exceptions.  As the parties 
become more ideologically distinct, the majority party will use its prerogatives more to 
pass its agenda.  
 In contrast, Senate rules protect prerogatives of the minority. The filibuster and 
60-vote requirement to invoke cloture provides great leverage for the minority party. 
Sinclair (2000) presents evidence that filibuster problems have more common in recent 
years, but the filibuster is not applied to all significant legislation.  Rather, it is used 
strategically to delay and kill legislation unless some of the minority party’s concerns are 
accommodated.  Just the threat of a filibuster can be effective.  They are often disposed 
of by informal deals that change legislation rather than killing it.  In other words, the 
filibuster is not a factor conducive to theories that posit a pass/fail outcome.  The more 
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important effects of the filibuster may be in the changes it causes in the content of 
legislation.  The threat of a filibuster may lead the majority party to make the legislation 
in question more bipartisan, decreasing the probability that the minority party will 
filibuster.  This may create a type of gridlock that can not be measure in terms of the 
passage or failure of legislation.  If the process of negotiations between the parties in the 
Senate leads to important policy changes being removed from the bill, the bill may pass 
but significant changes to policy will have been blunted.   
 Though polarization may not lead to the failure of legislation in the Senate, there 
is evidence that polarization leads to an increase in what Sinclair (2000, 54) refers to as a 
“filibuster problem,” as indicated by the correlation between polarization and the 
number of cloture votes in Congress.  The two are correlated at .73.10  Sinclair finds that 
major bills subject to extended debate have less of a chance to pass.  It is possible that 
polarization amplifies this effect, which would mean that bills filibustered in a polarized 
Senate are less likely to pass than bills filibustered in a less partisan Senate.     
 It is also worth keeping in mind that the Senate rules are not as rigid as House 
rules.  The Senate is a body with a tradition of strong informal norms.  Matthews (1973) 
outlined several of these.  Informal norms such as courtesy provide the basis for some of 
the individual prerogatives.   For example, there are no formal chamber rules allowing 
for holds other than the willingness of the majority leader to honor them.  This 
environment suggests that informal negotiations blunt the effect of filibusters, allowing 
legislation to pass through the polarized Senate, though in a vastly changed form.  
                                                 
10
 Statistics on cloture votes from Ornstein, Mann, and Malbin (2008). 
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Sinclair (2000) has found evidence that bills in the Senate that are heavily amended are 
more likely to pass. 
 The findings of this study indicate that polarization tends to help the president 
rather than creating more gridlock.  In both the House and Senate, an increase in 
polarization under unified government leads to an increase in presidential victories.  In a 
polarized House, the majority party is more willing to support their president through 
passing legislation he supports and stopping legislation he opposes.  The majority party 
in the Senate also appears more willing to fight for the president’s position as 
polarization increases.   
 There is one area in which polarization produces gridlock.  The simulations for 
the congressional model in Chapter V indicate that high polarization under divided 
government creates a modest decrease in the probability of significant legislation 
becoming public law.  This indicates that in the aggregate there is an interactive effect 
between divided government and polarization.  Polarization enhances the negative 
effects of divided government on legislation on which the president has a position.      
 Based on the findings reported in prior chapters, the story of polarization is less 
about creating gridlock than it is a story of enhancing majority party prerogatives.  This 
can be seen in the passage of legislation and in presidential victories in the individual 
chambers.  Polarization allows the majority party in each chamber to better pass its 
agenda and support its president. In the aggregate it leads to gridlock when combined 
with divided government.  Had this study followed the research designs of most of the 
gridlock literature, it would have found the aggregate gridlock effect, but missed the 
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important findings on the enhancement of majority party power in the House and the 
Senate.  This illustrates the importance of disaggregating analyses of the legislative 
process and examining the process in the individual chambers, rather than simply 
looking only at overall outcomes. 
A Proper Understanding of Divided Government 
 A secondary goal of this study was to illustrate the need to account for the 
president when modeling divided government.  As discussed above, divided government 
and polarization interact.  It is critical to properly model divided government in a study 
of polarization and gridlock.  This study shows that when the president’s position is 
explicitly accounted for when modeling bill passage, the substantive impact of divided 
government on the passage of legislation changes dramatically.  According to the 
simulations in Chapter V, when the president does not take a position on a bill the 
probability of passage under divided government increases by 12 percent at mean 
polarization and is static at high polarization.  In contrast, when the president takes a 
position on a bill, the probability of passage decreases by 15 percent at mean 
polarization and by 22 percent when polarization is high. 
 Chapters III and IV illustrate the importance of divided government in the 
presidential-congressional relationship.  Polarization has only a minimal impact on 
presidential position taking.  Divided government affects the strategic calculations of the 
president. As expected the president is significantly more likely to oppose legislation 
when the opposition party controls Congress.  But I also find that the president is 
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significantly more likely to “stay private” (Covington 1987) and take no position under 
divided government.   
 Divided government is also the key factor determining overall presidential 
victories.  Divided government significantly reduces the probability of the president 
winning on a bill overall and in the House and Senate individually.  It was also shown 
that divided government significantly reduces the probability of presidential victory on 
legislation he supports, though it has little impact on legislation he opposes. 
 However, key to the gridlock literature and this study is the effect of divided 
government on the passage of legislation.  In that context, divided government must be 
properly accounted for.  This study shows that when gridlock studies fail to account for 
presidential position on legislation, the effects of divided government are misestimated.  
The congressional model of bill passage in this study was specified to account for the 
presidential position taking.  Divided government was significant and negative when the 
president takes a position, and positive and significant when the president takes no 
position.  When researchers examine divided government without regard for the position 
of the president, they not only set up their models in a theoretically unsatisfactory way, 
they underestimate the effects of divided government.  To have a proper understanding 
of the causes of gridlock, divided government must be properly accounted for, and this 
study illustrates a means to accomplish this goal. 
Future Research 
 There are several ways that research on the consequences of polarization can be 
extended.  I will discuss three.  First, I discuss another area in the lawmaking process 
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that polarization is likely to have an impact, in congressional committees.  Second, I will 
discuss ways that research on polarization can be extended to cover a broader historical 
time period.  Finally, I will discuss ways that research on the impact of polarization can 
be extended to examining the quality of representation that Congress gives its 
constituents. 
 Though this study has looked at several key areas of the lawmaking process, it 
has not exhausted the possible ways that polarization could affect the lawmaking 
process.  One venue that has been left untouched is congressional committees.  It has 
long been known that committees are extremely important in the shaping of policy 
outcomes (Wilson 1911; Fenno 1973).  Committees are also partisan entities.  The 
parties choose who among their membership sits on which committee and under certain 
conditions parties expect loyalty to party aims by members of committees.  One of the 
objects of the congressional reforms by liberal House Democrats in the 1970s was 
bringing to heel conservative committee chairs and forcing committees to create 
legislation more in line with the desires of the party caucus (Rohde 1991). 
 Clearly, committees are partisan entities, and should be affected by polarization.    
One way to assess the effects of polarization on committees would be to determine 
whether a shift in polarization at the committee level changes the amount of significant 
legislation that is reported by a particular committee.  Committee polarization could be 
determined by measuring the ideological distance between the committee chair and the 
ranking minority member or between the median of the members of each party on the 
committee.   
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 Most legislation in Congress is referred to a committee, but never reaches the 
floor of either chamber.  A detailed understanding of the consequences of polarization 
on the institution of Congress needs to account for the fundamental institutional role that 
committees play.  A closer examination of committees would benefit the polarization 
literature specifically and the gridlock literature at large.  
 Moving to the issue of examining polarization over a longer historical interval, a 
great weakness of both the gridlock literature and the literature on the sources of 
polarization is the time bounds that researchers in these areas have artificially placed on 
their research.  I could find no study that tries to explore the causes of gridlock or of 
polarization that examines data prior to the 80th Congress in a comprehensive manner.  
There are some examples of work that examines partisanship in the electorate and in 
Congress.  These studies also look at the consequences this partisanship for the 
functioning of Congress.  One example is Brady’s (1978, 1988) work on critical 
elections that examines changes in Congress in the late 19th century and during the early 
1930s, but this research only examines the effects of certain key elections on policy 
outputs in Congress.  The American political development literature also examines 
partisanship in Congress for certain defined periods (see Jenkins, Schickler, and Carson 
2004; Jenkins and Nokken 2008).  However, there is no Congress by Congress 
examination of changes in polarization and its consequences prior to the 80th Congress 
like this study or the rest of the gridlock literature.        
 One reason for not going back farther than the 80th Congress is the absence of 
convenient data sources prior to the late 1940s.  In this study, a key data source, The 
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Congressional Quarterly Almanac, was not published prior to the 79th Congress.  There 
also would have been difficulties duplicating the methods used by Mayhew (1991) and 
Edwards, Barrett, and Peake (1997) in creating lists of significant legislation for time 
periods prior to the 80th Congress.  Yet data sources that extend farther back in time are 
becoming available.  For example, older editions of The Congressional Record are 
becoming more widely available in searchable electronic form.  These can be used to 
examine the legislative process in earlier Congresses when secondary sources are 
unavailable.  
 There is an incentive for researchers to undertake such a project.  An 
examination of polarization as measured by DW-NOMINATE scores (Poole and 
Rosenthal 1997) shows that congressional polarization was the norm from the end of 
reconstruction until the 1920s.  The decrease in polarization beginning in the late 1920s 
and 1930s is a digression from the norm, and the resurgence in polarization in the late 
1970s and early 1980s can be seen as a return to more typical levels of partisanship.  
This raises several important questions.  What caused the dip in polarization in the 1920s 
and 1930s?  How did the operation of Congress change during this period?  Does the 
current polarized Congress operate in the same way as the polarized Congresses before 
the dip?  If not, why are they different?  All of these questions could be answered if 
political scientists are willing to undertake the admittedly difficult task of examining 
pre-World War II data.      
 Finally, future research should look into the consequences of polarization in 
terms of the quality of representation Congress provides its constituents.  Congress is 
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both a lawmaking body and a representative body.  This study and the gridlock literature 
in general concentrate on the legislative function of Congress.  Polarization also 
potentially affects the representational function of Congress.  Future research along these 
lines will be made more complicated because of the normative implications involved in 
setting a standard for quality representation.  In particular, creating empirical measures 
for normative concepts of representation will prove challenging.     
 The standards of good representation have been discussed by normative theorists 
such as Burke (1999), Mill (1991), and Pitkin (1967).  These normative standards have 
been used, either explicitly or implicitly, to create empirical hypotheses for testing by 
researchers from Miller and Stokes (1963) to Stimson, MacKuen, and Erickson (1995).  
It is possible that the increase in polarization changed the representational relationship 
between members of Congress and their constituents.   
 Representation is a rare area where empirical research lends itself to normative 
interpretation.  Political theorists have created standards by which representation in a 
democracy can be judged.  Empirical political scientists have and can use these 
standards to assess the quality of representation in Congress.  If it can be shown that 
polarization has affected the representational relationship, we would have evidence of 
how polarization affects the democratic elements of the American system of 
government.  We will be able to assess whether or not politicians like Lee Hamilton 
(2008) are correct in their dire warnings about the impact of polarization on our system 
of representative democracy.       
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Concluding Remarks 
 Partisanship has become the bane of the American political system, at least in the 
rhetoric of contemporary pundits and political observers.  There is no end to the myriad 
of evils for which polarization has been blamed by the political class.  In recent years, 
politicians of all political stripes have campaigned for office on the basis of bringing 
bipartisan cooperation to government.  These campaigns implicitly lead the electorate to 
conclude that their dissatisfaction with government can be traced to ideological 
differences between the parties and the lack of cooperation these differences create.   
Social scientists cannot be satisfied with the gripes and campaign tactics of the 
political class.  Gaining a scientifically based and objective understanding of the 
consequences of polarization is essential for political scientists.  It was with this in mind 
that this study was undertaken.   
 The findings of this research indicate that polarization in terms of gridlock is not 
quite the boogie man that the pundits suppose.  The evidence indicates that under the 
right conditions polarization can increase policy innovation rather than slow it down.  
The true source of gridlock is divided partisan control of the executive and legislative 
branches of the government.  In times of unified party control polarization should allow 
for an increase in policy innovation. 
 The question is whether or not contemporary politicians are capable of taking 
advantage of the opportunity polarization potentially provides.  Since polarization began 
to increase in earnest in the 1980s, the two presidents who could have benefited from 
unified government under high polarization, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, have 
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both eventually faced opposition Congresses.  Can President Obama and future 
presidents take advantage of the opportunities for change polarization provides without 
losing control of Congress?  It all depends upon whether the electorate is willing to 
tolerate the extremes to which a unified and partisan government will want to go. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
LIST OF BILLS USED IN ANALYSIS 
 
80th Congress (1947-48) 
H J RES 296 Social Security 
HR 1 Income Tax Reduction 
HR 29 Anti-Poll Tax Bill 
HR 49 Hawaii Statehood 
HR 573 Department of Health, Education and Security 
HR 1237 Pesticides 
HR 2157 Portal to Portal Pay 
HR 2245 Repeal of Margarine Taxes 
HR 3203 Rent Control 
HR 3950 Second Tax Reduction Bill 
HR 4273 Equal Pay for Women 
HR 4278 Universal Military Training 
HR 4790 Tax Reduction 
HR 5666 Alaska Statehood 
HR 5673 Anti-Lynching Bill 
HR 5852 Mundt-Nixon Anti-Communist Bill 
HR 6227 DC Home Rule 
HR 6248 Agriculture Act of 1948 
HR 6481 Government Corporations 
S 110 Railroad Anti-trust Exemption 
S 418 Water Pollution 
S 472 Aid to Education 
S 526 Science Funding 
S 545 National Health Act 
S 758 Unification of Armed Forces 
S 814 Wool Price Controls 
S 866 Housing Bill 
S 938 Greek-Turkish Aid Bill 
S 984 Federal Fair Employment Practices 
S 1320 National Health Insurance 
S 1390 Labor Extension Service 
S 1556 Equal Pay for Women 
S 1774 Foreign Relief Bill 
S 1988 Tidelands 
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S 2062 Minimum Wage Increase 
S 2202 European Recovery Plan 
S 2242 Displaced Persons 
S 2622 Federalize National Guard 
S 2655 Selective Service 
S 2860 Anti-Lynching Bill 
S J RES 111 St. Lawrence Seaway 
S J RES 157 Anti-Inflation 
S J RES 167 Anti-Inflation 
   
81st Congress (1949-50) 
H J RES 238 Naturalization without Racial Discrimination 
HR 49 Hawaii Statehood 
HR 184 Department of Health, Education, and Security 
HR 331 Alaska Statehood 
HR 782 Establish Department of Welfare 
HR 1211 Trade Agreement Extension Act of 1949 
HR 1758 Natural Gas Act Amendment 
HR 2032 Labor-Management Relations Act 
HR 3199 Anti poll tax bill 
HR 4286 Columbia Valley Administration 
HR 4453 Fair Employment Practices Commission 
HR 4617 Veterans' Pensions 
HR 5345 Agriculture Act of 1949 
HR 5856 
Fair Labor Standards Act Amendment (Minimum Wage 
Increase) 
HR 5895 Mutual Defense Assistance Act 
HR 5992 Submerged Lands 
HR 6000 Social Security Act Amendments of 1949 
HR 6567 Commodity Credit Corp. Borrowing Authority 
HR 7797 Foreign Economic Assistance Act of 1950 
HR 8195 Postal Delivery Service Restoration 
HR 8920 Revenue Act 
HR 9176 Defense Production Act 
HR 9827 Excess Profits Tax 
S 75 Central Arizona Water and Power Project 
S 91 Anti-lynching Bill 
S 246 Educational Finance Act 
S 247 National Science Foundation 
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S 249 National Labor Relations Act 
S 706 Equal Pay for Equal Work 
S 1008 Basing Point Pricing 
S 1070 National Housing Act of 1949 
S 1160 Missouri Valley Authority 
S 1209 European Recovery Program 
S 1527 DC Home Rule 
S 1631 Columbia Valley Administration 
S 1679 National Health Insurance 
S 2213 Postmaster Appointments 
S 2319 Aid to Korea 
S 2912 Labor Unions Anti-trust 
S 3181 Housing and Rent Act of 1950 
S 3463 Railway Strike Bans 
S 4062 Universal Military Training 
  
82nd Congress (1951-52) 
HR 403 Racial Restrictions on Naturalization 
HR 1612 Trade Agreements Extension Act 
HR 2536 Saint Lawrence Seaway 
HR 3193 Disability Pension Increase 
HR 4473 Revenue Act of 1951 
HR 5678 Immigration, Naturalization, and Nationality Revision 
HR 5743 Hell's Canyon Project 
HR 5904 Universal Military Training and Service 
HR 7005 Mutual Security Act of 1952 
HR 7800 Social Security Increase 
S 49 Hawaii Statehood 
S 50 Alaska Statehood 
S 75 Central Arizona Water and Power Project 
S 719 Good Faith Pricing 
S 1140 Federal Department of Health 
S 1203 New Federal Judgeships 
S 1717 Defense Production Act 
S 1976 D.C. Home Rule 
S 2441 Universal Military Training and Service 
S 2594 Defense Production and Housing and Rent Amendments 
S 2999 Seizure of Vital Plants During Labor Disputes 
S 3368 Civil Rights, FEPC 
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S 3407 Permit Truman to Operate Steel Industry 
S J RES 20 Tidelands Leases 
S J RES 27 St. Lawrence Seaway 
 
83rd Congress (1953-54) 
HR 2545 Taft-Hartley Revisions 
HR 3575 Hawaii-Alaska Statehood 
HR 4198 Tidelands 
HR 4351 Niagara River Power 
HR 4449 Upper Colorado River Project 
HR 4663 First Independent Offices Appropriation 
HR 5134 Continental Shelf 
HR 6672 National Debt Limit 
HR 7839 Housing Redevelopment 
HR 8356 Health Re-insurance 
HR 8649 Wiretapping 
HR 9366 Social Security Extension 
HR 9474 Reciprocal Trade Extension 
HR 9678 Mutual Security Authorization 
HR 9709 Unemployment Compensation 
HR 9757 Atomic Energy 
S 1555 Upper Colorado River Project 
S 2150 Saint Lawrence Seaway 
S 2601 School Construction 
S 2650 Taft-Hartley Revisions 
S 3067 Secretary of State Reports on International Agreements 
S 3114 Health Re-insurance 
S 3706 Communist Control Act 
   
84th Congress (1955-56) 
H J RES 159 Formosa Policy 
HR 1 Reciprocal Trade Extension 
HR 3 State Sedition Laws 
HR 12 Farm Price Supports 
HR 627 Civil Rights 
HR 2535 Alaska-Hawaii Statehood 
HR 4259 Tax Reduction 
HR 4719 Hells Canyon Dam 
HR 6645 Natural Gas 
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HR 6888 Immigration Bill 
HR 7225 Social Security 
HR 7535 School Aid Bill 
HR 7886 Veterans' Pensions 
HR 9424 Anti-trust Revisions 
HR 10660 Highway Construction 
HR 11380 Postal Rates 
HR 11742 Public Housing 
S 1 Postal Service Pay Raise 
S 500 Colorado River Storage 
S 636 Campaign Finance Reform 
S 669 D.C. Home Rule 
S 1333 Hells Canyon Dam 
S 2126 Housing Act of 1955 
S 2168 Minimum Wage Increase 
S 2663 Depressed Areas 
S 3617 State Sedition Laws 
S 4050 Federal Employee Security Firing 
S 4146 Atomic Reactors 
   
85th Congress (1957-58) 
H J RES 117 President's Mideast Doctrine 
HR 1 School Construction 
HR 3 Preemption Doctrine 
HR 10 Self Employed Retirement Funds 
HR 49 Hawaii Statehood 
HR 6127 Civil Rights Act of 1957 
HR 7125 Technical Changes to Excise Tax 
HR 7383 Nuclear Insurance 
HR 7999 Statehood for Alaska 
HR 8525 Natural Gas 
HR 12065 Temporary Unemployment Compensation 
HR 12181 Mutual Security Act of 1958 
HR 12541 Defense Reorganization 
HR 12575 NASA Established 
HR 12591 Trade Agreements Extension Act 
HR 12695 Corporate and Excise Tax Extension 
HR 13067 Farm Surpluses for Food Stamps 
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HR 13247 National Defense Education  
HR 13254 Food Additives 
HR 13549 Social Security Amendments 
S 11 Price Discrimination in cosmetics, food, and drugs 
S 50 Hawaii Statehood 
S 555 Hell's Canyon Dam 
S 1411 Federal Employee Security Firings 
S 1451 Financial Institutions Act 
S 1846 D.C. Home Rule 
S 2150 Campaign Finance 
S 2646 Supreme Court Powers 
S 2792 Immigration Law Revisions 
S 3497 Community Facilities  
S 3778 Transportation Act 
S 3974 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act 
S 4035 Housing Act 
S 4036 Domestic Minerals Stabilization 
S 4071 Agriculture Bill 
S 4110 Communists Passports 
S J RES 162 Agriculture Price Supports 
 
86th Congress (1959-60) 
HR 3 Limits on Federal Courts Striking Down State Laws 
HR 5 Foreign Investment Incentive Tax 
HR 10 Self Employed Retirement Taxes 
HR 781 Department of Urban Affairs 
HR 3460 TVA Authorization 
HR 3610 Water Pollution 
HR 4267 College Construction 
HR 4957 Mallory Rule 
HR 7500 Mutual Security Act of 1959 
HR 7523 Tax Rates 
HR 7650 Veterans' Pensions 
HR 8121 Industrial Security 
HR 8601 Civil Rights 
HR 8678 Federal Highway Aid 
HR 9035 Savings Bonds Interest Rates 
HR 9069 Passports for Communists 
HR 9070 Common Site Picketing 
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HR 9883 Postal and Federal Employees Salary Increase 
HR 10128 School Construction 
HR 12261 Wheat Program 
HR 12677 Minimum Wage 
HR 13062 Dominican Sugar 
S 1 Federal Airport Grants 
S 8 Emergency Federal Assistance for School Construction 
S 50 Hawaii Statehood 
S 57 Housing Bill 
S 144 Rural Electrification Administration Functions 
S 722 Economic Redevelopment Loans 
S 812 Youth Conservation Corp 
S 1017 College Construction 
S 1138 Veterans' Benefits 
S 1555 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act 
S 1697 Economic Aid to Communist Countries 
S 2436 Clean Elections 
S 2539 Housing Bill 
S 2643 Common Site Picketing 
S 2759 Wheat Program 
 
87th Congress (1961-62) 
H J RES 636 Quality Stabilization Act 
HR 2010 Mexican Farm Labor Program Extension 
HR 3935 Fair Labor Standards Amendments (minimum Wage Increase) 
HR 4222 Medical Insurance for the Aged 
HR 4510 Emergency Feed Grain Program 
HR 4806 Temporary Extended Unemployment Compensation 
HR 4999 Medical Training Aid 
HR 6027 Social Security Amendments 
HR 7053 Mallory Rule 
HR 7300 School Assistance 
HR 7446 Tax Rate Extension 
HR 7500 Peace Corps 
HR 7576 Atomic Energy Commission Authorization 
HR 8429 Establish Department of Urban Affairs and Housing 
HR 8723 Welfare and Pensions 
HR 8890 Emergency Educational Funding 
HR 8900 College Aid Bill 
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HR 9118 Establish U.S. Arms Control Agency 
HR 10117 Unemployment Compensation 
HR 10144 Federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
HR 10264 Enlargement of House of Representatives 
HR 10682 Youth Conservation Corp 
HR 11040 Communications Satellites 
HR 11677 Equal Pay Act 
HR 11970 Trade Expansion 
HR 12479 Campaign Finance Reform 
S 1 Area Redevelopment 
S 174 Establish National Wilderness Preservation System 
S 204 Equal Time Rules 
S 349 Cold War G.I. Bill 
S 404 Youth Conservation Corp 
S 1021 School Assistance 
S 1633 Establish Department of Urban Affairs and Housing 
S 1643 Agriculture Act 
S 1740 Truth in Lending 
S 1983 Foreign Assistance 
S 1991 Manpower Development and Training 
S 2393 Extend Laws on Federal Aid to School Districts 
S 2750 Civil Rights Bill (literacy Tests) 
S 2768 United Nations Bonds 
S 2813 Wiretapping 
S 2965 Public Works Acceleration 
S 2996 Foreign Assistance 
 
88th Congress (1963-64) 
H J RES 247 Suspension of Equal Time Rule for 1964 Election 
HR 12 Health Professions Educational Assistance 
HR 1839 Beef Import Quotas 
HR 3669 Quality Stabilization 
HR 4955 Vocational Education Act 
HR 5130 Bank Deposit Insurance 
HR 6074 Shared Time Proposal 
HR 6143 Higher Education Facilities Grants 
HR 6196 Wheat-Cotton Subsidy 
HR 6518 Clean Air Act 
HR 7152 Civil Rights 
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HR 7351 Accelerated Public Works 
HR 7525 D.C. Crime Bill (Mallory Rule) 
HR 7700 Immigration Reform 
HR 7885 Foreign Assistance 
HR 9631 Federal Reserve Overhaul 
HR 9802 40 Hour Work Week/Overtime Protection 
HR 10088 Services for the Elderly 
HR 10222 Food Stamp Bill 
HR 11049 Federal Workers Salary Increase 
HR 11865 Social Security Amendments 
HR 11926 
Remove Supreme Court Jurisdiction Over State Legislature 
Reapportionment 
S 1 Youth Employment 
S 4 Wilderness Act 
S 6 Urban Mass Transit 
S 387 Deceptive Packaging Labels 
S 649 Water Pollution Control Amendments 
S 750 Truth in Lending 
S 1163 Area Redevelopment Amendments 
S 1321 National Service Corps 
S 1409 Equal Pay for Women Act 
S 1576 Community Mental Health Centers 
S 1658 Central Arizona Water and Power Project 
S 1666 Freedom of Information Bill 
S 1856 Accelerated Public Works 
S 1932 Immigration Reform 
S 1975 Gun Control 
S 2214 International Development Association 
S 2272 Stockpiling Strategic Materials 
S 2486 40 Hour Work Week/Overtime Protection 
S 2782 Appalachian Development Act 
S 3140 Aid to College Students 
S J RES 102 Rail Strike Arbitration Commission 
 
89th Congress (1965-66) 
HR 77 Right to Work Repeal 
HR 2362 Elementary and Secondary Education Act 
HR 2580 Immigration Bill 
HR 4347 Copyright Law Revisions 
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HR 4644 D.C. Home Rule Charter Board 
HR 4671 Upper Colorado River Project 
HR 5505 Congressional District Size 
HR 5688 D.C. Crime Bill 
HR 6675 Compulsory Health Insurance (Medicare) 
HR 6927 Establishment of HUD 
HR 7179 Department of Consumers 
HR 7750 Foreign Assistance 
HR 7984 Housing and Urban Development Act 
HR 8283 Economic Opportunity Amendments (Anti-poverty) 
HR 8371 Excise Tax Reduction 
HR 9567 Higher Education 
HR 10027 Common Site Picketing 
HR 10065 Equal Employment Opportunity Act 
HR 12047 Punishment for Aiders of Viet Cong 
HR 13103 Foreign Investors Tax 
HR 13712 Minimum Wage Increase 
HR 14765 Civil Rights 
HR 15111 Economic Opportunity Amendments (Anti-poverty) 
HR 15119 State Unemployment Standards 
HR 15317 Elections Reform 
HR 15963 Establish Transportation Department 
HR 17488 Veterans Pensions 
HR 17607 Investment Tax Credit 
S 3 Appalachian Regional Development Act 
S 4 Water Quality Act 
S 306 Clean Air and Waste Disposal Acts 
S 596 Heart Disease, Cancer, Stroke Grants 
S 985 Truth in Packaging 
S 1336 Administrative Procedure Act Revisions 
S 1446 National Wild Rivers 
S 1483 Establish National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities 
S 1564 Voting Rights Act 
S 1592 Gun Control 
S 2084 Scenic Highways 
S 2097 Lawsuits over Aid to Church Related Schools 
S 2275 Truth in Lending 
S 2934 Rural Community Development Districts 
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S 2947 Clean Water Restoration 
S 3005 Traffic Safety 
S 3009 Hospital Modernization 
S 3112 Clean Air Act Amendments 
S 3435 Elections Reform 
S 3848 Congressional Reform Bill 
S J RES 186 Airline Strike 
   
90th Congress (1967-68) 
HR 8 Punishment for Aiding Viet Cong 
HR 1400 Rural Electrification 
HR 2508 Congressional Districts Standards 
HR 2512 Patent Law Revision 
HR 2516 Civil Rights-Open Housing 
HR 4070 Tax Sharing 
HR 5386 Wiretapping 
HR 7659 Mid Decade Census 
HR 10943 Teacher Corps, Teacher Education 
HR 11000 Rat Control and Extermination  
HR 11233 Campaign Finance Reform 
HR 12144 Meat Inspection 
HR 15263 Foreign Assistance 
HR 15414 Income Tax Surcharge 
HR 16014 Agriculture Workers Strikes 
HR 16363 Wholesome Poultry Products 
HR 17735 Gun Control 
S 3 
Taxpayer Lawsuits Over Federal Aid to Church Related 
Institutions 
S 5 Truth in Lending  
S 355 Legislative Reorganization 
S 780 Air Quality 
S 827 Scenic Trails 
S 830 Age Discrimination 
S 928 Wiretapping 
S 1004 Central Arizona Water Project 
S 1155 Export-Import Bank 
S 1160 Corporation for Public Broadcasting 
S 1166 Natural Gas Pipeline Safety 
S 1760 Abolish Death Penalty 
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S 1872 Foreign Assistance 
S 1880 Election Reform 
S 2307 Constitution Conventions 
S 2973 National Agricultural Bargaining Act 
S 3132 Surface Mining Reclamation Act 
S 3206 Water Pollution 
S 3249 Jobs for Unemployed 
S 3418 Federal Aid Highway Bill 
S 3465 Equal Employment Opportunities 
S 3769 Higher Education 
S J RES 81 Railway Labor Dispute 
S J RES 175 Televised Presidential Debates 
 
91st Congress (1969-70) 
H J RES 1355 War Powers Resolution 
HR 514 Elementary and Secondary Education Act Amendments 
HR 1045 Private Pension Security 
HR 4148 Water Quality Act 
HR 4249 Voting Rights 
HR 6543 Ban on TV and Radio Cigarette Ads 
HR 9951 Unemployment Tax Collection 
HR 11102 Hospital Construction 
HR 12806 Preventive Detention 
HR 14001 Selective Service Reform 
HR 14465 Airport and Airway Development Act 
HR 14705 Unemployment Compensation 
HR 14931 Consumer Class Action Suits 
HR 15628 Foreign Military Sales 
HR 17070 Postal Reorganization 
HR 17123 Military Procurement Authorization 
HR 17255 Air Quality Standards 
HR 17550 Social Security 
HR 17654 Legislative Reorganization 
HR 17849 Rail Passenger Corporation 
HR 18429 Environmental Protection Act 
HR 18546 Agriculture Act 
HR 18582 Food Stamps 
HR 18583 Drug Abuse Prevention 
HR 18970 Trade 
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HR 19446 Elementary School Aid 
S 30 Organized Crime Control 
S 1075 Environmental Policy 
S 1830 Alaska Land Claims 
S 2060 Head Start 
S 2193 Occupational Safety and Health 
S 2453 Equal Employment Opportunities Enforcement 
S 2483 Federal/State Revenue Sharing 
S 2600 Preventive Detention 
S 2876 Campaign Finance- TV Advertising 
S 2917 Coal Mine Safety 
S 3154 Mass Transit 
S 3201 Consumer Class Action Suits 
S 3220 Sexually Oriented Mail 
S 3575 Environmental Protection Act 
S 3637 Equal Time Amendment 
S 3867 Manpower Training 
S 4297 National Health insurance 
S 4459 Consumer Protection Agency 
 
92nd Congress (1971-72) 
HR 1269 Private Pensions 
HR 1746 Equal Employment Opportunities Enforcement 
HR 3596 Transportation Strike Intervention 
HR 5408 Law Enforcement Revenue Sharing 
HR 6181 Manpower Revenue Sharing 
HR 6482 Strip Mining 
HR 6531 Military Draft 
HR 6962 Department of Community Development 
HR 7130 Minimum Wage Increase 
HR 8395 Rehabilitation Act 
HR 8414 Death Penalty Moratorium 
HR 8432 Emergency Loan Guarantees 
HR 9910 Foreign Aid Authorizations 
HR 10729 Pesticides 
HR 10835 Consumer Protect Agency 
HR 11453 Legislative Activities Disclosure 
HR 12202 National Health Insurance 
HR 12846 Military Drug Treatment 
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HR 13366 Cyclamate Compensation 
HR 13915 Equal Educational Opportunities 
HR 14153 Census 
HR 14370 General Revenue Sharing 
HR 15390 Social Security 
HR 16071 Public Works-Economic Development 
HR 16141 Tuition Tax Credits 
HR 16742 Foreign Travel Restrictions 
S 2 Private Pensions 
S 31 Emergency Public Service Employment 
S 382 Federal Election Campaign 
S 560 Transportation Strike Intervention 
S 575 Appalachian Regional Development 
S 632 Land Use Bill 
S 870 Federal Mass Transit Funding 
S 945 No Fault Insurance 
S 1087 Law Enforcement Revenue Sharing 
S 1243 Manpower Revenue Sharing 
S 1669 Education Revenue Sharing 
S 1828 National Cancer Act 
S 2007 Economic Opportunity Act Amendments 
S 2507 Gun Control 
S 2574 National Voter Registration 
S 2770 Water Pollution Control 
S 2891 Economic Stabilization Act Extension 
S 2956 War Powers 
S 3178 Equal Time Repeal 
S 3327 Health Maintenance Organizations 
S 3419 Consumer Product Safety 
S 3617 Child Development 
S 3818 Endangered Species 
S 3939 Federal Aid Highway Program 
S 3994 Safe Drinking Water 
   
93rd Congress (1973-74) 
H J RES 542 War Powers 
HR 2 Pension Reform 
HR 69 Elementary and Secondary Education Act Extension 
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HR 982 Employment of Illegal Aliens 
HR 5823 Education Revenue Sharing 
HR 5928 News Reporter's Privilege 
HR 6912 Dollar Devaluation 
HR 9142 Northeast Rail Reorganization 
HR 9286 Defense Procurement 
HR 10294 Land Use Planning 
HR 10710 Trade Reform 
HR 11104 Debt Limit 
HR 11333 Social Security Increase 
HR 11510 Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
HR 12471 Freedom of Information Act 
HR 12684 National Health Insurance 
HR 13834 Standby Energy Emergency Authority 
HR 14368 Energy Supply and Coordination 
HR 14449 Community Services 
HR 14747 Sugar Act Amendments 
HR 16596 Public Service Employment 
HR 16994 Savings Interest Tax Exemption 
S 1 Criminal Law Reform 
S 14 Health Maintenance Organizations 
S 352 Voter Registration 
S 354 No Fault Auto Insurance 
S 356 Consumer Warranties 
S 386 Urban Mass Transit 
S 394 Rural Electrification Loan Program 
S 398 Wage-Price Control Extensions 
S 424 National Resource Lands Management 
S 425 Strip Mining 
S 426 Toxic Substances Control 
S 597 New Judgeships 
S 707 Consumer Protection Agency 
S 1081 Alaskan Pipeline 
S 1319 Education Revenue Sharing 
S 1401 Capital Punishment 
S 1435 D.C. Home Rule 
S 1559 Comprehensive Employment and Training Act 
S 1868 Rhodesia Chrome Sanctions 
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S 1988 Ocean Fisheries Jurisdiction 
S 2432 Executive Privilege 
S 2589 National Energy Emergency (energy tax) 
S 2747 Minimum Wage Increase 
S 2776 Federal Energy Administration 
S 2994 Health Planning 
S 3044 Federal Election Campaign Financing 
S 3221 Outer Continental Shelf Oil leasing 
S 3585 Health Manpower Programs 
S 3830 Executive Agreements Veto 
S 4016 Watergate Tapes 
 
94th Congress (1975-76) 
H J RES 683 Sinai Agreement 
HR 15 Lobbying Law Amendments 
HR 25 Strip Mining 
HR 50 Full Employment 
HR 2559 Executive Level Pay Raises 
HR 3510 Land Use Bill 
HR 4222 School Lunch and Child Nutrition Programs 
HR 4296 Agriculture Act Amendments 
HR 4481 Emergency Job Bill 
HR 4485 Emergency Housing Assistance 
HR 5900 Common Site Picketing 
HR 6096 South Vietnam Assistance 
HR 6219 Voting Rights Act Extension 
HR 6222 National Health Insurance 
HR 6971 Fair Trade Laws 
HR 8401 Uranium Enrichment 
HR 8532 Antitrust Enforcement 
HR 8603 Postal Service 
HR 8617 Hatch Act (public Employees in Federal Campaigns) 
HR 9464 Natural Gas Deregulation 
HR 9771 Airport Development 
HR 10028 Catastrophic Health Insurance 
HR 10210 Unemployment Compensation 
HR 10481 Aid to New York City 
HR 10909 Ground Transportation Deregulation 
HR 11193 Gun Control 
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HR 11453 Public Service Jobs 
HR 11552 National Voter Registration 
HR 12048 Congressional Regulatory Veto 
HR 12175 Social Services Block Grants 
HR 12196 Education Block Grants 
HR 12233 Health Block Grants 
HR 12438 Weapons Procurement 
HR 13501 Medicare/Medicaid Revisions 
HR 13555 Mine Safety and Health 
HR 14232 Ending Federal Aid for Abortion 
HR 14262 Defense Spending/ B-1 Bomber 
HR 14553 Busing 
S 1 Criminal Code Revisions 
S 22 Copyright Law Revisions 
S 50 Full Employment 
S 200 Agency for Consumer Protection 
S 249 Securities Act Amendments 
S 287 Federal District Judgeships 
S 354 No Fault Auto Insurance 
S 495 Watergate Reforms 
S 507 Land Management Policies 
S 622 Energy Policy and Conservation Act 
S 846 Military Aid to Turkey 
S 961 200-Mile Fishing Zone 
S 2150 EPA Hazardous Waste 
S 2255 Patent Law Revision 
S 2310 Emergency Natural Gas 
S 2387 Oil Company Divestiture 
S 2470 Catastrophic Health Insurance 
S 2662 Foreign Military Aid 
S 2718 Railroad Reorganization 
S 2925 Sunset Legislation 
S 2929 Ground Transportation Deregulation 
S 3065 Federal Election Law  
S 3084 Export Administration Act Revisions 
S 3091 Forest Management 
S 3136 Food Stamps 
S 3137 Health Block Grants 
 151 
S 3149 Toxic Chemicals Controls 
S 3197 Domestic Wiretapping 
S 3201 Public Works Jobs 
S 3219 Clean Air Act Amendments 
 
95th Congress (1977-78) 
H J RES 638 Extension of Time to Ratify ERA 
HR 2 Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act 
HR 10 Hatch Act Amendments 
HR 15 Elementary and Secondary Education Act 
HR 39 Alaska Lands 
HR 50 Full Employment Act 
HR 1037 Cargo Preference 
HR 3199 Water Pollution Control 
HR 3744 Minimum Wage 
HR 4018 National Energy Act- Public Utility Rates-CPEP 
HR 4250 Common Site Picketing 
HR 5037 Energy Conservation-CPEP 
HR 5146 Coal Conversion-CPEP 
HR 5263 Energy Tax Incentives-CPEP 
HR 5285 Hospital Cost Controls 
HR 5289 Natural Gas Pricing-CPEP 
HR 5400 Election Day Voter Registration 
HR 5885 Waterway User Fees 
HR 6655 Community Development Block Grants 
HR 6782 Emergency Farm Aid 
HR 6805 Consumer Protection Agency 
HR 8309 Waterway User Fees 
HR 8410 Labor Law Reform 
HR 8494 Lobby Disclosure 
HR 8729 Airline Noise Control 
HR 9030 Welfare Reform 
HR 9346 Social Security Financing 
HR 9937 Carson City Silver Dollars/ Textile Tariffs 
HR 10929 Weapons Procurement Bill 
HR 11315 Campaign Finance Bill 
HR 11488 National Health Insurance 
HR 11942 Civil Antirust Lawsuits 
HR 12050 Tuition Tax Credits 
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HR 12736 Social Security Tax Rollback 
HR 12928 Public Works Water Policy 
HR 12931 Foreign Aid Bill 
HR 13048 No Fault Auto Insurance 
HR 13611 Child Health Assessment Program 
HR 13750 Sugar Stabilization Act 
S 2 Sunset Bill 
S 555 Ethics in Government 
S 926 Public Funding of Congressional Races 
S 991 Establishment of Education Department 
S 1072 Election Day Voter Registration 
S 1381 No Fault Auto Insurance 
S 1392 Child Health Assessment Program 
S 1613 Magistrate Act of 1978 (Diversity Jurisdiction) 
S 1874 Civil Antirust Lawsuits 
S 2084 Welfare Reform 
S 2493 Airline Deregulation 
S 2640 Civil Service Reform 
S 3075 Military Aid Bill 
S 3100 Elimination of Supreme Court Mandatory Review 
 
96th Congress (1979-80) 
H J RES 521 Selective Service Funding-Draft 
HR 39 Alaska Lands 
HR 111 Panama Treaties Implementation 
HR 1197 Ship Tonnage (Strip Mining Rider) 
HR 2172 Sugar Bill 
HR 2313 Federal Trade Commission Authorization 
HR 2479 Taiwan Relations 
HR 2626 Hospital Cost Control 
HR 2977 Domestic Violence 
HR 3919 Windfall Profits Tax 
HR 4395 Lobby Disclosure 
HR 4904 Welfare Reform 
HR 4962 Child Health (Medicaid) 
HR 4986 Banking Regulation 
HR 5200 Fair Housing Act Amendments 
HR 5829 Tax Cuts (attached to private bill) 
HR 5860 Chrysler Loan Guarantees 
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HR 5980 Countercyclical Aid 
HR 6081 Central American Aid 
HR 6233 Criminal Code Revision 
HR 7020 Hazardous Waste Disposal (Superfund) 
HR 7112 Revenue Sharing 
S 2 Sunset Legislation 
S 114 Federal Death Penalty 
S 210 Education Department 
S 450 Supreme Court Jurisdiction/ School Prayer 
S 562 Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
S 662 International Development Bank 
S 760 National Health Insurance 
S 932 Defense Production Act/ Synthetic Fuels 
S 1308 Energy Mobilization Board 
S 1309 Food Stamps 
S 1722 Criminal Code Revision 
S 1724 Home Energy Assistance 
S 1946 Railroad Deregulation 
S 2147 Regulatory Reform 
S 2153 OSHA Restrictions 
S 2189 Nuclear Waste Policy 
S 2245 Trucking Deregulation 
 
97th Congress (1981-82) 
H J RES 521 Nuclear Arms Freeze 
HR 1635 Tuition Tax Credit 
HR 2289 Eliminate Department of Education 
HR 3112 Voting Rights Act Extension 
HR 3809 Nuclear Waste Policy Act 
HR 4331 Minimum Social Security Benefits 
HR 5133 Automobile Domestic Content Requirements 
HR 5252 Clean Air Act Rewrite 
HR 5427 Freedom Broadcasts to Cuba 
HR 6250 Job Creation Bill 
HR 6267 Depository Institutions Act 
HR 6590 Tobacco Program Revisions 
HR 6838 Soviet Economic Sanctions 
HR 6954 Department of Defense/Joint Chiefs Reorganization 
HR 7397 Caribbean Basin Initiative 
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S 114 Federal Death penalty 
S 509 Milk Price Supports 
S 995 Antitrust Law Revisions 
S 1080 Regulatory Reform Act 
S 1503 Standby Petroleum Allocation Act 
S 1629 TV and Radio Regulation Reduction 
S 1630 Criminal Code Revision 
S 1821 Eliminate Department of Education 
S 2036 Job Training 
S 2172 Cable TV Regulation 
S 2222 Immigration Reform 
S 2372 Anti-abortion Bill 
S 2590 Clean Water Act Rewrite 
S 2631 Product Liability Damage Limits 
 
98th Congress (1983-84) 
H J RES 13 Nuclear Freeze 
H J RES 308 Debt Limit Increase 
H J RES 364 Multinational Forces In Lebanon 
HR 999 American Conservation Corp 
HR 1010 Coal Pipeline Act 
HR 1183 Tax Rate Equity Act (tax caps) 
HR 1234 Auto Domestic Content Requirement 
HR 1652 Reclamation Dam Safety 
HR 1904 Child Abuse Amendments 
HR 1983 Emergency Housing Act 
HR 2544 Public Works Job Creation 
HR 2973 Interest and Dividend Tax Withholding 
HR 3021 Unemployment Health Insurance 
HR 3385 Dairy Production Stabilization 
HR 3706 Martin Luther King, Jr. Holiday 
HR 4072 Agricultural Programs Adjustment 
HR 4102 Universal Telephone Service 
HR 4230 Export Administration Act 
HR 4616 Motor Vehicles Safety 
HR 5314 Clean Air Act 
HR 5490 Civil Rights 
HR 5640 Superfund Expansion 
HR 5916 Banking Deregulation 
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S 44 Product Liability Limits 
S 55 Broadcast Deregulation 
S 66 Cable Communications Policy Act 
S 121 Trade Department 
S 431 Clean Water Act 
S 529 Immigration Reform and Control Act 
S 663 Sodbuster Soil Conservation 
S 768 Clean Air Act 
S 774 FOIA Overhaul 
S 1715 Natural Gas Deregulation 
S 1764 Exclusionary Rule Limitation 
S 1765 Capital Punishment 
S 1917 Broadcast Freedom (Equal Time) 
S 2181 Banking Deregulation 
S 2496 Education Amendments 
S 2649 Safe Drinking Water 
 
99th Congress (1985-86) 
HR 1 Housing Act 
HR 99 American Conservation Corp 
HR 281 Construction Labor Law Amendments 
HR 700 Civil Rights (Grove City) 
HR 1096 African Relief/Farm Credit 
HR 1400 Federal to Local Government Revenue Sharing 
HR 1460 Anti-Apartheid Act 
HR 1562 Textile Import Quotas 
HR 1616 Plant Closing Notification 
HR 2005 Superfund Reauthorization 
HR 2100 Farm Programs Reauthorization 
HR 2369 Family Planning Assistance 
HR 2482 Pesticide Control Reauthorization 
HR 3008 Federal Pay Equity 
HR 3622 Joint Chiefs of Staff Reorganization 
HR 4300 Family and Medical Leave Act 
HR 4759 Intelligence Authorization 
HR 4868 South Africa Sanctions 
HR 5050 Social Security Amendments 
S 43 Line Item Veto 
S 47 School Prayer 
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S 49 Firearm Owner's Protection 
S 100 Product Liability Overhaul 
S 655 Campaign Finance (Attached to Unrelated Bill) 
S 1128 Clean Water Act 
S 1200 Immigration Reform and Control Act 
S J RES 71 MX Missile Procurement 
S J RES 283 Aid to Nicaraguan Rebels 
S J RES 316 Saudi Arms Sale 
 
100th Congress (1987-88) 
H J RES 444 Contra Military Aid 
HR 1 Clean Water Act Reauthorization 
HR 27 FSLIC Rescue 
HR 442 Japanese-American Internment Reparations 
HR 1115 Product Liability 
HR 1154 Textile and Apparel Trade Act 
HR 1157 Farm Disaster Assistance 
HR 1158 Fair Housing 
HR 1414 Nuclear Insurance Amendments 
HR 1580 South Africa Sanctions 
HR 2470 Catastrophic Health Insurance 
HR 2939 Independent Counsel Law 
HR 3054 Clean Air 
HR 3396 Rehiring of Former Air Traffic Controllers 
HR 3400 Hatch Act Revision 
HR 3436 Long Term Health Care 
HR 3601 ANWR Oil Drilling 
HR 3651 Arms Sales to Terrorist Nations 
HR 3660 Better Child Care 
HR 3822 Covert Action Limitation 
HR 3966 Children's Television Programs 
HR 5043 Lobbying Restrictions 
HR 5337 Iraq Sanctions 
S 2 Senate Campaign Finance 
S 508 Whistleblower Protections 
S 557 Civil Rights Restoration Act 
S 742 Fairness In Broadcasting 
S 825 Housing and Community Development 
S 837 Minimum Wage Restoration 
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S 1721 Intelligence Oversight 
S 1886 Bank Deregulation 
S 1894 Clean Air 
S 2214 ANWR Oil Drilling 
S 2455 Death Penalty for Drug Related Killings 
S 2488 Parental Leave 
S 2749 Military Base Closings 
S J RES 194 War Powers Compliance 
S J RES 243 Contra Military Aid 
S J RES 305 Persian Gulf Escorts 
 
101st Congress (1989-90) 
HR 20 Hatch Act Revisions 
HR 467 Brady Handgun Bill 
HR 486 Defense Production Act 
HR 770 Family and Medical Leave Act 
HR 1278 Savings and Loan Restructuring 
HR 1465 Oil Spill Liability 
HR 1750 Contra Aid 
HR 2710 Minimum Wage Increase 
HR 2712 Chinese Students 
HR 3368 Whistleblower Protection 
HR 3402 Aid to Poland and Hungary 
HR 3628 Capital Gains Tax Cut 
HR 3660 Government Pay and Ethics Package 
HR 3847 Department of Environmental Protection 
HR 4328 Textile Trade Act 
HR 4653 Export Control Act Amendments 
HR 4825 NEA Authorization 
HR 4939 China Trade Status 
HR 5267 Cable TV Regulation 
HR 5400 Campaign Finance Overhaul 
HR 5855 Enterprise for America Initiative 
HR 5932 Educational Excellence and Equity Act 
S 436 Whistleblower Protection 
S 566 Housing Programs Reauthorization 
S 594 Administrative Law Judge Corps 
S 684 ANWR Oil Drilling 
S 695 Education Programs 
 158 
S 874 Motor Voter Bill 
S 933 Americans with Disabilities Act 
S 1236 Brady Handgun Bill 
S 1400 Product Liability 
S 1430 National Service Act 
S 2104 Civil Rights Act 
S J RES 113 FS-X Plane Development 
   
102nd Congress (1991-92) 
H J RES 77 Use Of Force Against Iraq 
HR 5 Striker Replacement 
HR 7 Handgun Waiting Period 
HR 25 Abortion on Demand 
HR 429 Western Water Bill 
HR 776 National Energy Policy 
HR 918 Mining Law Overhaul 
HR 2164 Line Item Veto 
HR 2212 Conditional MFN for China 
HR 2507 National Institutes of Health Reauthorization 
HR 2929 California Desert Protection 
HR 2950 Surface Transportation Reauthorization 
HR 3030 Product Liability 
HR 3160 OSHA Overhaul 
HR 3435 RTC Financing 
HR 3807 CFE Treaty Implementation 
HR 4210 Tax Bill 
HR 4547 Russian Aid 
HR 4718 D.C. Statehood 
HR 4899 Old Growth Forest Protection 
HR 5100 Trade Bill 
HR 5249 Independent Social Security Administration 
HR 5260 Extended Unemployment Benefits 
S 2 Elementary and Secondary Education 
S 3 Campaign Finance 
S 5 Family and Medical Leave Act 
S 12 Cable Television Reregulation 
S 25 Abortion on Demand 
S 173 Baby Bells Antitrust 
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S 250 National Motor Voter Registration 
S 323 Family Planning Amendments 
S 433 Mining Law Overhaul 
S 533 EPA Cabinet 
S 543 Bank Reform 
S 640 Product Liability 
S 1128 Arms Proliferation Sanctions 
S 1722 Unemployment Benefits Extension 
S 1745 Civil Rights Act  
S 1936 Health Care Reform 
S 2532 Aid to Former Soviet Republics 
S 2766 Lobby Disclosure 
 
103rd Congress (1993-94) 
HR 1 Family and Medical Leave 
HR 2 Motor Voter Registration 
HR 5 Striker Replacement 
HR 25 Freedom of Choice 
HR 322 Mining Law Overhaul 
HR 1025 Brady Bill (Gun Control) 
HR 1804 School Improvement (Goals 2000) 
HR 1845 National Biological Survey 
HR 2010 National Service 
HR 3392 Safe Drinking Water Act Reauthorization 
HR 3400 Spending Cuts and Government Restructuring 
HR 3425 Department of the Environment 
HR 3450 NAFTA Implementation 
HR 3626 Telecommunications Regulations 
HR 3800 Superfund Reauthorization 
HR 3948 Clean Water Act  
HR 4604 Entitlement Spending Control 
HR 5110 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
S 3 Campaign Finance 
S 21 California Desert Protection 
S 25 Freedom of Choice 
S 349 Lobbying Disclosure 
S 636 Freedom of Access to Abortion Clinics 
S 687 Product Liability 
S 714 Resolution Trust Corporation 
 160 
S 1114 Clean Water Act  
S 1834 Superfund Reauthorization 
S 2019 Safe Drinking Water Act Reauthorization 
 
104th Congress (1995-96) 
HR 4 Welfare Overhaul 
HR 7 National Security 
HR 927 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity 
HR 956 Product Liability Overhaul 
HR 961 Clean Water Act Revisions 
HR 1058 Shareholder Lawsuits 
HR 1617 Job Training Overhaul 
HR 1627 Pesticide Regulations 
HR 1833 Abortion Procedures 
HR 2128 Affirmative Action 
HR 2500 Superfund Overhaul 
HR 2520 Banking Glass-Steagall Repeal 
HR 2606 Bosnia Troop Deployment Prohibition 
HR 2854 Farm Bill 
HR 3103 Health Insurance Revisions 
HR 3448 Small Business Tax Package/Minimum Wage 
HR 3820 Campaign Finance Overhaul 
S 1 Unfunded Mandates 
S 2 Congressional Compliance 
S 4 Line Item Veto 
S 21 Bosnian Arms Embargo 
S 440 National Highway Systems 
S 652 Telecommunications 
S 735 Anti-Terrorism  
S 1060 Lobbying Disclosure 
S 1085 Affirmative Action 
S 1219 Campaign Finance Overhaul 
S 1260 Public Housing 
S 1285 Superfund Overhaul 
S 1635 National Missile Defense 
S 1936 Nuclear Waste Storage 
S 2056 Sexual Orientation Non-Discrimination 
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105th Congress (1997-98) 
HR 1 Overtime Pay 
HR 2 Public Housing System Overhaul 
HR 3 Juvenile Crime 
HR 6 Higher Education Reauthorization 
HR 10 Financial Services Overhaul 
HR 478 Endangered Species Act Flood Waivers 
HR 655 Electricity Deregulation 
HR 867 Foster Children Adoption 
HR 1119 Defense Authorization 
HR 1122 Abortion Procedure Ban 
HR 1534 Private Property Rights 
HR 1984 Block EPA Clean Air Regulations 
HR 2183 Campaign Finance Overhaul 
HR 2400 Transportation Equity Act 
HR 2631 Line Item Vetoes 
HR 2644 Caribbean and Central American Trade 
HR 2646 Education Savings Accounts 
HR 2676 Internal Revenue Service Overhaul 
HR 2746 Private School Vouchers 
HR 3000 Superfund Overhaul 
HR 3150 Bankruptcy Overhaul 
HR 4250 Managed Care Regulations 
S 8 Superfund Overhaul 
S 104 Interim Nuclear Waste Repository 
S 621 Electricity Deregulation 
S 648 Product Liability 
S 830 FDA Overhaul 
S 981 Federal Rule Making 
S 1150 Food Stamps for Illegal Immigrants 
S 1269 Fast Track 
S 1415 Tobacco Restrictions 
S 1601 Cloning Ban 
S 1723 Skilled Workers Visas 
S 1768 IMF Funding 
   
106th Congress (1999-2000) 
HR 4 Anti-Missile Defense 
HR 8 Estate Tax Repeal 
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HR 117 Independent Counsel 
HR 417 Campaign Finance Overhaul 
HR 775 Y2K Liability 
HR 800 Education Flexibility 
HR 975 Steel Imports 
HR 1000 FAA Reauthorization 
HR 1283 Asbestos Liability 
HR 1300 Superfund Overhaul 
HR 1501 Juvenile Justice 
HR 1995 New Teachers and Training Programs 
HR 2260 Physician Assisted Suicide 
HR 2415 Bankruptcy Overhaul 
HR 2418 Organ Procurement 
HR 2436 Criminal Penalties for Harming a Fetus 
HR 2488 Tax Reconciliation 
HR 2614 Tax Cut Package 
HR 2723 Managed Care Patient Protection 
HR 3846 Minimum Wage 
HR 4444 China Trade 
HR 4680 Prescription Drugs 
HR 4762 Campaign Finance Disclosure 
HR 4810 Alleviate Marriage Penalty 
S 761 Electronic Signature Authorization 
S 900 Financial Services Overhaul 
S 1090 Superfund Overhaul 
S 1134 Education Savings Accounts 
S 1287 Nuclear Waste Storage 
S 1297 Independent Counsel 
S 1344 Managed Care Revisions 
S 1692 Abortion Procedure Ban 
S 2071 Electricity Deregulation 
S 2796 Florida Everglades Restoration 
S 2962 MTBE 
 
107th Congress (2001-02) 
H J RES 114 Use of Force- Iraq 
HR 1 ESEA Reauthorization (No Child Left Behind) 
HR 4 Energy Plan 
HR 7 Faith Based Imitative 
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HR 333 Bankruptcy Overhaul 
HR 586 Permanent Tax Cuts 
HR 1542 High Speed Internet Access 
HR 1619 Investment Tax Cut 
HR 2213 Supplement Agriculture Subsidies 
HR 2356 Campaign Finance Overhaul 
HR 2505 Human Cloning Ban 
HR 2563 Patients' Rights 
HR 2646 Farm Bill 
HR 2926 Airline Bailout 
HR 3009 Trade Promotion Authority (Andean Trade) 
HR 3162 Anti-Terrorism Authority (Patriot Act) 
HR 3210 Terrorism Insurance 
HR 3295 Election Overhaul 
HR 3448 Bioterrorism Defense 
HR 3762 Employee Pensions 
HR 3763 Corporate Accountability Act 
HR 4737 Welfare Renewal 
HR 4954 Prescription Drug Coverage 
HR 5005 Homeland Security Department 
S 149 Export Control Law 
S 812 Drug Patients 
S 1052 Patients' Rights 
S 1447 Airport Security 
S J RES 6 Objection to Ergonomics Rule 
S J RES 23 Use of Force- War on Terror 
 
108th Congress (2003-04) 
HR 1 Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit 
HR 2 Tax Reductions 
HR 4 Welfare Reauthorization/Minimum Wage 
HR 5 Medical Malpractice 
HR 6 Energy Policy 
HR 1036 Gun Liability 
HR 1115 Class Action Lawsuits/Minimum Wage 
HR 1298 AIDS Funding for Africa 
HR 1308 Family and Corporate Tax Breaks 
HR 1904 Forest Thinning 
HR 1997 Fetal Protection 
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HR 2115 FAA Reauthorization 
HR 2210 Head Start Reauthorization 
HR 2427 Importation of Prescription Drugs 
HR 2557 Water Projects 
HR 3030 Community Service Block Grants 
HR 3161 Do Not Call Registry 
HR 3550 Surface Transportation 
HR 4341 Postal Service Reform 
HR 4496 Vocational Training 
HR 4520 Corporate Tax Overhaul 
HR 5005 Disaster Relief 
S 3 Partial Birth Abortions 
S 1920 Bankruptcy 
S 2062 Class Action Lawsuits 
S 2370 Minimum Wage 
S 2468 Postal Service Reform 
S 2686 Vocational Training 
S 2845 Intelligence Overhaul 
 
109th Congress (2005-06) 
HR 3 Surface Transportation Reauthorization 
HR 4 Pension Overhaul 
HR 6 Energy Policy 
HR 8 Estate Tax Permanent Repeal 
HR 9 Voting Rights Act Reauthorization 
HR 810 Embryonic Stem Cell Research 
HR 3045 CAFTA 
HR 3100 Arms Sales to China 
HR 3199 Patriot Act Reauthorization 
HR 3645 Katrina Relief 
HR 3824 Endangered Species Act Reauthorization 
HR 4297 Tax Reconciliation 
HR 4772 Eminent Domain 
HR 4954 Port Security 
HR 4975 Lobbying and Ethics Overhaul 
HR 5252 Telecommunications Overhaul 
HR 5682 U.S.-India Nuclear Agreements 
HR 5825 Warrantless Wiretapping 
HR 6061 Border Fencing 
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HR 6111 Oil Drilling in Gulf of Mexico/Trade Measures 
HR 6407 Postal Service Reform 
S 5 Class Action Overhaul 
S 256 Bankruptcy Overhaul 
S 397 Gun Liability 
S 403 Parental Notification (Abortions) 
S 686 Schiavo Medical Care 
S 852 Asbestos Trust Fund 
S 2349 Lobbying and Ethics Overhaul 
S 2611 Immigration Overhaul 
S 3930 Military Tribunals 
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APPENDIX B 
 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
 This appendix contains tables of descriptive statistics for all variables in the 
models of this study.  The tables are broken down by the key independent variables in 
the first table and the control and dependent variables by chapter.  If a variable was used 
in more than one chapter it is in the table for the first chapter in which it appears. 
Table B.1 
Descriptive Statistics for the Primary Independent Variables 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum 
Value 
Maximum 
Value 
Congressional Polarization 0 0.12 -0.22 0.30 
Congressional Divided Government 0.61 0.49 0 1 
Congressional Polarization * 
Divided Government 0.001 0.09 -0.22 0.23 
     
House Polarization 0 0.13 -0.18 0.33 
House Divided Government 0.59 0.49 0 1 
House Polarization * Divided 
Government -0.003 0.09 -0.18 0.24 
     
Senate Polarization 0 0.11 -0.25 0.27 
Senate Divided Government 0.53 0.5 0 1 
Senate Polarization * Divided 
Government 0 0.08 -0.18 0.24 
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Table B.2 
Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in Chapter III  
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum 
Value 
Maximum 
Value 
Presidential Position 0.29 0.83 -1 1 
Presidential Approval at 
Introduction 55.4 12.5 22.2 88 
Change in Presidential Approval -2.57 11.4 -49 30.7 
1st Year, 1st Term 0.16 0.37 0 1 
1st Year, 2nd Term 0.17 0.37 0 1 
Presidential Election Year 0.14 0.35 0 1 
President Running for Reelection 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Midterm Election Year 0.16 0.37 0 1 
Ideological Distance 0.57 0.36 0.004 1.41 
 
 
 
 
Table B.3 
Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in Chapter IV 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum 
Value 
Maximum 
Value 
Congress Models     
Presidential Victories 0.64 0.48 0 1 
President Support 0.53 0.5 0 1 
Polarization * Presidential 
Support -0.004 0.09 -0.22 0.30 
Divided Government * 
Presidential Support 0.27 0.44 0 1 
Divided Government * 
Presidential Support* 
Polarization -0.001 0.06 -0.22 0.23 
     
House Model     
Presidential Victories 0.61 0.49 0 1 
     
Senate Model     
Presidential Victories 0.59 0.49 0 1 
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Table B.4 
Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in Chapter V 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum 
Value 
Maximum 
Value 
Congress Model     
Bill Becomes Law 0.49 0.50 0 1 
President Takes a Position 0.78 0.41 0 1 
President Position * Polarization -0.002 0.11 -0.22 0.30 
President Position * Divided 
Government 0.47 0.50 0 1 
President Position * Polarization * 
Divided Government 0.003 0.08 -0.22 0.23 
Time to Congress Closes 434 190.9 2 719 
     
House Model     
Bill Passes House 0.63 0.48 0 1 
President Takes a Position 0.78 0.41 0 1 
President Position * Polarization -0.003 0.12 -0.18 0.33 
President Position * Divided 
Government 0.45 0.50 0 1 
President Position * Polarization * 
Divided Government -0.001 0.08 -0.18 0.24 
Time to Congress Closes 394.5 194.8 1 719 
Majority Party 0.78 0.42 0 1 
Majority Party Size 58.6 5.04 50.8 67.8 
Majority Party Cohesion 71.3 7.95 60.2 88.7 
     
Senate Model     
Bill Passes Senate 0.58 0.49 0 1 
President Takes a Position 0.78 0.41 0 1 
President Position * Polarization -0.001 0.08 -0.25 0.27 
President Position * Divided 
Government 0.42 0.49 0 1 
President Position * Polarization * 
Divided Government 0.001 0.07 -0.25 0.24 
Time to Congress Closes 384.1 199.3 1 717 
Majority Party 0.72 0.45 0 1 
Majority Party Size 56.8 5 50 68 
Majority Party Cohesion 65.6 9.10 52.2 87.7 
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